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Preface
This work was inspired by my doctoral research at the University of Glasgow 
which raised a number of interesting questions about the states of the Baltic Sea 
region and the Former Soviet Union and their relationship to, and engagement 
with, the European Union as well as the broader constructions of Europe and 
the geopolitical categories of East and West. During my studies I developed 
a keen interest in the Baltic region and Estonia in particular. I was interested 
in why the Baltic states, and especially Estonia, progressed so rapidly towards 
EU membership whilst other EU aspirant countries appeared to lag behind. 
These developments also raised questions regarding identity construction in 
the context of the return to Europe of post-communist countries. It was during 
this time that international image came to be used by national governments as 
they sought integration into various European geopolitical power structures 
such as the EU and the Council of Europe. How were these elite level discourses 
on image received by the population as a whole within the context of alleged 
“plural society” states, home to ethnically diverse populations? My interest in 
these issues dovetailed with my own personal interest in the phenomenon of 
nation branding as well as events such as the Eurovision Song Contest, which I 
first started attending in 2000. My personal engagement and experience of the 
event meant that I saw first-hand the scale of the production and the signifi-
cance of the event for a number of countries. Whilst the volume of literature 
on nation branding and also the ESC are steadily increasing, detailed empirical 
studies remain few and far between.
This book would not have been possible without numerous individuals who 
deserve my thanks. First and foremost I would like to thank David Smith at the 
University of Glasgow, who was the supervisor for my PhD and has always sup-
ported and encouraged me in my work. It has been a privilege working under 
his guidance and expertise. I would also like to thank the editorial team at the 
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University of Tartu Press, in particular the series editor Eva-Clarita Pettai, 
who not only provided me with this opportunity to publish my work, but also 
gave excellent advice during the writing process and invested much time and 
energy (and patience!) during the editorial process – tänan teid väga! A special 
thank you to Lea Kreinin for her Estonian language tuition and enthusiasm 
towards my research. I would also like to express my gratitude to Göran Bolin, 
Per Ståhlberg, Nikolas Glover and Louis Clerc for their stimulating conversa-
tions and ideas about nation branding. I have been incredibly fortunate to have 
worked with some truly inspiring people during my doctoral research and dur-
ing the writing of this book. I would like to thank the respondents who took 
time to be interviewed for this work and who, in many cases, put me in touch 
with other people of interest. In Tallinn I would like to thank my colleagues at 
Estonian Television, Enterprise Estonia, the Estonian Institute and in Kyiv I 
would like to thank CFC Consulting. Though I owe much to their knowledge 
and expertise, any shortcomings or mistakes in this work remain mine alone. 
In particular I would like to thank my colleagues at the Eurovision Research 
Network; Karen Fricker, Phil Jackson and Brian Singleton – I will always be 
grateful for your encouragement and enthusiasm (gin and Fanta anyone?). I 
have also met some fantastic people through attending the Eurovision Song 
Contest who have always been so supportive of my work as ‘Dr Eurovision’ and 
who have gone onto become firm friends outside the bubble of the contest. On a 
personal note I thank my non-Eurovision friends who I am sure have, at times, 
grown tired of my discussions concerning the ESC! Special mention goes to my 
friend Susan Forster who, while we may not always see eye to eye, has always 
been on my side and was a source of great support during my formative years 
and continues to be a dear friend. I think Marion would be very proud of us. 
Last but certainly not least, my thanks go to my parents Betty and Tommy for 
all their support and encouragement (emotional and financial!) as well as to 
my sister Kate and her husband Phil for their love, support and endless cups 
of tea! Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to my niece and nephew, Izzy 
and Evan, who never fail to make me smile. 
Introduction
The primary aim of this book is to offer a new perspective on current debates 
concerning the relationship between nation and state as well as the political 
management of international image in today’s Europe through an examina-
tion of the debates on nation branding and the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). 
More specifically, it aims to examine the implications that these concepts and 
practices have for broader questions relating to European integration and the 
nation state. This work aims to advance critical thinking about contemporary 
nation branding and its relationship to, and influence on, nation building. This 
will be done with particular focus on the role that the Eurovision Song Contest 
has played in illuminating the more salient issues of European identity politics. 
Until recently, this has been an area which has lacked scholarly attention. This 
book aims to fill the gap.
The conceptual framework proposed here links modern forms of nation 
branding with broader issues of nation building and identity politics in the 
post-Soviet context. At the centre of this will be the Eurovision Song Contest 
(ESC) and its emerging role as a platform for especially post-communist nation 
branding. A thorough examination of the particular Estonian case as well as 
a later comaparative analysis of two other cases, one post-Soviet, the other 
Western, will further strengthen the key arguments of this study that nation 
branding and indeed the ESC are far from innocuous and an analysis of the 
key debates that they engender reveals interesting insights into nation and state 
building processes. The book also contextualises the ESC and demonstrates 
that while it continues to be seen as a piece of light entertainment, the conflicts 
and tensions played out on the Eurovision stage reveal much about the con-
structed nature of both national and European identities. It is argued in this 
book that the emergence of nation branding as a tool in redefining national 
image is evidence that we do not live in a post-nationalist world. While the 
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body of literature on nation branding and indeed the ESC is steadily growing, 
there have been few studies that use extensive empirical data from different 
cases in the field. 
As the Soviet Union dissolved and newly independent states emerged from 
its ruins, many of the successor states looked to an uncertain and unpredictable 
future. The particular geopolitical and economic context of post-Soviet com-
munism in which state independence was restored makes the Estonian case 
study especially interesting and unique. The restoration of independence in 
1991 made the country keen to project and build its image on the world stage. 
Estonian victory in the Eurovision Song Contest in 2001 came at a decisive 
moment in EU accession negotiations and the government launched a nation 
branding strategy, Welcome to Estonia: Positively Transforming, in order to 
capitalise on the publicity gained through hosting the ESC in 2002. In much 
of the current literature on nation branding, states and nations are viewed as 
similar to goods which can have a brand attached to them. However, in the 
case of the nation (as a political community and social entity) this brings into 
focus questions of power such as who decides/purports to speak on behalf of 
the nation? How does this fit in with the notion of popular sovereignty which 
is supposedly at the heart of the national project? Branding a nation is thus 
inevitably a more fraught project than the branding of commercial goods. It 
is especially so when the brand, so to speak, is a work in progress within the 
context of a rhetorical and institutional Return to Europe. 
This book seeks to problematise the relationship between nation branding 
and nation building. In the Estonian case, a country with diverse popula-
tions, with differing understandings of national identity and recent history, 
the building of both national solidarity and the national brand were orches-
trated simultaneously. I argue that this created a tension that allows us to better 
understand how both concepts are connected. The launch of Brand Estonia 
took place within the specificities of the rhetorical and institutional return to 
Europe. It is therefore interesting to observe how these tensions and difficulties 
have been represented in terms of projecting an external image of the country 
and its identity to a wider global audience. The question of how these issues 
have been negotiated lies at the heart of this book. 
As noted earlier, the book pays particular attention in this context to the 
role of the Eurovision Song Contest and the way in which this event contributes 
to the nation branding process as well as wider identity politics, especially, but 
not only, among the young nation states that emerged from the rubbles of the 
Soviet Union. As will be shown in the later discussion, the ESC represents a 
Introduction
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shared sense of viewership, a sense of togetherness as part of a viewing rou-
tine of ritual. This apparent sense of community therefore allows individuals 
to imagine a real connection with other members of different nation states. 
The ESC can be considered to be a symbol within European popular culture 
in that it forms a traditional ritual in television broadcasting, it has become 
to use Eric Hobsbawm’s famous term, an “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm, 
2002, p. 142). Public events, whether they are a ceremony commemorating 
war dead, a national holiday or large-scale international competitions, foster 
identity building. Whilst the ESC continues to be criticised for the quality of 
the songs and alleged partisan voting, it still attracts large viewing figures and 
the debates that the contest engenders have reflected or even shaped attitudes 
towards what it means to be European. Eurovision has therefore become a site 
of identity creation and an event where cultural struggles over the meanings 
of identity are constructed and contested. An examination of the ESC offers a 
unique opportunity to explore where countries see themselves in the interna-
tional system; participating countries have used the contest to project certain 
images of themselves on the European stage, and shape how they are perceived 
by their European others and by themselves (Jones & Subotic, 2011, p. 544). 
Participation in the ESC is therefore a declaration of Europeanness (Jordan, 
2011, p. 21) whilst the event has itself become a symbol signifying Europe itself 
(Fornäs, 2012, p. 189). The EU flag is arguably one of the more recognisable 
symbols in Europe today. Whilst Billig (1995) argues that many such symbols 
are often overlooked, Eglitis asserts that the power of symbols should not be 
underestimated, particularly in the context of newly independent nations. She 
makes reference to the return to Europe discourses which became a “symbolic 
landscape” and reflected “the power of space and place” (Eglitis 2002, p. 183). I 
argue that the Eurovision Song Contest has been used by participating nations 
in the same way; it is an event which many post-communist nations entered fol-
lowing the collapse of state socialism, some of which lie outwith the traditional 
boundaries of Europe, in order to present a certain narrative of nationhood to 
the international audience. Events such as the Eurovision Song Contest have 
an effect on how people conceive what Europe is about or what it means to be 
European. However a struggle remains over the identification of Europe and 
Europeanness, this is played out through the ESC.
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Methodology
Research that aims to scrutinise any part of identity can only be an inexact 
process. Identities are dynamic. The methodology used to investigate issues 
such as national identity needs to be appropriate and an awareness of the 
potential limitations of the research design is necessary. The use of qualitative 
interview research, as done in this study, continues to be a subject of debate; 
it has been asserted that the data gathered using qualitative methodology is 
hardly distinguishable from journalism (Strauss, 1998, p. 28). Yet, the value of 
qualitative interviews lies in the fact that they place emphasis on the way in 
which individuals interpret their social reality; interviews capture and decon-
struct meanings attached to social phenomena by particular actors at specific 
moments in time. They therefore add an invaluable additional perspective to 
the study of identity construction and the meanings attached to such identities. 
This empirical work is primarily based on an analyses of perspectives from 
“above”, namely the viewpoints of political figures, opinion leaders and indi-
viduals involved in the development of Brand Estonia and the Eurovision Song 
Contest. The aim is to ascertain what visions of the national political commu-
nity or nation state were propagated by elites in the country. The elite level can 
loosely be defined as politicians, journalists and opinion leaders. Among the 
people interviewed as part of my original research were Mart Laar, the former 
Prime Minister of Estonia, Signe Kivi, Minister of Culture in Laar’s govern-
ment and Evelin Ilves, who was the manager of the Brand Estonia campaign 
and is the current First Lady. Moreover, other respondents were drawn from a 
large sample using a snowballing technique, an established method for sam-
pling and in this case, the only practical means of gaining access to these elites. 
Yet, the elite-level provides only one perspective. Much of the recent lit-
erature on issues of nationhood and nationalism in the post-Soviet region has 
stressed the need to examine issues at the “ordinary” level. Rogers Brubaker, in 
his work on Transylvania (2006, p. xiv), argues that a perspective from “below” 
is needed if we are to truly understand the nature of identity processes in these 
countries:
Ethnicity and nationalism could best be understood if studied from below as 
well as above, in microanalytic as well as macroanalytic perspective. From a 
distance it is all too easy to “see” bounded and homogenous ethnic and national 
groups, to whom common interests, perceptions, intentions and volition can be 
attributed. Up close, on the other hand, one risks losing sight of the larger con-
texts that shape experience and interaction. The study of large- and mid-scale 
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structures and processes remains indispensible, but I came to believe that it 
must be complimented by research pitched at a level close to everyday experi-
ence if one is to avoid unwarranted assumptions of “groupness” and capture 
the way ethnicity actually “works.” 
In following Brubaker’s assertion, the elite-level data collected for this book 
was therefore complemented with insights “from below”, acquired through 
another set of in-depth interviews with members of the public in Estonia. 
These included students, pensioners and civil servants, for example. Ideally a 
randomised sample would have been used so that bias may be reduced, since 
interviewees are likely to suggest like-minded people. However, given that I 
was working in isolation in the field at the time, a fully randomised sample was 
not feasible. I therefore used my extensive network to facilitate access to public 
level respondents. Given my arguably curious status as an outsider, living and 
studying in Estonia at the time, people were keen to meet with me and public 
level access was straightforward. In order to ensure that I had access to a wide 
range of people of different ages, backgrounds and locations, I also advertised 
for respondents in universities in Tallinn and Tartu as well as local meeting 
places in Narva. This not only meant that the risk of bias was reduced; it also 
provided a unique and different perspective since the majority of respondents 
from Narva were Russian speakers. This then allowed me to examine the inher-
ent tensions that nation branding in Estonia has engendered. All interviews 
were carried out in 2007/2008 and designed to allow the respondent to give as 
much of their opinion as possible in order to allow some flexibility and scope 
to bring in new ideas and angles.
In total, 78 interviews were conducted over a period of nine months. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed. In a minority of cases respond-
ents requested that their views be not recorded. This was upheld. In these 
cases, detailed notes were made and the use of email contact became very 
important. Email was a quick and effective method for confirming quotes and 
clarifying points made in interviews which were not recorded. In addition to 
interviews, I also analysed a variety of print and online media. This provided 
an important insight into media discourses concerning the image of Estonia 
and the Eurovision Song Contest. The two Estonian national daily newspa-
pers, Postimees and Õhtuleht were used alongside official documents from the 
archives of Estonian Television. All Estonian language sources were translated 
by a native Estonian speaker. 
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The major strength of this work lies in the range of interviews that I con-
ducted in person, with key political figures and decision makers behind both 
Brand Estonia and the Eurovision Song Contest. The public level respondents 
provide a more nuanced perspective. Nonetheless, I do not claim that these 
views are entirely representative of the views of the Estonian public. The main 
intention of this research was to examine the nature of debates concerning 
nation branding at an elite level. The select views of the public, therefore, pro-
vide but a snapshot of perspectives from the ground, views of a particular 
subject, at a specific point in time. These interviews highlighted significant 
disparities between the elite and the public level respondents and as such pro-
vide a unique insight into the way the Estonian national image is constructed, 
articulated and contested through both nation branding and the Eurovision 
Song Contest.
Structure of the book
The Modern Fairy Tale explores the ways and means in which nation branding 
practices were used to promote an image of Estonia at a specific moment in 
the country’s history; the run-up to EU accession. The next chapter provides 
a theoretical background on nation branding and the contemporary debates 
in the field. In particular, this chapter problematises the relationship between 
nation branding and nation building with nation branding being dependent on 
certain political discourses. In the Estonian case, the development and launch 
of Brand Estonia coincided with a wider process of nation and state building 
in a post-Soviet context.
Chapter two provides an in-depth analysis of Brand Estonia, launched by 
the Estonian government in 2002 to capitalise on the publicity garnered from 
hosting the Eurovision Song Contest. It describes the political context in which 
Brand Estonia was launched. The chapter explores the nature of the debates 
that the campaign engendered through interviews with key figures involved in 
the project and analyses the messages behind the campaign images.
Chapter three describes the way in which the Eurovision Song Contest has 
come to be used by host nations as a platform for nation branding. It details the 
history of the competition and provides an analysis of the event in a post-Cold 
War context. Through a series of case studies it argues that whilst the ESC is 
officially a non-political event, it is inherently politically charged and as such 
Introduction
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has the capacity to illuminate wider debates on nationhood and nationalism 
in Europe today.
Chapters four and five are devoted to an analysis of the Eurovision Song 
Contest in Estonia. The Estonian case study has much to teach us about the 
way in which national identity is both articulated and contested. It also serves 
as an empirical reminder that nationalist politics remains a potent force in 
an EU accession context, intruding on even the most unlikely situations; the 
Eurovision Song Contest. 
Chapter six, using mainly secondary literature, provides a comparative 
afterthought to the empirical Estonian chapters. Using two case studies, 
Ukraine and Finland, it explores the discourses on nationhood and national 
identity that the Eurovision Song Contest has engendered. In particular it 
examines the nature of the debates concerning Ukraine’s staging of the 2005 
event and provides a rich insight into the nature of the Orange Revolution and 
accompanying debates on nation and state building. It also explores the role 
that the ESC has played in terms of constructing and articulating national 
identity in Finland since the Cold War. 
1. Nation building and nation branding  
in the post-Soviet context 
Rogers Brubaker in his much acclaimed Reframing nationalism argues that the 
fundamental question concerning nation building is not “what is a nation?” but 
“how is nationhood as a political and cultural form institutionalised within 
and among states?” (Brubaker, 1996, p. 16) Immediately after the collapse of 
state communism in Eastern Europe, governments of successor states were to 
concern themselves with new state formation and nation-building. As part of 
the process of constructing new state institutions, the political elites in the 
region attempted to gain legitimacy for their own claims to power, by invoking 
a particular vision of what constitutes the nation. How the various republics 
would negotiate their newly found sovereignty and identities was unclear as they 
sought to renegotiate their geopolitical positions in a post-communist, post-
Soviet context. National and ethnic identities were re-forged, and in many cases, 
integration into wider European institutions such as the European Union was 
sought. This return to Europe discourse was prevalent throughout the Baltic Sea 
region and manifested itself across diverse spheres of society from the political 
level to the sphere of popular culture. Part of the process of constructing “the 
nation” involves establishing the state within the wider geopolitical context, 
asserting the state on the world stage. One of the ways in which nation states 
have done this is to engage in nation branding and image building initiatives. 
Nation branding, the phenomenon by which governments engage in self-
conscious activities aimed at producing a certain image of the nation state 
(Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2010, p. 82), can be understood as a commercial practice 
which has emerged since the end of the Cold War as a means for a nation state 
to redefine and reposition itself within the master narrative of globalisation 
(Jansen 2008). In the case of Estonia, the launch of a nation branding campaign 
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coincided with the wider process of nation and state building following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of independence. I argue that 
nation building and nation branding, both distinctly different, were orches-
trated simultaneously in Estonia and that this created a tension. In Estonia, 
the nation state or brand, to use the term loosely, was a work in progress and 
the creation of it took place within the specificities of the rhetorical and insti-
tutional return to Europe. This chapter, by way of an introduction to the main 
case study, explores nation building in the post-Soviet context and its relation-
ship to, and influence upon, nation branding. 
Imagining the nation
A debate on nation branding raises many questions concerning the identity 
and legitimacy of the nation state since they are modern fictions with clear 
political intentions disguised as ancient myths but without any old mytho-
logical background (Fornäs, 2011, p. 18). Discussions concerning national 
identity and statehood in turn poses the question of what a nation actually 
is. Benedict Anderson famously described the nation as an “imagined com-
munity”, a construction of the post-industrial age. Anderson argues that the 
nation is imagined since members of even the smallest nation will never know 
most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion (2006, p. 6). In order to 
keep a state together in the modern world populations have a shared feeling of 
belonging, bound together by loyalty toward the same institutions, symbols 
and values. However as Pål Kolstø argues, creating a common identity does not 
necessarily imply that all inhabitants of the nation state must have the same 
ethnic identity. National identity may, and in many cases, must be political 
rather than cultural (Kolstø, 1999, p. 1). Discourses on nation building set 
the agenda for inclusion or exclusion from a particular nation state. Titular 
citizens of ethnic states hold membership automatically through their ethnic 
affiliations, whereas citizens from non-titular groups can be seen as (more or 
less explicitly) members of a second order (Kolstø, 2002, p. 106). Some argue 
that nation states are not natural entities; “they clothe and enclose an existing 
or developing political and economic framework” (Grillo, 1980, p. 8). Keane 
(1995, p. 182) sheds further light on this issue by arguing that, historically, the 
nation did not refer to the whole population of a region but only to those classes 
which had developed a sense of identity based upon language and history and 
had begun to act upon this. 
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If the nation is constructed then logic dictates that national identity is too. 
National identity “infuses citizens with a sense of purposefulness, confidence 
and dignity by allowing them to ‘feel at home’” (Keane 1995, p. 186). A nation 
is a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and 
historical memories, a mass public culture as well as a common economy and 
common legal rights and duties for all members (A.D. Smith, 1999, p. 12). What 
constitutes a national identity in a country that consists of populations with 
differing understandings and interpretations of recent history, language and 
culture is therefore problematic. Arguing with many of the modernist theorists 
that national identity is constructed, I also assume that it is a learned attribute. 
What is it that makes someone Scottish, Irish, British or Estonian? As such 
identities can be contested. Whilst there is inevitably a tolerance of difference, 
that difference or diversity is only tolerated if it does not compromise or threaten 
the sense of self of the titular population, or their ownership of the nation. As 
the Soviet Union disintegrated, it forced changes in the political space and the 
identities within the new Soviet successor states. The rediscovery of the national 
self represents a symbolic break from the past which in turn aids the develop-
ment of the new independent state. As in other Soviet successor states, after 
the passage to independence, ruling elites embarked on a process of forging 
a national identity by (re)constructing the discursive boundaries of nation-
hood (Wolczuk, 2000). Nation building in the post-Soviet region was therefore 
fraught with tensions, complexities and contradictions.
History and language are potent tools for political elites in nation states, that 
otherwise seek to legitimise and secure dominance of the titular nationality in 
the political sphere. Those who share the same language and understandings 
of the past would be included in the imagined community of the nation whilst 
those who do not would be, to varying degrees, excluded. If we take Linz and 
Stepan’s argument, the dominant, titular nationality comes to be privileged in 
state symbols and institutions. They argue that a nation state is a state in which 
the dominant nation’s language becomes the only official language and the only 
acceptable language for state business and education, the religion of the nation is 
privileged and the culture of the dominant nation is enshrined in state symbols 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996) Effectively, nation building represents a state-controlled 
means of socialisation. These practices are evident in all states, something 
which is often overlooked in literature relating to the so-called “new Europe”. 
Western European discourses concerning nation building and nationalism in 
Eastern Europe are often Orientalist. George Schöpflin highlights the tendency 
to see Western European nations and nationalism as intrinsically “good” and 
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Eastern as “nasty and brutish”, terming it “Hans Kohnism” (Schöpflin, 2000, 
p. 4). According to Daina Eglitis (2002, p. 8), “every epoch produces its own 
notions and understandings of social change and the transformation of the East 
European and post-Soviet space is no exception.” Multiple identities play a role 
in discourses surrounding national identity, particularly in the territories of the 
Former Soviet Union as well as within narratives of nationalism more generally. 
Taras Kuzio (2001) and Stefan Auer (2004) highlight that different definitions 
of “nationalism” and levels of inclusion and exclusion are a phenomenon in all 
societies, both East and West. The recent debates concerning the independ-
ence referendum in Scotland exemplify this. Daina Eglitis (2002) and David 
Smith (2001) have highlighted the role of the European institutions such as the 
Council of Europe and the European Union in “normalising” ethnic relations 
in newly restored states. Given the various nation building practices which have 
prevailed since the early 1990s, the region can be characterised as a region of 
“living nationalism.” The narrative of the nation is rarely so straightforward 
and this work exemplifies the more salient discussions concerning nationhood 
and national identity in the post-Soviet and Baltic Sea regions. Nation brand-
ing effectively brings questions concerning nationhood and belonging to the 
foreground of the debate, even though this is never the aim of such campaigns. 
These tensions lie at the heart of this book. 
Nation building in the Baltic Sea Region
The collapse of communism in Europe led to a massive political, economic 
and social paradigm shift. In the case of the Former Soviet Union, state build-
ing was intrinsically linked with nationhood and competing discourses on 
national identity. After 1991 some 25 million Russian speakers found them-
selves residing outside the borders of the Russian Federation. During Soviet 
rule the demographics of the Baltic states changed dramatically. For exam-
ple, in Estonia, in 1945, ethnic Estonians constituted 94% of the population. 
However, as a result of the continuous immigration of Russian speakers into 
Estonia from other parts of the Soviet Union, the share of ethnic Estonians fell 
to 61% by 1989 (D. Smith, 2001, p. xxiii). Russian became increasingly spoken 
across the republic with large majority of ethnic Estonians proficient in Russian 
whilst only 12% of non-Estonians were fluent in the titular language (Trapans, 
1991, p. 77). Essentially this led to polarisation in society as well as growing 
resentment amongst Estonians that the nation was under threat. 
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The rejection of the Soviet past is consistent with discourses in the Baltic 
states that depict the Soviet period as illegal and as representing an artificial 
separation of these countries from their Western European neighbours (A. 
Smith, 2000, p. xi). For political elites in these republics Soviet rule and the 
presence of a sizeable Russian speaking population living within the state came 
to be viewed through the prism of post-colonialism. Such narratives had a pro-
found effect on nation building practices in the region and essentially meant 
that issues of national identity and belonging became contested and politicised. 
This construction of the other in relation to the Russian speaking minority 
affected the very foundation of the nation and state building processes taking 
place in the region. Political elites drew upon elements of historical justice to 
enact restrictive citizenship laws, and effectively othered the country’s Russian 
speaking minority. This rhetoric of the other arguably under-pinned many of 
the policies implemented by successor governments in various Former Soviet 
Republics, namely Estonia and Latvia. This was particularly the case in terms 
of the (restrictive) citizenship and language laws enacted in both these states.
Nation building in the Baltic Sea region in the 1990s represented the com-
petition for power in which various national elites sought to naturalise their 
own particular model of state institutions and gain legitimacy for their own 
claims to power. They did this by invoking a particular vision of what consti-
tutes the national political community and by propagating this amongst the 
population through speeches, interviews and within the wider media to create 
an “imagined community”, to use Anderson’s term, amongst the state’s popu-
lation. Politicians drew on various cultural raw materials such as language, 
ethnicity and religion. This satisfied the cultural dimension of the nation build-
ing project. In terms of citizenship, political elites effectively set the stage for 
deciding who belongs to the nation state at the legal level. Language was a 
key to this part of the nation building process and the implementation of one 
official state language can be seen as a way of distancing the countries from 
the Soviet past. Knowledge of the official language of the republic became a 
key requirement in the process of obtaining citizenship. Language therefore 
became a powerful tool in the renegotiation of state and citizenship boundaries, 
essentially establishing who belonged to the political community and who did 
not. Nation building practices in post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia in particu-
lar can be categorised as processes of de-Sovietisation where political elites 
effectively removed physical symbols from the Soviet era, dissolved previous 
political institutions and replaced them with new national symbols (G. Smith, 
1998, p. 13), providing a new normality. Normality in this context represented 
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anything which was “not Soviet” or “not Communist” (Eglitis, 2002, p. 8). 
Eglitis goes further to examine the concepts of spatial and temporal normal-
ity. The former represents the location of transformation. In the Baltic case, 
this meant orientation towards Western Europe. Eglitis argues that notions of 
normality are intrinsically linked with security and prosperity and that this 
was said to have been found in the process of returning to Europe. Eglitis cites 
the apparent rush to join European institutions and structures such as the EU 
and NATO, which may offer the desired economic and security guarantees 
which were sought, as proof of this (Ibid., p. 18). Eglitis’ concept of temporal 
normality, on the other hand, suggests more nationalistic undertones since it 
emphasises restoration of the infrastructure of the interwar republics. This 
narrative highlights the danger of integration of Russian speakers rather than 
the perils of non-integration. Whilst spatial normality depicts Russia as the 
other, in the sense that NATO membership is a goal in order to attain security 
guarantees, it recognises the possible dangers posed by the non-integration of 
Russian speaking minorities (Ibid., p. 17). However the propagation of normal-
ity failed to take account of the fact that the Europe of which the Baltic states 
were a part of before World War II had changed (D. Smith 2001 p. xiii). This 
would later bring its own challenges for Estonia and Latvia in particular, which 
had to come to terms with the Soviet past and a large resident Russian minority 
whilst at the same time aspired to join the EU, an organisation that emphasised 
respect for minority rights. The return to Europe discourse also suggests that 
since Soviet rule was illegal, so too was the presence of Russian speakers who 
had immigrated to the republics during that time.
In the case of the Baltic states, both the East and Soviet rule represent the 
other; a period of captivity (Neumann, 1999, p.162). Othering did not just man-
ifest on the legal level, it impacted upon the speeches of political elites. In 1989, 
Estonian politician Tiit Made was quoted in a Swedish newspaper as saying 
that Russian people were “untamed and wild and tended to spread like a blob 
over every territory they can find” (Neumann, 1999, p. 107). Such language 
invokes an image of Russian speakers in Estonia as colonisers, uncivilised and 
untrustworthy. The other is not a straightforward paradigm however, there are 
several others which are functional at the same time and are not constructed 
in wholly negative terms. Pille Petersoo (2007, p. 129) highlights that otherness 
of Baltic Germans continues today although they are not seen as a threat to 
Estonian identity while post-WWII Russian speaking immigrants to Estonia 
are. Similarly, in Estonia, the similarities between the Finnish and Estonian 
languages tend to be highlighted while the differences between both languages 
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and Russian are flagged. The role of the other therefore serves to flag both dif-
ference and commonality in a bid to affirm a collective sense of identity. Merje 
Kuus (2004, p. 484) argues that since the EU and NATO have expanded, to 
include many post-communist nations, rather than diminishing boundaries, 
they are effectively reinforced; the other is therefore re-inscribed. This rhetoric 
has manifested strongly in the discourses surrounding the expansion of the 
Eurovision Song Contest and will be discussed in chapter three. 
Nation branding in context 
In today’s globalised world, one important part of guaranteeing sovereignty and 
stability, building up viable economic structures, and ensuring state legitimacy 
is to expand international links and attract inward investment. To do this, the 
country first has to be known on the map and have the reputation of a reliable 
partner. In this context nation branding campaigns and popular culture media 
events such as the Eurovision Song Contest have significance attached to them, 
especially by the newly-sovereign nations as they seek to negotiate their position 
on the world stage. On the surface, nation branding might seem benign, another 
manifestation of marketing in a globalised world. However, I argue in this book 
that nation branding upholds the nation state as the primordial marker of iden-
tity. This then raises questions concerning ownership of that identity. Nation 
branding is an exercise in the sale of the nation state and the commodification 
of national identity and with this come questions, particularly where nation 
branding coincides with the process of nation building. 
The origins of nation branding can be traced back to the late nineteenth 
century world fairs and international exhibitions which drew large crowds 
keen to witness the staging of national culture (Aronczyk, 2013, p. 4). Most 
typically, nation branding is used to promote tourism, foreign investment and 
boost exports (Dinnie, 2008, p. 7). Nation branding essentially communicates 
a nation’s policies and culture to an international audience; the public face of 
international diplomacy. The logic behind nation branding is that every nation 
is a brand and as such it can be strategically marketed in order to attract inward 
investment and improve the overall image of a country. Moreover, in addition 
to the key goals of attracting tourists, stimulating investment, and boosting 
exports, nation branding can also have further reaching effects. Thus some 
claim that the process can help restore international credibility, increase cur-
rency stability and therefore investor confidence as well as even consolidating 
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nation building itself (Dinnie, 2008, p. 17). Nation branding can be seen as 
a manifestation of soft power. Where military force or economic sanctions 
represents a hard form of power, soft power relates to attitudes and influence 
over others, cultural persuasion (Nye, 2003, p. 545). This is exactly what nation 
branding aims to do. Nation branding represents a desire by the countries con-
cerned to make people want to pay attention to their particular nation state, 
their achievements as well as building belief in its qualities. As a practice it 
seeks to manage the image and reputation of a country and help consumers, 
namely the wider public, differentiate between and identify within countries. 
Nation branding operates in the same way that traditional public relations 
does in that it is a practice which is undertaken by governments to persuade 
the overseas public, investors, partners, employees, and other stakeholders to 
maintain a certain point of view about a nation state (Aronczyk, 2008, p. 42).
Nation branding is largely undertaken by a narrow, elite group of consul-
tancy agencies, the majority of which are based in the UK. Melissa Aronczyk 
(2013, p. 12) claims that this is no coincidence since the expert knowledge 
and knowledge experts related to nation branding reflect a deep-rooted and 
on-going paternalism, as well as a very particular idea of the terms of condi-
tions of “global nationalism.” In recent years the cause of nation branding 
has been championed by individuals such as Simon Anholt, who argues that 
lesser known emerging nations have no other option but to use soft power, 
namely nation branding (Anholt, 2005, p. 13). Anholt goes as far to say that 
the demands of a globalised economy mean that nations need branding and 
that it is a process in which states have little choice in:
So much of the wealth of nations in the globalised economy derives from each 
country’s ability to export branded goods, and because so much of the wealth 
to survive and prosper now comes from the “added value” of branded goods 
and services, the competitivity of nations and the branding of countries is the 
only way forward; it has become an immutable law of global capitalism [...] 
whether we like it or not, the international promotion of each country’s culture 
is essential for the renewal and regeneration of culture [...] demand must be 
created for culture as products (Anholt, 2005, p.140). 
Whilst Anholt has undoubtedly made a significant contribution to the field of 
nation branding, his work should not be read uncritically since he has a vested 
interest in promoting nation branding as a successful initiative and continues 
to profit from this. Anholt has certainly been successful in generating business 
for his consultancy activities and he continues to advise national governments 
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on their nation branding strategies.1 He appears to have won the argument that 
smaller countries need to “punch above their weight” through culture, image 
and branding; cases such as Ireland exemplify this. It was in this context that 
Enterprise Estonia launched their Brand Estonia campaign with the slogan, 
Welcome to Estonia: Positively Transforming, to capitalise on the publicity that 
Estonia garnered from hosting the Eurovision Song Contest in 2002. 
The lines defining nation branding are somewhat blurred however, when 
governments contract private firms to develop and propagate their nation 
brand. This is something which nation branding consultants such as Anholt shy 
away from. Whilst nation branding as a phenomenon is attracting an increased 
amount of scholarly attention, much of the existing literature has been written 
by those involved in the industry themselves. While there has been some stud-
ies which have been written from a critical viewpoint, the conflicting narratives 
of branding a nation have often been forgotten. Whilst nation branding is an 
internationally-focussed phenomenon, it is a practice which has the capacity to 
illuminate the more salient narratives of national identity and, in some cases, 
reflects the nationalist rhetoric of politicians. Moreover, the perspective of the 
public living in the states that are engaged in the process of nation branding 
has all too often been neglected. Despite the lack of theoretical agreement on 
nation branding, it remains a process in which governments continue to buy 
into. In the past decade dozens of countries have launched nation branding 
campaigns. Advertisements on international channels such as BBC World and 
CNN for Incredible India, Amazing Azerbaijan and Malaysia’s Truly Asia, are 
not uncommon. All have followed the same pathway with stakeholders from 
the government and private sector involved in brand development.
Nations are not homogenous entities and nation branding effectively sug-
gests that a particular state can be marketed as such. If the nation can be 
understood as a public space then using marketing techniques from the pri-
vate sphere, such as branding, to promote a particular image of the nation is a 
provocative undertaking. If we take Sue Curry Jansen’s argument that “nation 
branding transforms national identity into intellectual property” (2008, p. 121), 
an inherent tension between nation branding and nation building emerges. As 
Bolin and Ståhlberg state:
If yesterday’s nation builders were able to focus on building social solidarity, 
this is hardly possible today when the nation also has to be branded for global 
1  See www.simonanholt.com for a list of current work.
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attraction (or consumption). The two logics of nationalism and nation branding 
exist simultaneously. The question is to what extent these two logics compete 
or reinforce each other […] what happens when the logics of nation branding 
and nationalism are blurred? (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2010 p. 97). 
Nation branding transforms a civic image such as the flag, something which 
belongs to all, and revered by many, into something calculated and therefore 
contested. Nation branding can be a particularly fraught process particularly 
where international image is concerned. India is one such example of a country 
which has engaged in the process of nation branding in order to manage its own 
international image on its own terms. Brand India, with the slogan Incredible 
India, was developed with two aims in mind; to market India as an international 
tourist destination and to promote the country as an option for trade and invest-
ment (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2010). Brand India was a controversial initiative within 
the country itself since it promoted the country internationally as a rising super-
power despite it being home to more of the world’s poor than any other country 
(Hannerz, 2007). Thus, there is incongruence between the image that nation 
branders seek to project and the pragmatic realities facing the nation, or people 
living in those countries being branded. In the case of Germany, nation branding 
has been used in an attempt to overcome the legacies of the past. The Land of 
Ideas campaign was initiated by members of the German government in 2006 to 
capitalise on the international media attention garnered from Germany hosting 
the FIFA World Cup that year. Key messages in the campaign presented Germany 
as “cosmopolitan”, “future-orientated” and “progressive” (Aronczyk, 2013, p. 148). 
The German case study highlights how nation branding has the capacity to illu-
minate some of the more sensitive paradigms of nationhood and in particular 
the legacy of post colonialism. Nation branding therefore goes some way to shed 
light on how the nation is constructed in a particular political context. 
The rise of nation branding, particularly among newly sovereign nations, 
can be seen as a response to questions of ontological security in that a nation 
only exists in as much as it is recognised to be a nation on the international 
stage. Christopher Browning (2011, p. 6) argues that nationalism and onto-
logical security are intrinsically linked; both are driven by the desire of a 
community to justify itself and legitimise its position and standing, at a mini-
mum protecting what has been achieved, but ultimately seeking to enhance 
one’s standing and credentials. Nation branding offers countries legitimacy; 
allowing governments to control how the nation state is viewed, either through 
repairing damaged reputations as a result of economic or political legacies, 
deflect unfavourable international attention or control and manage impressions 
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in the context of unforeseen events (Aronczyk, 2013, p. 16). I would therefore 
argue that if nation branding is also used for the purposes of damage limita-
tion, then it is calculated and not as innocuous as it first might seem. Some 
might question the ability of branding to live up to its promises and argue that 
the monolithic, hierarchical and reductive nation of branding communica-
tion makes it antithetical to democratic governance (see Kaneva, 2011, p. 15). 
Aronczyk (2008, p. 43) argues that nation branding is merely an updated form 
of nationalism since “by employing the symbolic resources and resonance of 
nationalist discourse which perpetuate the nation state as a necessary frame 
of identity, allegiance, and affiliation, nation branding maintains and extends 
the nation as a legitimate entity in the context of globalised modernity.” In this 
context nation branding can be seen as a process which plays to paradigms of 
“us and them” or one which appeals to tourists whilst engendering a sense of 
pride in the citizens of that particular nation. Michael Billig argues that much 
nationalism is salient, even “banal”, and often unspoken. He points to examples 
such as the flag flown outside a garage forecourt or on a public building, part of 
the routine of everyday life (Billig, 1995, p.19). According to Billig such symbols 
represent a reminder of the nation, albeit one which is to a large extent unno-
ticed. I argue that nation branding is the same, on the surface such campaigns 
appear harmless, frivolous and even glamorous. However, they do represent a 
very deliberate attempt to manipulate thinking about a particular nation state, 
its culture and its people. This raises questions of belonging, since only those 
included and accepted as part of the nation state will ever be represented in 
nation branding campaigns. Would a Romanian nation branding campaign 
ever include Roma people? Would an Israeli branding campaign include Arabs? 
Branding a nation is controversial and highly politicised since by defining a 
nation in such narrow terms this effectively constructs boundaries within the 
state. How can one brand reflect the diversity and plethora of identities and 
opinions of a society? What is being branded and by whom and for whom? 
These questions lie at the heart of this book. 
The Eurovision Song Contest as a platform  
for nation branding
The Eurovision Song Contest is often an event which is dismissed as musi-
cally and culturally inferior and until recently it has lacked scholarly attention. 
However it deserves attention in view of its longevity, annual audience and 
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significance for many countries. Celebrating its sixtieth year in 2015, the 
Eurovision Song Contest is one of the largest television and media events in 
the world. According to Dayan and Katz (1992, p. 1) media events are “high 
holidays of mass communication” and the Eurovision Song Contest is one 
example of such an event. They argue that media events can be defined on 
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels. Syntactic because it is something 
which interrupts the routine of daily life, it monopolises the media coverage 
at the time that the event is taking place. It can be seen as a media event on a 
semantic level given that it represents an occasion or a “historic” ceremony with 
reverence. Finally, Dayan and Katz argue that the Eurovision Song Contest is a 
media event on a pragmatic level in that it enthrals large scale audiences who 
view them in a festive style (Ibid., p. 9–14). 
Many studies on the Eurovision Song Contest have focussed on fandom 
and how the ESC has been transformed from a three hour television show to 
a year-long interest. Especially Peter Rehberg (2006), Dafna Lemish (2004) 
and Singleton, Fricker and Moreo (2007) have, moreover, focussed on fandom 
mostly from the perspective of sexual identity, linking the ESC to homosexual-
ity and gay pride. There have been a limited number of academic studies which 
have examined the ESC from the perspective of national identity construction. 
Recent scholarship has addressed constructions of national identity through 
the ESC; Baker (2006) has examined the nationalist elements of Croatian 
entries, while Pajala (2013) uses the contest to discuss Finland’s geopolitical 
position in Europe. There has, however, been little in the way of scholarship 
linking the ESC to the issue of nation branding. Whilst there is a growing body 
of literature on the contest as well as nation branding more generally, few use 
detailed case studies and much of the work on nation branding in particular 
has been written by practitioners involved in the business itself. 
Irrespective of whether the Eurovision Song Contest contributes anything 
to the advancement of music per se, it does provide a remarkable and unique 
example of an annual exchange of goods and opinions between countries. It 
is arguably the only international forum in which a given country can express 
an opinion about another, free of any economic and governmental bias (Fenn 
et al., 2006, p. 578). Göran Bolin argues that the ESC is the modern television 
equivalent of the World’s Fairs of the early 20th century (Bolin, 2006, p. 191). 
Like Fornäs, Bolin argues that the ESC has become a discursive tool in the 
definitions of Europeanness and political strategies of Europeanisation, includ-
ing nation branding. The Eurovision Song Contest, like the World’s Fairs of 
the 19th Century, is a showcase for elements of national culture and identity, 
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allowing countries to market themselves to a wider audience on their own 
terms, through both participation and by hosting the event. The crucial dif-
ference is that whilst the World’s Fairs were delivered predominantly by the 
strongest nations, Eurovision has recently been dominated, to a certain extent, 
by relatively weak (politically-speaking) nations. This has infused further ten-
sions and controversies into discourses surrounding the expansion of the event. 
The song contest is the post-industrial equivalent to the World’s Fairs of high 
industrialism […] the World’s Fairs were promoting the then new nation-states 
in the same way as new nation states use the Eurovision Song Contest as a 
vehicle for constructing themselves. This is especially evident if one looks at 
the newly founded sovereign states recently freed from Soviet rule. And it is 
quite clear that these popular culture events have the power and the ability to 
reshape the geopolitical map of Europe and are also used in this way by the new 
member states of the European Union […] new nations also need to prove to the 
rest of the world their ability to produce large-scale events (Bolin, 2006, p. 203).
The Eurovision Song Contest shares many characteristics with other large-
scale, international media events such as the Olympic Games and the World 
Cup, but also annual entertainment events that are broadcast internationally 
such as the Academy Awards or the MTV awards. The ESC is similar to sports 
events in the sense that it is a competition between nations rather than between 
actors as at the Academy Awards. It has also been linked to international char-
ity events such as Live Aid given the scale of the broadcast. However, Bolin 
notes that whilst these charity events are politicised to a certain degree, they 
are more humanitarian rather than nationalism-based which, he argues, makes 
the Eurovision Song Contest unique in its genre (Bolin, 2006, p. 190). Mega-
events are “large-scale cultural events, which have a dramatic character, mass 
popular appeal and international significance” (Roche, 2001, p. 1). Indeed, the 
Eurovision Song Contest is a mega event which puts the host city/country in 
the spotlight and, as will be argued in chapter three, one which can be used 
as a tool for nation building. However, as with the case of many mega-events, 
it also has the capacity to divide since minority groups often remain mar-
ginalised. These issues are routinely played out through the Eurovision Song 
Contest. The seriousness in which many new entrant countries approach the 
event, particularly through hosting, also demonstrates the significance of it as a 
platform for nation branding; it is an opportunity to showcase the nation state. 
Estonia won the Eurovision Song Contest in May 2001, the first post-com-
munist participant to do so. The victory was immediately seized upon by the 
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then Prime Minister, Mart Laar, who according to the newspapers proclaimed 
to a jubilant crowd waiting to welcome the victorious team back to Tallinn “We 
demolished the Russian empire by singing; now we are not knocking on the 
door of Europe but will simply walk in singing.” (Leivak 2001b) Immediately 
after Estonia won, Laar was reported to have said “now the name Estonia will 
be on everyone’s lips” (Guha, 2002). Thus, the symbolic link to the image and 
EU accession of the country was made from the outset. Estonian officials had 
to confirm in June 2001 whether they would be staging the event in Tallinn 
in 2002. Given that the wider (Western) European press had already reported 
that Estonia was “too poor to host Eurovision” (Poole, 2001), there was pres-
sure on Estonian Television to ensure that the event was successfully staged 
in Tallinn. Failure to host the event would have undoubtedly been damaging 
to Estonia’s international standing, cultivating an image of Estonia as a “poor 
Former Soviet republic” rather than prospective EU member, or as Göran Bolin 
suggests, “a poor Eastern relative of the EBU” (Bolin, 2006, p. 191). It is with 
this background that the preparations for the 2002 Eurovision Song Contest 
began. Estonian Television not only had to prove that it was capable of pro-
ducing a slick international television show but also had to do this against a 
backdrop of uncertainty in terms of technical expertise and infrastructure and 
in front of the gaze of the international media. Closer analysis of the content 
of ESC 2002 provides a unique insight into both the construction of Estonian 
national identity and the self-image of the country as well as the reinforcement 
of the other, namely Russia and the Soviet past. This raises questions of power; 
who decided what narratives of the Estonian nation were fit for broadcast and 
how was this received within the host country? This tension is explored in this 
work through an analysis of the debates surrounding Brand Estonia and the 
Eurovision Song Contest in Estonia. 
2. Brand Estonia: Nordic with a twist or  
twisting nationalism?
As outlined in chapter one, nation branding is dependent on certain political 
discourses and in the Estonian case, the development and launch of Brand 
Estonia coincided with a wider process of nation and state building which 
took place within the specificities of the institutional and rhetorical return to 
Europe. For the majority of newly sovereign countries the return to Europe 
paradigm essentially represented a clean break from the communist past and 
the beginning of membership of long-standing European institutions and 
frameworks (A. Smith, 2000, p. 2). The return to Europe discourse not only 
signalled the practical long-term goals of membership of European economic 
and political institutions, it also orchestrated the re-direction of trade flows 
away from the former Soviet Union towards Western Europe. Ultimately, it was 
perceived by ruling elites in Estonia at the time that this was the most stable 
way of guaranteeing security and sustainable development for the country 
(Rüütel, 2003, p. 197). 
Estonian nation building in the context  
of the Return to Europe
The return to Europe discourse was also a symbolic element of wider nation 
building processes in the Baltic Sea region. The use of the word return was par-
ticularly important since it re-inscribed the fact that many countries, including 
Estonia, which became part of the Soviet Union following World War II, were 
independent and integrated with the West during the interwar period, further 
discrediting Soviet rule. Myths and symbols are an integral part of any nation 
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building project for it is in the symbolic sphere where national political elites 
attempt to consolidate their power over the state. I argue that for Estonian 
political elites, the return to Europe became a symbol of de-Sovietisation; EU 
accession was a guarantee of security and stability against a potentially hostile 
neighbour. The Estonian political elite consistently emphasised the necessity 
of European integration throughout the 1990s, Lennart Meri, who went on 
to become President of Estonia, highlighted the importance of Europe to the 
country in one of many speeches he gave on the subject: 
Europe is to the Estonians more than a geographical concept: Europe is our 
programme. Not because we regard ourselves as better Europeans but because 
we know what the price is of being absent from Europe (Meri, cited in Lehti 
2003, p. 38). 
Estonian political elites cultivated an image of the country as a small Baltic 
state, historically part of the Nordic sphere of influence, “the little country 
that could” to use former Prime Minister Mart Laar’s slogan. EU accession 
essentially meant that the issue of the Russian minority in Estonia came to 
the foreground of the political debate. Essentially, the return to Europe dis-
courses forced the Estonian government to provide some concessions to the 
Russian speaking minority in return for wider European integration. This can 
be seen in the fact that the original terms of the Law on Aliens were signifi-
cantly relaxed. Furthermore, in 1998, it was ruled that children born in Estonia 
to non-citizens after 1991 were to be given automatic Estonian citizenship. 
Essentially the return to Europe discourses forced the Estonian government 
to walk a tightrope between national assertion (i.e. Estonian-led state build-
ing processes), on the one hand, and the demands of European integration 
on the other. Politicians in Estonia sought to integrate with Europe by join-
ing Western European organisations such as the Council of Europe which 
emphasised respect and tolerance towards minorities whilst at the same time 
seeking to ensure ethnic Estonian dominance in the political sphere. It was 
no easy task and yet one in which Estonia managed to strike a balance. Mart 
Laar claims that the citizenship laws drafted in Estonia were “the most liberal 
citizenship law in Europe” (Laar, 2002, p.296). This is a somewhat dubious 
statement given the conditionality and language restrictions placed on obtain-
ing Estonian citizenship. However, given that the Estonian authorities were in 
a sense providing non-Estonians with a choice; to meet the requirements and 
obtain citizenship or go without, they may be considered to be liberal, or at 
32
The Modern Fairy Tale
least on a par with many other European Union countries. Laar asserts that 
the Estonian Citizenship Act corresponds to the European standard and that 
the only difference between citizens and non-citizens is that citizens can vote 
in national elections. 
It was especially important to make such people face the reality. It was essen-
tial for them to understand that the Soviet Union was gone forever and that 
they were living in an independent country (Laar, 2002, p.296). 
Controversy arose after the Law on Aliens was adopted in June 1993. The law 
stipulated that people residing in Estonia with Soviet or Russian passports 
had one year to apply for new residence and work permits. If they failed to do 
this then they would be deemed to be illegal immigrants and therefore subject 
to deportation. The law was also controversial because it did not distinguish 
between persons who had been resident in Estonia all their lives and those 
who had recently arrived. Such a law was potentially divisive and caused alarm 
both inside Estonia and within the various European political structures which 
Estonia aspired to be a part of. In effect, it had the potential to stall Estonia’s 
so-called return to Europe, something the Isamaa government at the time were 
keen to avoid. Evidence of this came in the form of liberalisation of the language 
requirements for citizenship. A basic working knowledge was stipulated rather 
than the previous ambiguous guidelines and the Law on Aliens was amended to 
extend residence permits to military pensioners as well as granting automatic 
citizenship to children born in Estonia to non-citizens (although this did not 
happen until 1998). In May 1993, despite protests from Russia over alleged 
human rights violations relating to the citizenship issue, Estonia was admitted 
to the Council of Europe (Raun, 2001, p. 252). This lends credence to Smith’s 
assertion that, in the eyes of the Estonian government, social stability, foreign 
investment and membership of the Council of Europe counted for more than 
strict restorationism (D. Smith, 2001, p. 86). In other words, the spatial dis-
course of normality took precedence over the temporal discourse of normality, 
to use Eglitis’ term. It was at this point that multiculturalism entered the debate 
in Estonia and came to be used in relation to the Russian speaking minority. 
Multiculturalism is a contested concept. Whilst Estonia can be considered 
to be a plural society state, it is also one which remains enmeshed within an 
avowedly post-colonial network of identity political discourses encompassing 
the Estonian state, its Russian speaking population, the Russian Federation and 
the governments of the EU and other Euro-Atlantic organisations. Part of the 
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process of discursively constructing the nation is to establish its coordinates in 
time and space and to situate it in relation to external entities (EU, Russia, USA, 
CIS) as well as larger geopolitical categories, essentially putting the country on 
the map. Whilst Estonia had made great strides throughout the 1990s, in terms 
of international relations, economic reform, and integration into the various 
European power structures, the country still remained relatively unknown and 
poorly understood in Europe and the world at large. It was in this context that 
Enterprise Estonia launched their Brand Estonia campaign with the slogan, 
Welcome to Estonia: Positively Transforming, to capitalise on the publicity sur-
rounding Estonia hosting the Eurovision Song Contest in 2002.
The little country that could
The political context in which Brand Estonia was launched is important since 
the initiative, like the political processes which took place in the country fol-
lowing independence, essentially represented the othering of the Soviet past 
in Estonia. In its quest for EU membership, Estonia set itself on a course to 
prove its so-called “European credentials”, cultivating an image of Estonia as 
an economic trail blazer. In his very first Presidential address to the people 
of Estonia in 1992, Lennart Meri highlighted the significance of Europe to 
Estonia and stated that the recent elections had brought an end to the Soviet 
past. “Estonia has chosen the free, European, democratic road […] Estonia’s 
integration into Europe is of importance to us” (Meri, 2009, p. 17). Buoyed by 
the attention the country was receiving as a result of robust economic reforms, 
the then Prime Minister, Mart Laar, began to actively court global attention 
in an attempt to bolster Estonia’s reputation in the world. In order to attract 
foreign investment, Estonia needed international attention and so the govern-
ment undertook a campaign to promote the country internationally. Using 
money from a World Bank Loan, the Estonian government bought a supple-
ment in Newsweek magazine. The headline bore the slogan “Estonia: The Little 
Country That Could” which represented the challenges Estonia had faced and 
the progress, against the odds, it had made in economic transformation. The 
deal also included several follow-up articles on Estonia, further promoting the 
country as a place of stability and a place for foreign businesses to invest in.
In 1997, Estonia was invited to join accession talks, ahead of neighbouring 
Latvia and Lithuania. According to Mart Laar (2002, p. 304) Estonia is like 
Finland, a Nordic country since both are similar geographically, linguistically 
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and culturally as well as in terms of their recent history (Laar, 2002, p. 58). 
The Finnish development model was consistently flagged as entirely compa-
rable to Estonia. Finnish television which was watched in northern Estonia 
also played a role in highlighting the differences between the two countries 
(Laar 2002, p. 304). It allowed Estonians to see the development gap which had 
emerged between the two countries during Soviet times and allowed Nordic 
culture to permeate the iron curtain in Estonia. According to Laar, both had 
similar levels of economic development before 1940. Therefore, the situation 
Estonia faced in 1991 and the disparities with its more prosperous Finnish 
neighbour only served to further repudiate the Soviet past since it was consid-
ered that Estonia would have been on the same economic level as Finland had 
the country not experienced such a cruel fate. This further added impetus to 
the European integration project, which took on an even deeper significance 
in this context. Throughout his Presidency, Lennart Meri emphasised Estonia’s 
so-called Nordic identity, representing a clean break from the Soviet past, but 
also highlighted Estonia’s rightful place in Europe. “We have been a very active 
member of the Nordic community […] there are a lot of emotional ties and 
legal ties which makes us much more of a Nordic country than it is usually 
believed” (Meri, 1995). Arguably the term Nordic became more widely used 
and strategically and advantageous than the term Baltic. It was in this context 
that Enterprise Estonia launched the Welcome to Estonia campaign which 
amongst other things served to promote Estonia’s Nordic temperament.
Nation branding in practice
As discussed in chapter one, on the surface, nation branding operates in the 
same way that traditional public relations does, in that it is a practice which is 
undertaken to persuade overseas public, investors, partners, employees, and 
other stakeholders to maintain a certain point of view about a nation state. 
Nation branding can effectively be seen as a public relations exercise for gov-
ernments, it is a communication strategy which allows governments to manage 
and control the image they project to the world. In the case of Estonia the 
campaign was managed by Interbrand, a global branding consultancy which 
also developed the Cool Britannia campaign in the UK. Branding consultants 
such as Simon Anholt and Wally Olins argue that nation branding is needed 
in the globalised world, at a time when the nation state as an entity is said to 
be waning in importance. According to Olins, having a strong identity in the 
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world means that a product is identifiable and that the same tools which are 
used to create product brands are the same tools used to build nations (Olins, 
1990, p. 15). However, such arguments by branding consultants fail to acknowl-
edge that nation and state building and indeed the politics of nationalism are 
still very much alive, no more so than in the post-Soviet region. The lines 
defining nation branding are somewhat blurred when governments contract 
private firms to develop and propagate their national brand. Moreover, nation 
branding upholds the notion of the nation-state as the primordial framework 
for identity, in-line with nationalist discourses on statehood. Aronczyk (2008) 
goes as far to say that nation branding affects the moral basis of national citi-
zenship. Therefore, the context in which nation branding operates affects the 
way in which national identity is communicated, understood and contested. 
As such, nation branding is a highly politicised activity. This conclusion seems 
especially relevant in the Estonian case. 
According to Aronczyk (2008) there are four steps in the development 
of a nation branding campaign. The first is an evaluation where the external 
perceptions of the country are identified. The second involves developing the 
message of the campaign in order to alter perceptions. The third involves iden-
tifying the methods by which to communicate this message. The fourth and 
final stage is to implement the campaign outlined. The audience for nation 
branding campaigns can be categorised into three broad overseas groups: busi-
nesses, politicians and tourists (Marat, 2009). One of the challenges of nation 
branding is to develop an idea or slogan which can reach out simultaneously 
to these three groups. Kazakhstan’s Heart of Eurasia campaign serves as one 
example where all three groups were the targets (Marat, 2009). Name recogni-
tion is also a part of the branding process. However, this is something which 
is more difficult to foster, particularly when increasing numbers of nation 
states are promoting similar style campaigns. In the case of Kazakhstan, the 
film, Borat provided the country with that recognition albeit one which the 
government of Kazakhstan considered to be detrimental to the country’s inter-
national image. It was within that context that the Heart of Eurasia campaign 
was launched (Marat, 2009). 
If nation branding can be viewed as an exercise in public relations then the 
historical case of Lithuania and the contemporary example of Russia can be seen 
as an illustration of this. After World War I the Lithuanian National Council 
enlisted the support of Edward Bernays who successfully lobbied on their behalf 
to the US government calling for them to recognise Lithuanian independence 
(Cutlip, 1990). Whilst Russia does not have a formal nation branding campaign 
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per se, the launch of news channel Russia Today can be seen as an effort on the 
part of Russia to promote a more positive international image to a global audi-
ence (Evans, 2005). Similarly, Russia has used popular culture events such as the 
Eurovision Song Contest to manage its own image on its own terms and as with 
the case of the 2009 contest, reflected a stronger more confident nation (Jordan, 
2009). In this sense, nation branding campaigns and practices aimed at image 
building; undertaken throughout the world, usually with similar goals, mean 
that the launch of Brand Estonia was nothing unusual. However, this chapter 
seeks to shed light on elite-level identity debates at a crucial time in Estonian 
history through a critical analysis of Brand Estonia. I argue that in the Estonian 
case, the logics of branding and nationalism were somewhat blurred. 
Welcome to Estonia: Positively Transforming
The Brand Estonia project was commissioned by Enterprise Estonia in 2001 
in order to capitalise on Estonia hosting the 2002 Eurovision Song Contest 
in Tallinn. Enterprise Estonia is an Estonian government agency which pro-
motes Estonian business interests internationally. Brand Estonia had the aims 
of achieving greater direct foreign investment for the Estonian economy, 
expanding Estonia’s tourist base beyond Scandinavia and also broadening the 
scope for Estonia’s export market (Dinnie, 2008, p. 230). Enterprise Estonia 
commissioned Interbrand to conduct a six month study in order to ascertain 
the strength of Estonia’s image abroad. The research project included inter-
views with more than 1,400 tourists in the UK, Germany, Finland, Sweden 
and Russia. The research found that the perception of Estonia became weaker 
the further from the country; Germany and the UK were deemed to have the 
least understanding of Estonia compared to Finland for example. Enterprise 
Estonia’s study also found that many respondents considered the “Baltic” 
regional grouping for Estonia to be “limiting and potentially limiting” and that 
understanding Estonia as a Nordic country would be more fitting “tempera-
mentally and geographically” (Enterprise Estonia, 2002, p. 51). In particular 
the description of the term “Baltic” as “limiting” is interesting and reflects the 
distancing of Estonia from the other Baltic states by Estonian politicians in the 
run-up to EU accession talks. Thus, the essence of Brand Estonia can be seen 
as entirely in keeping with the rhetoric of nationalist politicians and remarks 
made by politicians such as Lennart Meri, Mart Laar and Toomas Hendrik 
Ilves stating that Estonia is a Nordic country. 
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Estonia’s brand essence was captured in two words “positively transform-
ing”; highlighting the post-Soviet transition in Estonia which was described 
as “revolutionary, positive and a welcome change against all odds” (Dinnie, 
2008, p. 233). “Positively transforming” therefore connected what was going on 
inside Estonia to the outside world, to those being targeted and encouraged to 
invest in Estonia. Alongside the positively transforming slogan, a logo was also 
devised, “Welcome to Estonia”, in the shape of the country itself. Brand Estonia 
was launched in May 2002 to coincide with Tallinn staging the Eurovision 
Song Contest. Promotional items with the Brand Estonia logo were given to 
delegates and the assembled press at the event itself and posters were unveiled 
in major transit locations across Europe, such as airports and train stations. 
A group of brand narratives were also included in the project outline in 
order to articulate the “positively transforming” essence to the world (Dinnie, 
2008, p. 233). The first, “a fresh perspective”, highlighted Estonia’s versatility 
to the investor. The second narrative highlighted that Estonia had a “radi-
cal, reforming and transforming attitude”. The third such narrative promoted 
Estonia as having “a Nordic temperament and environment”. Crucially this 
section boldly stated that Estonia “has always been part of the web of Northern 
Europe […] an accident of history links us in the minds of most people with the 
East instead of the West” (Enterprise Estonia, 2002, p. 65). Therefore, by focus-
ing on the Nordic influence on Estonia it not only distances Estonia with the 
Soviet past but also Baltic regionalism. The fourth and penultimate narrative 
defined Estonia as “a resourceful self-starter by nature”, and an attractive place 
for overseas businesses to invest. The final narrative was entitled “A European 
society” and presented Estonia as a juxtaposed country between East and West 
with a “deep heritage rooted in European tradition”, therefore offering Estonia’s 
geopolitical position as an advantage. Each of these narratives was then trans-
lated into verbal and visual branding manifestations. Posters featuring the 
“Welcome to Estonia” logo and “Positively Transforming” slogan appeared on 
billboards abroad, at airports with the logo being added to the side of Estonian 
Air aircraft. T-shirts and other merchandising were also made available. 
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A critical analysis of Brand Estonia: Imagery 
In the introductory chapter of the Brand Estonia report, the concept of Estonia 
as a Nordic nation was reinforced further; “Nordic with a twist”. The report 
emphasised that the choice of images to represent Estonia in the campaign were 
deliberately designed to capture the brand essence of Estonia as Nordic: “All 
photographs capture the feeling of Estonia as a country with a powerful and 
charismatic personality, essentially, Nordic with a twist” (Enterprise Estonia, 
2002, p. 94). The choice of colours was also deliberate, since “this is another 
way of saying that Estonia shares a similar pastel-centred colour palette with 
our Nordic neighbours” (Ibid., p. 127). Thus images used in the campaign 
used mostly light pastel colours as well as arguably more stereotypical Nordic 
images; blonde hair, blue eyes, an enchanting Hanseatic old town. Moreover, 
clean, minimalist and modern architecture with clean surfaces was presented 
to depict a cool Nordic climate as well as to suggest Estonia’s belonging to 
the Western European, moreover, Nordic realm. Arguably all nation brand-
ing campaigns seek to depict the country in a positive light through scenes 
of culture, innovation, natural beauty. When Brand Estonia is compared to 
such campaigns as Malaysia: Truly Asia or Amazing Azerbaijan, to name some 
Figure: The Brand Estonia logo ©Brand Estonia / Enterprise Estonia
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examples, the choice of images, such as an airport scene, does appear to be 
somewhat curious in comparison. Given the wider political developments in 
the country and in the context of EU accession negotiations, Brand Estonia 
can be seen as a manifestation of geopolitics, neatly packaged for international 
consumers. Perhaps more tellingly, the Brand Estonia report also included 
a section titled “What they think of us” which was based on international 
research conducted by Interbrand in order to gain an insight into Estonia’s 
international image. 
The review of images used in the Brand Estonia campaign also reveals 
a development over time as early images used in the the image collage that 
accompanied the report depicted Lenin, heavy polluting industry and a coun-
try with an antiquated workforce. It is precisely these negative stereotypes, 
portraying Estonia as a troubled Soviet successor republic, which Estonian 
politicians had been trying to dispel since independence. The Brand Estonia 
campaign can therefore be seen as a project which was itself a part of the 
return to Europe process and involved the distancing of Estonia from its Soviet 
past while presenting the country to the international community as Nordic. 
This is exactly what political elites such as Mart Laar and Lennart Meri had 
been doing since independence. Newspaper articles and images in the 1990s 
reflected, indeed, much concern, particularly among the elites in the country, 
about Estonia’s international image and more crucially, what the outside world 
thought about the country. An analysis of Brand Estonia through interviews 
with key the decision makers behind the campaign provides further insight 
into the Estonian sense of self, its relationship to and influence on, nation 
building and nation branding. 
A critical analysis of Brand Estonia: Interviews with elites
Unlike many nation branding campaigns, where private consultancy compa-
nies work with relative autonomy, Brand Estonia was developed by Interbrand 
in consultation with political elites in the country. The prime minister at the 
time, Mart Laar, sanctioned the initiative and Evelin Ilves, current First Lady 
of Estonia was installed as the Project Manager. Given that the launch of the 
campaign was timed to coincide with Estonia hosting the Eurovision Song 
Contest in May 2002, the then Minister of Culture, Signe Kivi, was also a con-
sultant to the project. During interviews conducted for this book, elite level 
respondents were overwhelmingly supportive of Brand Estonia, viewing it as 
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an appropriate campaign for promoting the country. EU accession and the 
Eurovision Song Contest were recurring themes in the interviews. Estonian 
elites highlighted that there was a need at the time to do something to promote 
the image of Estonia and to capitalise on the attention the country was get-
ting as a result of winning the Eurovision Song Contest in 2001. Hosting the 
contest in 2002 together with the on-going EU accession talks which were also 
generating media coverage internationally. Riina Kionka, who was the Estonian 
Ambassador to Germany at the time of the campaign launch, recalled that 
branded materials were used effectively in embassies and at events promoting 
Estonia abroad. 
I was using these materials in Berlin in order to help sell the country. This 
was one of my major aims, to sell the country in Berlin. It was very effective, it 
helped a lot, all the stickers, t-shirts, all of this stuff was very effective. People 
would see it and they would identify. It was on Estonian Air, every place. They 
produced a lot of brochures and information sheets which we passed out at 
various meetings. I think these materials were helpful for raising awareness 
about Estonia (Riina Kionka, Interview, 11.08.2008). 
However, the media narratives concerning Brand Estonia were less than 
positive, and the public level respondents interviewed for this study were 
overwhelmingly critical of the campaign (this will be discussed later in this 
chapter). Following the ESC in 2002 and the collapse of Mart Laar’s govern-
ment, the Brand Estonia campaign was considerably scaled down. I asked all 
elite level respondents about the criticism of Brand Estonia and gave them an 
opportunity to respond to the accusation from the media and public that the 
campaign was simply a waste of money. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Mart Laar 
blamed his successors for any failure associated with Brand Estonia. “The gov-
ernment after me cancelled this promotion campaign. This was a bad mistake 
[…] it needed to continue” (Mart Laar, Interview, 12.11.2007). He concedes that 
people viewed it as a waste of money but did not offer evidence of any counter 
arguments he might have launched against the critics at the time: 
When you promote your country, the people can have very different opinions 
and it is always more complicated because people think other slogans are always 
better. It means the government must have the courage to do unpopular deci-
sions even knowing the campaigns will not bring a lot of popularity at home 
[…] It always takes time for the results to land in the pockets of people. People 
looked outside the country not understanding how to get the results […] it was 
not popular and seen as a waste of money and when you are a politician you 
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want to take popular decisions. Sometimes when you start to measure it with 
direct money you don’t immediately see how to earn it back. It comes back but 
in different ways […] the programme for promoting a country is a long lasting 
process […] you must invest for years and years and decades and decades (Mart 
Laar, Interview, 12.11.2007).
Media criticism of Brand Estonia was levelled rather unsurprisingly at the 
Project Manager for the campaign, Evelin Ilves, who effectively became the 
public face of the initiative in Estonia, and as a consequence, the focal point for 
condemnation. Like Laar, she deflects any apparent failure of the campaign and 
even goes as far to suggest that the Estonian public simply did not understand 
the concept of marketing. 
Lots of people didn’t like it; they said it was strange and not something 
Estonian. I think the problem was the basic lack of knowledge. People just 
did not know what is marketing, branding, how do these things work? It was 
something which was quite new for ordinary people and politicians as well […] 
when we introduced our project […] it was so hard to explain what is branding, 
why we need it, how it works (Evelin Ilves, Interview, 20.11.2007).
Signe Kivi, the then Minister of Culture echoed the rhetoric of both Laar and 
Ilves and stated that she believed the campaign was not given a chance since 
the media focussed on the price tag which in turn influenced public opinion. 
It was widely criticised as the budget was large and many people saw it as a 
waste and this view was promoted in the media. However I think it was a very 
important campaign and I was pleased with it. Evelin Ilves was the head of it 
and worked hard on it […] It was important to start something professional to 
promote Estonia since we were so unknown in the world. This campaign was 
only one way of promoting Estonia – it is a long-term campaign which will 
take many years and a lot of money. In my view it was not a waste of money 
as it was based on solid research and I just don’t think it was given a chance to 
succeed (Signe Kivi, Interview, 26.11.2007).
Further analysis of these interviews demonstrates that the Estonian political 
elite buy into the argument appropriated by branding consultants such as Wally 
Olins and Simon Anholt that the promotion of a country is a long-term pro-
gramme of work and requires considerable investment over a sustained period 
of time. Mart Laar’s assertion that investment in nation branding “comes back 
in different ways” is not only difficult to qualify, it also deflects criticism of the 
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campaign that he approved. Figures such as Simon Aholt in particular, have 
revolutionised the way that governments think about the international image 
of a country, offering them a solution for economic development in the future 
through nation branding. The mantra that continuous investment is needed, 
has not only been internalised by politicians such as Mart Laar and Signe Kivi, 
but also plays into the interests of branding consultants themselves. 
Elite level respondents, in their defence of Brand Estonia, apportion blame 
for any apparent failure of the campaign to negative media coverage and a lack 
of understanding of basic marketing principles amongst the Estonian public. 
They did not offer any counter defence at the time of the campaign or in inter-
views for this work. Arguably the aims of the campaign were not effectively 
communicated to the public, with hindsight this is plain to see. Pille-Triin 
Männik, who was a Programme Coordinator for the Tallinn 2011 European 
Capital of Culture, believes that the lack of communication was a major down-
fall in the development of Brand Estonia. 
Something went very wrong in the internal communications. I don’t think 
it was such a big disaster but at the time, the result is the logo and the whole 
concept linked to it is not actually bad, it just got very bad publicity, probably 
a communication error at some stage and there was a whole discussion about 
the campaign, it got very much stuck on the price tag and this is what people 
remember. This was also a time when the quality of life was not very high so 
it was painful to see that sum being mentioned on the campaign or on a logo, 
there might have been some negative attention towards it because it was not 
designed in Estonia actually (Pille-Triin Männik, Interview, 13.08.2008).
From the outset, the director of Interbrand’s London office, Penny Harris, 
was keen to point out that the company were aware of their position as an 
outsider and aimed to be sensitive to the views of the Estonian public. “We are 
very sensitive to the fact that we are an outside company, but we hope we can 
provide objectivity and an international viewpoint that will help achieve the 
best solution” (Gunter 2001). The responses given in this book highlight that 
attempts at sensitivity on the part of Interbrand were not internalised amongst 
a significant proportion of the Estonian population. Rather unsurprisingly, 
Interbrand considers that the campaign was not only a success internation-
ally but also domestically and contends that it promoted a new commonality 
between ethnic Estonians and Russian speakers who responded favourably to 
the campaign (Jansen 2008). 
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A critical analysis of Brand Estonia: Public-level interviews
As stated in the introduction, this book does not aim to provide a detailed 
account of Estonian public opinion. The strength of this work lies in the unique 
interviews conducted with key political figures, broadcasters and decision-mak-
ers behind both the Brand Estonia campaign and the Eurovision Song Contest. 
However, the public level interviews that were conducted in Estonia do provide 
an insight into popular opinion at the time, a snapshot of the feelings of a sec-
tion of the Estonian population at a particular moment in time. An analysis of 
the views of some members of the Estonian public provide an interesting insight 
into not only how Brand Estonia was received internally but also highlights 
some of the more salient narratives of national identity in a post-Soviet context. 
Public level respondents widely criticised the campaign and in particular the 
logo, Welcome to Estonia. Many of those interviewed commented upon the type-
face of the logo, stating that it resembled something from the 1970s which was 
at odds with their understanding Estonia as a forward-looking Nordic country. 
It also appears that many respondents did not believe the campaign to be value 
for money. The budget for the enterprise was 13.31 million kroons, approxi-
mately £650,000 (Jansen, 2008). Moreover, the use of a UK-based company, 
Interbrand, caused much consternation among those members of the public 
that were interviewed.
It was a total waste of money. They [Interbrand] got a lot of money and they 
came up with a stupid logo (Margit, Interview, 17.11.2007). 
What does it [the logo] actually mean? It doesn’t make you think about any-
thing. Words that you don’t really associate with anything. It reminds me of 
adverts from years ago […] embarrassing. (Riina, Interview, 08.04.2008). 
I thought it was garbage […] the company in England saw them coming really. 
They just did a half-assed job of it and charged full prices. It was the tax payer 
who paid of course (Maimu, Interview, 08.04.2008). 
This sort of rhetoric was repeated by many respondents and a sense of confu-
sion about the aims of the project, along with frustrations at the perceived lack 
of value for money and a finished product. Many public level respondents had 
the impression that the campaign simply stopped without any follow-up after 
2002. This further consolidated the view that the project had not worked and 
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was a waste of resources in the eyes of the public. However not all respondents 
were so dogmatic in their approach. Whilst many continued to express dis-
satisfaction with Brand Estonia, there were some who believed that there was 
a genuine need to promote the country.
Nobody can argue that Estonia didn’t need a campaign. The question is 
whether the campaign was properly done, whether it was effective enough or 
appropriate for the task at hand (Meelis, Interview, 08.04.2008). 
As highlighted earlier, Interbrand considered the Brand Estonia campaign to 
be a success in terms of uniting Russian speakers and ethnic Estonians. On the 
contrary, many Russian speakers interviewed for this book did not have a con-
nection to the representations of the country portrayed through Brand Estonia, 
shedding further light on the way in which Estonian identity is constructed, 
internalised and in this case, contested.
I think the idea of promotion is good but […] I did not like this brand trademark 
[…] too old-fashioned [...] I understand maybe I have a different understanding 
of things since I speak Russian (Dmitry, Interview, 23.11.2007).
Interestingly, whilst public level respondents were overwhelmingly critical of 
the campaign, they identified with Estonia as a Nordic country suggesting 
that the logo was the main point of contention and not deemed to be fitting 
in with this Nordic identity. On the other hand, Russian speakers appeared to 
be almost apathetic in their response to Brand Estonia. The response quoted 
above, “maybe I have a different understanding”, is telling and suggests that 
differences between ethnic Estonians and Russian speakers run much further 
than just language and citizenship. An analysis of nation branding therefore 
illuminates “top-down” or official/elite and “bottom-up” public/ground-level 
perspectives on nationhood and nation-building and as such, shows that 
branding a nation is far more problematic than the current literature suggests. 
Is nation branding merely a more palatable  
version of nationalism?
The debates presented in this chapter concerning Brand Estonia have high-
lighted the difficulties in branding nation states, such as Estonia, holding 
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populations with different national identities and understandings of their recent 
history. If we take Bolin and Ståhlberg’s argument that nation branding has 
become “a historically specific form of producing images of the nation” (Bolin 
& Ståhlberg, 2010 p. 79), then this raises questions relating to the relationship 
between nation branding and national identity. What exactly is being branded 
and by whom and for whom? In the case of Estonia it is the “positively trans-
forming”, post-Soviet EU applicant which was branded by a British company, 
Interbrand, for the international community, namely existing EU member states. 
The two logics of nationalism and nation branding exist simultaneously. The 
question is to what extent these two logics compete or reinforce each other 
[…] what happens when the logics of nation branding and nationalism are 
blurred? (Bolin & Ståhlberg, 2010 p. 97).
According to Aronczyk (2013, p. 28) nation branding is merely an updated form 
of nationalism since by employing the symbolic resources and resonance of 
nationalist discourse, which perpetuate the nation state as a necessary frame 
of identity, allegiance, and affiliation, nation branding maintains and extends 
the nation as a legitimate entity in the context of globalised modernity. This 
raises a pertinent question for this study, which version of national identity is 
promoted? In the Estonian case, it is arguably the ethnic Estonian paradigm 
of nationhood but how does this then fit in with the discourses of multicul-
turalism from Estonian politicians, which coincided with the launch of the 
Brand Estonia campaign? In this context nation branding can be seen as a 
process which plays to paradigms of “us and them”, in the same the way that 
nationalism works. Nation branding is both reactive and proactive, it aims 
to draw attention away from a negative past while emphasising the present 
opportunities that a country can offer the international community into the 
future. However, by defining a nation in such narrow terms, it effectively con-
structs boundaries within the state. How can one brand reflect the diversity 
and plethora of identities and opinions of a society? Many cultural stereo-
types concerning nations have evolved over time and they arguably cannot 
be eradicated through a focused marketing campaign (Fan, 2006, p.10). In the 
case of Estonia, does the othering of the Soviet past not simply put further dis-
tance between ethnic Estonians and Russian speakers? The apathy towards the 
campaign emanating from Russian speakers, as opposed to a more dogmatic 
response from ethnic Estonians, suggests that this is indeed the case. 
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The Estonian case is especially interesting in that the Nordic narrative of 
the nation depicted through Brand Estonia was largely internalised by eth-
nic Estonians and yet it was the use of an overseas company and the logo 
which caused most consternation amongst the public-level respondents. Brand 
Estonia came to be viewed as a label or brand imposed from above, but more 
crucially, from outside the country rather than something organic. The inter-
views in this chapter demonstrate that Brand Estonia was not the “national 
feel-good campaign” that Aronczyk claims (2013, p. 144). The responses from 
Russian speakers interviewed for this work suggests that their understanding 
of Estonian national identity is different, perhaps weaker than that of their 
Estonian counterparts. Moreover, the distancing of the country from its Soviet 
past may not have sat well with them. This sheds further light on the “Two 
Estonias” debate. An analysis of Brand Estonia has highlighted that the debates 
go further than just “winners and losers” of the transition, but cross-cuts into 
other areas of social life, namely identity politics. This perceived incongruence 
between ethnic Estonian national identity on the one hand, and the branding of 
the nation state on the other, highlights a fundamental tension between nation 
branding and nation building. 
Nations are complex entities and nation branding as a practice strips 
them down to a simplified representation in a bid to enhance the marketabil-
ity of a state. Nation states are not consumer products, so can they really be 
branded and marketed in the same way? Proponents of nation branding such 
as Simon Anholt argue that they can be; nations must compete for visibility in 
an increasingly crowded and globalised environment (Anholt, 2005). Critics 
question the viability and desirability of branding something as complicated as 
national identity, which at the same time, can be used as a tool for airbrushing 
histories, memories and rituals which underpin and encapsulate the nation. 
In the case of Brand Estonia, it is this airbrushing of the Soviet past which 
is particularly interesting. Whilst nation branding campaigns may appear to 
be frivolous, they are in fact calculated. Such programmes attempt to shape 
and control perceptions of a place, traditionally thought of as a public space, 
the nation state. The typical methodology behind nation branding campaigns 
has been to undertake market research to ascertain what particular image a 
country has. Marketing strategies are then developed on the basis of this to 
reinforce positive images and distract from any negative ones. Umberto Eco’s 
term to describe the methodology behind such campaigns as “ur-fascist” (Eco, 
1995, p. 12) might on the surface appear to be a step too far, however, when the 
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wider political context is considered, nation branding as a practice does not 
appear to be so meaningless. 
The depictions which formed the basis of Brand Estonia were based on the 
ethnic narrative of the nation and, by doing so, were in tune with the rhetoric 
from Estonian politicians during the 1990s, namely that Estonia was Nordic 
and that the Soviet past needed to be buried. The continuous reinforcement 
that Estonia was “Nordic with a twist” and “positively transforming” suggests 
that Brand Estonia was essentially a platform for the othering of the Soviet past. 
This was entirely in-tune with the more nationalising elements of ethno politics 
in Estonia during that time. Brand Estonia promoted what Estonia is, but by 
doing so, highlighted what Estonia is not, in effect representing a friendlier 
face of nationalism to a global audience. What makes one country Nordic and 
another not? Could it be that there is no claim to call Estonia Nordic other 
than for the purposes of PR? It could be argued that Estonia was so proactive 
in marketing the country as a Nordic state that any attempt by its neighbours 
would risk charges of plagiarism should they have adopted the same strategy. If 
we take the criteria defined by Lagerspetz (2003) of geographical location, his-
torical ties, linguistic affinity, Lutheran faith, social development (the Nordic 
model), Nordic cooperation, legal and administrative tradition and gender 
equality, then Estonia can be considered to be more Nordic than its neighbours. 
Amongst respondents interviewed for this work, the term Nordic sat far better 
with them than post-Soviet which is a reflection not only of Estonian national 
identity but is also a product of Estonian nation building. 
Concluding remarks
The main aim of Brand Estonia was to attract inward investment into the 
country. However, the wider rhetoric from respondents concerning this cam-
paign has drawn out some of the more salient narratives of identity politics. 
Since too many variables are at play, it is unlikely that an accurate measure 
of the impact of the Brand Estonia campaign, or any other nation branding 
campaign for that matter, will emerge. For the Estonian political elite it appears 
that Brand Estonia in 2002 was best forgotten. Yet nation branding is a process 
which countries continue to buy into to varying extents. In 2008, the campaign 
was briefly re-launched with the slogan “Positively Surprising”. One of the 
main criticisms of nation branding is that the slogans can be used to describe 
almost any location. This is not the case with the Estonian campaign; Brand 
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Estonia reflected the rhetoric from nationalist politicians at the time, it was 
not a generic message, it reflected what was going on in Estonia at a specific 
moment in time. The development of Brand Estonia reflected, and was argu-
ably part of, the wider return to Europe discourse propagated by Estonian 
politicians at the time. The elite level interviews have highlighted the impor-
tance of image building for Estonian politicians in a post-Soviet context as well 
as demonstrating the internal dimensions of state and nation building. As part 
of the wider process of European integration, Estonian politicians sought to 
present the country as a European or Nordic nation in an attempt to distance 
the country from its Soviet past. If we take the criteria for defining a country 
as Nordic as outlined by Landgrén and Lagerspetz, Estonia can credibly call 
itself Nordic. An inherent tension appears though when nation branding cam-
paigns reflect the rhetoric of nationalist politicians. Brand Estonia was a very 
deliberate attempt to convey a certain narrative of the nation to the interna-
tional community and to control perceptions of the state. In the Estonian case, 
nation branding was a tool for soft nationalism and therefore not as innocent 
as it first might seem. 
3. The Eurovision Song Contest:  
Nation building and nation branding
When the head of the jury in Bosnia Herzegovina calls, we suddenly get the 
feeling that the Eurovision Song Contest is something more than the world’s 
oldest television programme. When he says “good evening Oslo” from his 
war-devastated capital and is met by spontaneous applause from the concert 
hall, then we really understand the whole idea behind the programme (The 
official programme of the 41st Eurovision Song Contest 1996, NRK, p. 4).
Since its inception the Eurovision Song Contest has provoked fierce debates 
concerning national identity and what it means to be European. The ESC is a 
symbolic contact zone between European cultures but it is also a site where the 
meanings of what Europe is, and what it means to be European, are both enacted 
and contested (Fricker, 2009). This chapter outlines a political history of the ESC. 
In particular, it will focus on how the contest has been a discursive tool in nation 
building and, in more recent years, nation branding. Eurovision essentially pro-
vides a platform for the performance of the nation and participation is arguably 
affirmation of a nation’s European credentials. This raises questions concerning 
how nationhood is articulated. Europe in 2014 is a fractured entity politically, 
economically and socially. The meanings of what it is to be European are con-
stantly evolving, yet the ESC has continued to endure and as such is a unique 
lens through which nationhood and the politics of identity can be analysed. 
The Eurovision Song Contest: A brief history
The inaugural Eurovision Song Contest took place on 24 May 1956 and was estab-
lished by Marcel Baison of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU). The contest 
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was modelled on the popular Italian San Remo Music Festival, a competition 
of original songs which was founded in 1951. The EBU was founded in 1950 and 
is a confederation of state broadcasting organisations with 74 active members. 
The EBU is not just confined to European networks, other members include 
national broadcasters in the Middle East and further afield.2 The ESC is the 
organisation’s highest profile event; however, the EBU network also transmits 
major international events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World 
Cup through the Eurovision Network. The founding of both the EBU and ESC 
therefore reflects attempts by Western European governments to unite in the 
wake of World War II. Although the Eurovision Song Contest is officially a 
non-political event, its history can be seen as part of the Cold War process of 
fashioning Europe as a unified bloc (Fricker et al, 2007). In this context the 
“Europe” referred to here is the West; the ESC can be seen as an event uniting 
Western European countries in terms of popular culture and one which, with 
the exception of Yugoslavia, did not include any communist nations. With the 
establishment of Intervision, the Eastern European equivalent of Eurovision, 
the divide between Western Europe and communist East became more appar-
ent. The Intervision Song Contest which began in 1977 and ran until 1980, with 
an all-communist entrant list, with the exception of Finland, was an attempt 
by Eastern European broadcasters to emulate the very successful Eurovision 
Song Contest. Finland participated in this event as well as in the Eurovision 
Song Contest; the country’s peripheral geopolitical position was therefore re-
inscribed, reflecting a dual-vector approach towards both East and West. 
In 1993, following the collapse of state communism in Europe, the EBU merged 
with the International Television and Radio Organisation (OIRT), its once Eastern 
European equivalent,3 which was responsible for organising Intervision. The devel-
opment of both the EBU and ESC represents a mirror image of the growth of the 
European Union, which has also continued to expand its membership eastwards 
since the fall of communism. The ESC therefore both constructs and destructs 
barriers between East and West. Marko Lehti and David Smith (2003) and others 
(Kuus 2004, p. 473; Mälksoo, 2009, p. 656) argue that the imagined East/West 
divide still exists today within an EU accession context. This is exemplified by the 
rhetoric surrounding the Eurovision Song Contest which provides a useful mirror 
of these trends and will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.
2 The contest is also broadcast in Australia and New Zealand.
3 Similar to the EBU in the West, the OIRT was an East European network of radio and televi-
sion broadcasters with the primary purpose of establishing ties and securing an interchange 
of information between those various organisations responsible for broadcasting services.
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The original idea behind the contest and still its defining feature today, is 
that nations (whose television companies are active members of the EBU) submit 
original songs which are performed and televised live. This is followed by voting 
to determine the “best” European song of the year. The first contest only included 
seven participating countries, each submitting two songs. Since then only one 
song has been entered by each competing nation. In 2008, a record 43 countries 
participated in the event. Eurovision represents one of the major television spec-
tacles in Europe given the scale of the production and annual viewing figures. 
The contest is broadcast in Australia and Japan amongst other countries and it 
is estimated by the EBU that 100 million viewers watch every year, though it is 
popularly believed that the total is over 200 million or higher (Fricker et al, 2007). 
One of the main aims of the ESC was that it would act as a catalyst for pioneer-
ing new broadcasting techniques (BBC 1992). Such developments are evidenced 
in the introduction of colour broadcasting in 1968, more elaborate stage designs, 
computerised scoreboards in the 1980s, the introduction of satellite links with the 
jury spokespersons in 1994 and virtual reality in 1996. The contest was broadcast 
on the internet for the first time in 2000. Other significant changes in the con-
test’s history have concerned language rules. Between 1973 and 1977 countries 
were permitted to sing in the language of their choice. From that point until 1999 
participants had to perform in their national language. This therefore reflects an 
effort on the part of the EBU to promote identity articulation at a national level 
as well as the international. Today each national entry can be performed in any 
language, including imaginary languages as evidenced by Belgium in both 2003 
and 2008; which in itself can be seen as a reflection of the contested nature of 
Belgian linguistic identity. In 1999, the use of a live orchestra was abandoned and 
has never returned to the contest since. However, one of the largest changes in the 
competition’s history has been the eastward expansion of the contest which has 
attracted renewed interest in the contest, and renewed controversies. 
The re-integration of Eastern European countries into the mainstream of 
Europe led to a relegation systems being introduced in 1993 before the current 
semi-final qualification rounds from 2004 onwards. In 1996, in response to pres-
sure from Germany, which had been relegated as a result of its poor showing in 
the event in 1995, a pre-selection featuring 29 countries was organised in which 
the top 22 songs would proceed to the live final (O’Connor, 2007, p. 138). Of 
those relegated, Germany was one of them, 1996 would be the first and to date, 
only time that Germany has not participated in a Eurovision Song Contest final. 
The absence of Germany and the expansion of the ESC meant that the EBU were 
faced with a logistical challenge balancing the interests of existing participants 
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with the aspirations of new entrant countries from Eastern Europe. Following 
on from this a “Big Four” rule was introduced in 2000, later re-named “Big Five” 
with the return of Italy to the contest in 2011 for the first time since 1997. This 
rule effectively ensured that the largest financial contributors to the competition, 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom all had guaranteed places 
in the Eurovision finals every year. The Big Five rule represents a response to 
the eastward enlargement of the competition, a symbolic appeasement on behalf 
of the EBU to its western broadcasters in the wake of further eastward enlarge-
ment. The Big Five rule is therefore a reflection of the tensions between eastward 
enlargement and the need for Western financial security.
Eurovision provides an arena for the discussion and analysis of pan-European 
identities. In this context Switzerland, a founding Eurovision nation, provides a 
good example as its complex identity was manifested in the way it presented itself 
on the Eurovision stage. Switzerland last won the contest in 1988, when Céline 
Dion, a French-Canadian, took the prize with a song written by Turkish song-
writer, Atilla Şereftuğ. In recent times they have opted for a girl band from Estonia, 
Vanilla Ninja in 2005 and an international group Six4One in 2006. The entry that 
year was written by German songwriters Ralph Siegel and Bernd Meinunger. The 
group, Six4One consisted of six performers from across Europe; Malta, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel and Portugal. Switzerland, as a united 
country, representing its national identity in the Eurovision Song Contest is there-
fore a construct. The group Six4One can therefore be considered to be reflective 
of the complexities concerning Swiss identity.
Eligibility to participate is not determined by geographic inclusion within the 
continent of Europe, despite the inference in the title of the competition. Rather 
entry to the event is dependent upon the national broadcaster being a full and 
active member of the EBU. Several countries which are geographically outwith 
the boundaries of Europe have competed; namely Israel and Azerbaijan since 
1973 and 2008 respectively. Morocco in North Africa took part in 1980. In addi-
tion, Turkey and Russia, which are both transcontinental countries with most of 
their territory outside of Europe, have competed respectively since 1975 and 1994. 
Thus, Europe as a socio-political construct (Made, 2003, pp.183–184) is not just 
mirrored in the ESC but also effectively reinforced.
The Eurovision Song Contest: A tool for nation building 
The Eurovision Song Contest has reflected the changing map of Europe in the 
wake of the collapse of communism. Although officially it is a non-political event, 
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the contest has reflected wider political events; the 1990 contest, held in Zagreb 
after the collapse of the Berlin Wall is a strong example of this. The event featured 
songs which made reference to Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate (Norway), Ireland’s 
“Somewhere in Europe”; Austria pleaded for “No More Walls”, Germany’s effort 
was called “Frei Zu Leben” (“Free to Live”) whilst the winner from Italy called for 
a united Europe (Gambaccini, 1998, p. 114). Yugoslavia took part in the Eurovision 
Song Contest from 1961 until 1992 and was the only Eastern European and commu-
nist country to do so. The mere participation may be seen as a form of nationalist 
politics and protest as a result of Tito’s refusal to submit Yugoslavia to Soviet politi-
cal and cultural dominance (Vuletic, 2007, p. 83). Yugoslavia participated in the 
Eurovision Song Contest for the final time in 1992 and the following year Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia all made their debuts. In 1994, Russia, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania all made their respective debuts, 
the largest ever influx of new countries to the contest since the inaugural competi-
tion in 1956. The rush of new countries to enter the Eurovision Song Contest in the 
wake of the collapse of communism can be seen as a reflection of the wider return 
to Europe discourse which prevailed in the post-communist and Baltic Sea region. 
In this context, as the Estonian case exemplifies, participation in the ESC was seen 
as a rite of passage for prospective EU members keen to assert their European 
credentials in a global setting. The return to Europe rhetoric essentially meant 
throwing off Soviet rule and re-emerging on the world stage, fully integrated with 
European and global geopolitical structures. Estonia, after becoming a full member 
of the EBU in 1993, another manifestation of the Return to Europe, was eligible 
to take part in qualifying rounds for the ESC that year. For Estonia, Eurovision 
provided a platform, not only showing that they were a “normal” independent 
country and an integral part of Europe, but also one which enabled it to compete 
on a level playing field with the major western powers. Participation in Eurovision 
is therefore confirmation of a country’s European credentials and a performance 
in Europeanness itself (Borneman & Fowler, 1997). However, what it means to be 
European is open to question and therefore open to debate, which in turn makes 
an analysis of the ESC all the more interesting. Lauristin highlights the various 
“signposts” which identify a “return” to Europe and cites hosting Eurovision suc-
cessfully as one of them (Lauristin, 2009). In this context the ESC has become a 
cultural ritual and a discursive tool in defining a nation, as Ilmar Raag, former 
chairman of Estonian Television expands:
In the beginning of the 1990s Estonia used every possibility to go to the West; 
this was a policy across the board. Estonia tried to become members of almost 
every international organisation; the European Union, Council of Europe, 
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European Broadcasting Union. In the European Broadcasting Union the 
biggest and most outstanding project is the Eurovision Song Contest. It was 
almost natural for Estonia to take part in order to show themselves as active 
members of this organisation and also to show to the rest of Europe and the 

















1993 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia
1994 Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia
1998 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
2000 Latvia
2003 Ukraine





Table 1: Countries entering the ESC for the first time, 1956–2008 44 55
4 Before German reunification in 1990 West Germany participated, representing the Federal 
Republic of Germany. East Germany (the German Democratic Republic) did not compete.
5 Serbia and Montenegro participated for the first time in 2004 however after the union was 
dissolved in 2006 they both entered as separate entities in 2007.
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Arguably one of the strongest examples of the ESC being used as a platform 
for nation building is the participation of Bosnia Herzegovina in 1993. At the 
time of the 1993 contest the war in the Balkans was raging and this was given 
particular attention in the songs from Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia, which, 
along with Slovenia were making their debut at the competition that year. At a 
press conference, a member of the Bosnian delegation highlighted the signifi-
cance arising from participating in the event for the country: 
We have many problems to come here [to Eurovision]. We go out from the sur-
rendered city, running across the runway in the middle of the night, through 
grenades, through snipers. We risked our lives to be here to show the whole 
of the world that we are just normal, peaceful people in Bosnia Herzegovina 
and that we just want to live in peace and to do our jobs (Why Not Millstreet? 
[TV] RTE 1993). 
The delegation from Bosnia Herzegovina sought to portray their country as 
an ordinary European state despite news reports in the wider press suggesting 
otherwise. The entries from both Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina reflected 
the turmoil in each country. The ESC is thus significant in terms of both 
demonstrating national sovereignty to a pan-European audience and also rep-
resenting a return to normalcy, as highlighted by Eglitis in chapter one. The 
Bosnia Herzegovina entry was entitled “Sva Bol Svijeta” (Pain in the world). The 
Croatian effort, “Don’t ever cry”, had similar undertones and told the story of 
a young man, Ivan, who died in the war (Vuletic, 2007, p. 97). Furthermore, 
Slovenia which had largely escaped the bloodshed of the war made no reference 
to the conflict in their Eurovision debut. 
Gender, sexuality and ethno-nationalist politics in the 
Eurovision Song Contest
The ESC has routinely been used as a platform for political statements, reflect-
ing the rhetoric of conflict. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 is one such 
example. Greece withdrew from the contest in 1975 when it was announced 
that Turkey would enter, and neither country took part in the same contest 
until 1978 (Gambaccini, 1998, p. 69). The Greek entry of 1976, “Panaghia Mou, 
Panaghia Mou” (My Lady, My Lady) was a direct protest against the Turkish 
invasion. The lyrics included references to napalm ruins and fields of refugees. 
It shows how symbolic the contest is in terms of nationalist politics as neither 
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country was willing to share the same stage. Greece and Cyprus have become 
infamous for awarding each other the maximum twelve points every year 
whilst giving very few, if any, to Turkey. When Cyprus broke with tradition 
in 2003 and awarded eight points to Turkey, it did not go unnoticed when the 
spokesperson declared ‘Europe, peace to Cyprus, Turkey eight points’ (Melani 
Steliou, Eurovision Song Contest 2003). Thus the political relevance of the 
gesture was flagged, representing a change in the way the relationship between 
Cyprus and Turkey is imagined. It is noteworthy that this occurred at a time 
when both sides of the divided island were moving closer together as a result 
of the on-going peace talks. Although following this, some Greek-Cypriots 
accused the state-run broadcasting authorities of rigging the vote (Soloman, 
2007, p. 140). Similarly, points exchanged between Greece and Turkey have 
increased in recent years and this has been attributed to the so-called “earth-
quake diplomacy”6 of 1999 (Polychronakis, 2008).
Israel’s participation in the ESC not only highlights the socially con-
structed nature of the Europe in which Eurovision operates but also the 
highly politicised image that the country presents through participation. In 
1998, the Israeli Broadcasting Authority (IBA) selected a trans-gender artist, 
Dana International, to represent Israel at Eurovision. This caused uproar in 
the country, with ultra-Orthodox Jews, considering Dana International to be 
peripheral to their ideal of national identity (Raykoff, 2007, p. 11). Others such 
as composer, Svika Pikk, highlighted the fact that it was a chance to promote 
Israel as a liberal and tolerant country, changing the way the Middle East is 
imagined. Politician Shlomo Ben-Izri claimed that the decision “symbolised 
the sickness of a secular Israel” (BBC News, 10.05.1998). Such discourses show 
how seriously some nations approach the ESC; a Eurovision entry is seen as 
representative of the entire nation. The IBA defended their choice, “we should 
be seen as a liberal, free country that chooses songs on their merits not on the 
basis of the body of a man or woman” (Raykoff, 2007, p. 11). Furthermore, the 
1999 Eurovision Song Contest in Jerusalem was dogged by controversy. The 
interval act featuring Dana International singing below Jerusalem’s historic city 
walls caused further outrage to ultra-Orthodox Jews, who were also incensed 
at religious lyrics being used in the performance. The rules of the ESC state 
that a full dress rehearsal must take place on the Friday evening before the 
contest. This violated the traditions of the Jewish Sabbath where all activity is 
6 A series of earthquakes in both Greece and Turkey in the summer of 1999 saw the two 
countries cooperate in a humanitarian capacity, the experience is said to have improved 
relations between the two countries.
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forbidden from sunset on Friday through to Saturday evening, again provoking 
angry reactions from conservatives despite the fact that, officially, Israel is a 
secular state. A compromise was reached, the IBA held the rehearsal in private. 
The Israeli entrants of 1999, four-piece boy band Eden, with the song, “Happy 
Birthday”, was a celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the 
state of Israel. At the 2000 contest, Israeli representatives, Ping-pong, waved 
Syrian flags during rehearsals. Israel and Syria were officially in a state of war 
at the time and Israel’s then Deputy Education Minister, Shlomo Yahalom, 
called for the group’s participation to be banned claiming that they failed to 
represent national values (BBC News, 11.05.2000). The waving of the Syrian 
flag during rehearsals on Israel’s Independence Day, 10 May, in particular, 
caused further upset to officials, who publically boycotted the group leaving 
them to cover their own expenses. Despite threats from the Israeli delegation 
to ban the group from performing altogether, they appeared at the 2000 ESC 
and waved the Syrian flag along with the Israeli flag in a call for peace. The case 
of Israel has shown how the Eurovision Song Contest often touches on sensi-
tive subjects such as gender identity, sexuality, religion and politics. Indeed, 
in Israel and Jerusalem, these issues often intrude on even the most unlikely 
of situations. The reaction of some officials in Israel has shown how seriously 
they regard Israel’s image. Such controversies therefore represent a struggle in 
Israel between secularism and religious freedom. 
Gender and sexuality were issues which came to the foreground in Slovenia 
in 2002 when the transvestite act, Sestre, were chosen to represent the coun-
try. It was the choice of a jury who overruled the public vote and was seen by 
some as promoting an image of Slovenia which was peripheral to the traditions 
of a Catholic country and so street protests ensued. The debate reached the 
European Parliament with Lousewies van der Laan of the Public Liberties and 
Civic Rights Committee openly questioning Slovenia’s commitment to human 
rights. Van der Laan was “very shocked to learn that in Slovenia there is again 
a debate relating to sexual minorities. That the issue of gay rights is coming 
up, confirms to us that, perhaps, Slovenia is not yet ready for EU membership” 
(BBC News, 05.03.2002). Sestre went on to perform in Eurovision in 2002. This 
episode further serves as evidence of the seriousness that some countries take 
of their image, and for that matter, Eurovision itself. 
In 2009, a series of disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan unfolded 
throughout the live broadcasts of the semi-finals and final. During the semi-
finals, an introductory “postcard” leading into the Armenian performance 
depicted, amongst other monuments, a statue located in Stepanakert, capital 
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city of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which constitutes a part 
of Azerbaijan. The statue was built in Soviet times to celebrate the Armenian 
heritage of the area. The delegation from Azerbaijan complained to the EBU 
that the video clip was unacceptable based on the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh 
is a part of Azerbaijan, and it was subsequently edited out for the broadcast 
of the final. In retaliation, the presenter of the Armenian votes held up a clip-
board with the monument’s picture on it multiple times as she read off the 
votes. In the background, a screen in the capital’s main square could also be 
seen to display the disputed monument. In August 2009, the BBC reported 
that several people had been questioned in Azerbaijan after their votes for 
Armenia were traced by mobile phone service providers. According to the BBC 
“one man was accused of being unpatriotic and a ‘potential security threat’ 
after he sent a text backing Armenia’s song […] the Azerbaijani authorities 
said people had merely been invited to explain why they voted for Armenia” 
(BBC News, 18.08.2009). The issue was investigated by the EBU and whilst 
they found no evidence to pursue the affair, a clause preventing telecom com-
munication providers from disclosing personal information was added to the 
rules of the contest. The 2013 contest held in Malmö, Sweden was not without 
controversy after footage emerged on YouTube suggesting that Azerbaijani 
officials had been buying votes ahead of the final. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham 
Aliyev ordered an internal investigation after it emerged that Russia received 
no points in the final from Azerbaijan. Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, 
claimed that the result was outrageous and that the incident “will not remain 
without a response” whilst Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko also 
questioned the voting results (BBC News, 21.05.2013). In February 2014, the 
EBU confirmed that there had been irregularities in the voting results from 
one country in 2013 but did not disclose any further information. The EBU 
also pointed out that this did not affect the result. 
The politics of pop: voting in the Eurovision Song Contest
Since its inception, various systems have been used to determine the winner 
of the Eurovision Song Contest. During the 1950s and 1960s the winner was 
determined by ten juries from each participating country who in turn gave 
one vote to their favourite song. However this was not without problems and 
in 1969 four countries tied for first place (Spain, France, Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom). With no precedent in place, all four nations were declared 
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the winner. Between 1971 and 1973 two jurors from each country voted for 
the top five songs, this was done “in vision” with the respective jurors seen 
on-screen casting their votes. In 1975, a new system was introduced which is 
still the defining feature of the contest today; countries vote from one to eight 
then ten points and finally the maximum twelve points is awarded. 
Until 1997 this traditional jury system consisting of 16 people of differ-
ing ages from the music industry and the general public had been used. As a 
result of the 1996 contest, which handed Ireland its fourth win in five years, 
there was much discussion about the relevance of the juries at the ESC. The 
British act, Gina G, went on to global success despite coming eighth in the 
event. At the 1997 ESC, in response to criticism of the result from the previous 
year, telephone voting or “televoting” was trialled in five competing nations 
(O’Connor, 2007, p. 148). By 1998, this had been extended to all states unless 
there was a specific reason why voting should not be used, such as a voting 
malfunction or a weak telephone system, in which case a back-up jury was 
used. The change in the voting procedure was described as a departure from 
“a corrupt, narrowly-based voting system in favour of wider democracy” (The 
Independent, 13.05.1998). However, since televoting has been introduced fur-
ther controversy has arisen amidst claims that the voting is “political” or has 
been hijacked by national diasporas voting for their homeland entries. Such 
claims were exacerbated after 2004 when the contest was opened up further 
to incorporate many Former Soviet Republics.
An examination of the nature of the debates on voting in the ESC reveals 
more about the wider socio-political context within which the Eurovision Song 
Contest operates, a Europe still divided between “old” and “new”. Every winner 
from 2001–2008 has been from a new-entrant country outside the contest’s tra-
ditional Western European heartland, or from long-time participant countries 
which had not yet scored a victory. Greece, Turkey and Finland, all of which 
are located on the physical edges of Western Europe, won for the first time in 
this period (Fricker, 2009, p. 1–2). This has been largely met with negative press 
attention in Western Europe. The failure of the Netherlands to reach the final 
in 2005 was held up in the Dutch media as an example of how power within 
the EU has shifted eastwards (Browne, 2005). Thus the ESC is a stage where 
wider political tensions concerning EU enlargement are enacted. 
Recent studies have found that voting patterns do exist; former Soviet, 
Scandinavian and Balkan countries all tend to vote for each other (Fenn et al., 
2006). The 2006 study also found that Estonia is grouped in with the Nordic 
countries; Estonia’s voting patterns largely reflect the return to Europe rhetoric 
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of Estonian politicians in the 1990s. The accusation that the ESC is political is 
nothing new; since the 1980s Greece and Cyprus have regularly exchanged the 
top vote whilst awarding few, if any, to Turkey. However, since the contest has 
expanded ever eastward it has infused new interest and with that, new contro-
versies, in particular the inclusion of countries with large diaspora populations. 
Some strong examples of this include Turkey, Armenia and Russia.
Turkey, which first entered the competition in 1975, did not fare well until 
the late 1990s. With the introduction of the public vote, Turkey’s entries have 
been markedly more successful, going on to win the event in 2003. What 
is interesting to note is that Germany, with a large population of people of 
Turkish origin, tends to vote overwhelmingly for Turkey. Between 2003 and 
2006, Germany awarded Turkey with 44 points out of a maximum of 48. In 
2003, when Turkey won, it received most votes from Germany, Belgium, France 
and the Netherlands, all of which have a sizeable Turkish diaspora. In recent 
years Turkey has also received the high scores from the UK vote and when 
the popular vote did not go to Turkey it went to Greece, both of which have 
long-established communities in the UK. Furthermore Armenia, which first 
entered the competition in 2006, has until 2011, consistently placed in the top 
ten countries, receiving most votes from Russia, Netherlands, Belgium and 
Turkey. All of which have a large Armenian diaspora. 
Arguably the strongest example of diaspora voting in the Eurovision Song 
Contest is the votes that Russia receives. Russia, which first participated in the 
event in 1994, has like Turkey, received more votes after the introduction of the 
public telephone vote. In recent years, Russia has received the most votes from 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Israel. All of which awarded 
the winning Russian entry the maximum vote in 2008 and all of which have 
significant Russian-speaking populations. Whilst this again is not evidence 
of politics per se, it does suggest that there does appear to be a direct link with 
the diaspora vote. The reaction to this apparent diaspora voting in the wider 
Western press has been overwhelmingly negative as headlines such as “UK 
may quit Eurovision amid fears tactical voting is turning competition into a 
farce” suggest (Daily Mail 29.05.2008). Terry Wogan quit in his role as BBC 
commentator after the UK finished last in 2008 whilst Russia went on to win. 
The debates surrounding the ESC and the increasing politicisation of the 
contest, namely by Eastern European participant states, ignores the voting cor-
relations which exist between the UK and Ireland for example and also serves 
as a further example of the othering of Eastern Europe. In this context, com-
ments about so-called Eastern-bloc voting at the ESC can be seen as a reflection 
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of the general rhetoric concerning European Union enlargement. The 2007 ESC 
semi-final, where all ten qualifiers came from east of the Danube, inflamed 
the passions of critics of the contest and arguably paved the way for further 
changes to the organisation of the event. In a bid to dispel the controversies 
of the previous year, the EBU separated countries on the basis of location and 
by those which had previously tended to vote for each other into various dif-
ferent “pots”. Countries which took part in one semi-final were not eligible to 
vote for those in another, effectively splitting the vote. A further jury vote was 
introduced in the semi-finals meaning that in 2008, Sweden, which ranked 
twelfth in the popular vote, qualified ahead of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. Despite the changes to the voting system, the inherent perception 
of corruption persisted mainly amongst Western competitors. In fact, the Big 
Four (Big Five as of 2011) nations were to pave the way for further changes the 
following year (O’Connor, 2007, p.195). In 2009, the EBU re-introduced the use 
of the jury vote, combining it in an equal division with the public telephone 
vote for the final and this was expanded further to include both semi-finals in 
2010. The Big Four countries provide up to 40 per cent of the EBU Eurovision 
budget due to their sizeable populations (Roberts, 2009, p. 151). Such a move 
can be seen as evidence of the EBU desire to continue to expand the competi-
tion whilst at the same time providing reassurance to long-standing (Western) 
participants that their concerns were being addressed whilst at the same time 
ensuring that funding for the competition continues to be secured. In short, 
when it comes to the ESC, Western Europe still holds the economic power 
within the EBU which therefore re-inscribes the image of the East as underde-
veloped in comparison. This confirms the arguments that the imagined East/
West divide still exists today within an EU accession context (Kuus 2004, p. 
473; Mälksoo, 2009, p. 656).
The ESC as a showcase for the nation
Göran Bolin (2006) argues that the Eurovision Song Contest is the modern day 
equivalent of the World’s Fairs of the 19th Century. As the world exhibitions 
declined in popularity following World War II, mass media events came to 
dominate culture in modern societies. The Eurovision Song Contest is a media 
event (Dayan & Katz, 1992), yet it is one which is unique in its genre. Whilst 
the Academy or Grammy Awards can be considered to be media events, they 
represent competition amongst actors and musicians whilst the ESC, on the 
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other hand, is a competition between national broadcasters in Europe, effec-
tively a competition between nation states. The ESC is also distinctive in that 
it was originally devised as a television show where as other programmes are 
events which were broadcast. In chapter one I argue that the Eurovision Song 
Contest is a mega-event (Roache, 2001, p. 1) which has the capacity to draw the 
eyes of the world and provides an opportunity for the host country to promote 
or even change its image. However, with these opportunities comes scrutiny 
as the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest held in Baku, Azerbaijan demonstrated. 
The ESC in Baku not only put Azerbaijan’s authoritarian government and its 
human rights record under the international spotlight, it also drew attention 
to EU relations with Azerbaijan (Gluhovic, 2013, p. 207).
Since 2001, the contest has come to be staged in locations outside of the 
traditional Eurovision heartland and has become a discursive tool in defining 
Europeanness and effectively has become a strategy for Europeanisation and 
nation branding. Bolin argues that the World’s Fairs had separate pavilions for 
each nation state and that through competing against each other, participat-
ing nations in the ESC can win the right to host the event, thus providing a 
platform to the country to showcase itself (Bolin, 2006, p. 201). Furthermore, 
technology also allows host countries to pioneer new broadcasting techniques 
to present a positive international image of the nation state to a global audience. 
As recent contests in Moscow (2009) and Baku (2012) have shown, this offers 
an opportunity to try and produce more and more elaborate shows. Indeed, 
the 2012 contest in Azerbaijan was staged in a venue, the Crystal Hall, which 
was custom built specifically for the ESC. 
The ‘tourist gaze’ (Urry, 2002, p.1–3) is applicable to the ESC in that the 
contest has played a role in refining and promoting the international images of 
participating countries. The tourist gaze is a set of expectations and assump-
tions within which individuals regard destinations in particular and tourism 
in general. It is fundamentally “constructed through difference” (Urry, 2002, 
p. 1), understood by contrast to the routine of everyday life. The resources for 
constructing the tourist gaze are drawn from ‘a variety of non-tourist prac-
tices, such as film, television, literature, magazines records and videos’ (Ibid., 
p. 1–3). It is this use of media which therefore makes this idea relevant to the 
Eurovision Song Contest. The reach of the mass media means that it may not 
be necessary to travel in order to see with the tourist gaze (Ibid., p. 90). The 
strongest examples are the short film clips shown between each song during 
the ESC. These “postcards” resemble tourist advertising campaigns; promoting 
scenery, cityscapes and other places of interest to the potential tourist, and are 
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in essence representations of essentialised heritage. In particular, the postcards 
used during the Estonian ESC production in 2002 were drawn from the nar-
ratives of Brand Estonia, which is discussed in chapter five. Consequently, 
the ESC represents a platform for nation branding, allowing host countries to 
convey their own images on their own terms. In particular the cases of Ireland, 
Turkey and Russia exemplify this and will be briefly discussed in the follow-
ing. All are united by a desire to banish their peripheral status and aspire to 
greater centrality in Europe. Ireland has won seven Eurovision Song Contests 
in total, more times than any other nation. The continued success of Ireland 
at the contest brought much attention to the financial pressures that staging 
the contest successively placed on national broadcaster Raidió Teilifís Éireann 
(RTE). In this context, the ESC took on greater significance for Ireland which 
by its continued and successful staging of the show, along with the launch 
of global dance phenomenon, Riverdance, as part of the interval act for the 
1994 contest, meant Ireland was able to cultivate an image of modernity and 
economic success (Lin, 2010, p. 53). For Turkey, a nation with long-standing 
EU accession aspirations, the ESC provided the opportunity for the country 
to showcase itself as an integrally European state rather than a peripheral or 
Eurasian one (Erkem, 2009, p. 500). Finally, in 2009, Russia staged the largest 
contest ever in terms of scale and cost of production, evidence of a desire to 
promote a resurgent Russia to a global audience.
At the periphery: Ireland, Turkey, Russia and  
Azerbaijan at the ESC 
Ireland first won the ESC in 1970, at a time when the country was seen very 
much as an agricultural backwater, spending most of the 20th century in eco-
nomic stagnation (Singleton, 2013, p. 146). State broadcaster RTE went on to 
stage the ESC in Dublin in 1971 confounding concerns from other participat-
ing countries that the broadcaster would not be capable (Top Ten: Eurovision 
[TV] 2000). The ESC therefore acted as a platform for Ireland to manage its 
image internationally. By the 1990s and until the recent global economic crisis, 
Ireland was seen as the Celtic Tiger (Goodman, 2000, p. 157), and the narra-
tives concerning Eurovision during the 1990s, of which Ireland won and staged 
four contests in five years, reflect this. Whilst Ireland’s rise involved state pro-
motions of trade, not nation branding per se, the country used the ESC as a 
platform for image building or as Greg Clark argues “gentle political purposes 
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in terms of redefining a country’s image” (Clark, 2008, p. 94). The ESC in the 
1990s was an opportunity to promote an alternative vision of Ireland, one of 
economic success and stability. RTE was responsible for staging the event in 
1993 after Ireland won in 1992. Instead of taking Dublin as the expected choice 
for the host city, RTE took the show to Millstreet, a small village in County 
Cork with a population of 1,500 people. The village boasted one of the largest 
equestrian auditoriums in the country, the Green Glens Arena. The decision 
represented an attempt by RTE to showcase the wider country through the 
ESC. A clear sign of the importance that Ireland attached to the event was the 
appearance of Irish Premier, Albert Reynolds, who visited the arena during 
renovations:
You could not buy the space on television screens all around the world that 
you get from the Eurovision Song Contest. In the past we have found that RTE 
do a magnificent job in showing Ireland at its best and I have no doubt that 
down in Millstreet when you combine the talents of RTE and the people here 
in Millstreet, we will have an excellent production on the night (RTE,1993). 
It is interesting to note that Reynolds’ was paying attention to the value that 
the ESC had in terms of promoting Ireland, essentially the contest acted as a 
three hour television advert, one which as he states RTE could not afford to 
buy using conventional airtime. Ireland went on to win the event in 1993 and 
the contest return to Dublin the following year. 1994 saw seven new compet-
ing nations join Eurovision which along with production costs increasingly 
meant that Eurovision was becoming an ever more expensive television format. 
Consequently, critics began to question the usefulness of RTE hosting the ESC. 
Liam Miller, Head of Programmes at RTE at the time, argued that failure to pro-
duce the show would not only be damaging for Ireland’s image but would also 
impact upon national pride (BBC & Open University, 1995). The interval act 
in 1994 was the then unknown Riverdance, an act which combined traditional 
Irish folk music with modern dance. Riverdance became a global phenom-
enon, and with the single exception of ABBA, is the biggest money-spinner 
ever created by Eurovision, (Gambaccini, 1998, p. 130). Riverdance created the 
prospect that managing the contest would do more than drain the budget of 
the broadcaster. The runaway success of Riverdance provided RTE with a hand-
some return on their initial Eurovision investment. It still remains popular 
today and succeeded in transforming the image of Irish traditional dancing into 
something modern, exciting and exportable (BBC & Open University, 1995).
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Ireland won the contest again in 1994 meaning that RTE was therefore 
responsible for staging the event again the following year. The 1995 edition 
was like the previous year, held at the Point Theatre in Dublin. The year also 
marked the fortieth anniversary of the Eurovision Song Contest and so the 
pressure was on for Ireland to stage a spectacular show. RTE had mastered the 
art of appearing lavish in production but actually being frugal in reality, re-
using previous equipment and materials for the event the following year (BBC 
& Open University, 1995). The contest also reflected political events in Ireland 
at the time with the presenter, Mary Kennedy, introducing the show by making 
reference to the Northern Ireland peace process. 
The Eurovision Song Contest is an event which celebrates a shared love of 
music by people of different cultures. This island of ours is shared by people of 
different cultures. We invite you to join with us tonight in our own celebration 
that neighbours north and south can now, together, share in the warm glow of 
peace. Long may it shine (Kennedy, 1995). 
RTE used the ESC as a platform for political commentary, despite the EBU 
insisting that the event is not a political one. Furthermore, the comments con-
tributed to a change in the way the relationship between the Republic of Ireland 
and Northern Ireland is imagined. Ireland won the contest again in 1996 and 
so were due to host the event again in 1997. This victory made headline news, 
not only because of the feat of winning the event again but also because of the 
financial burden that the contest appeared to present to RTE. 
When it costs the winning nation up to £3 million to stage, it is not surprising 
that this year’s celebrations are somewhat muted […] The state broadcaster 
RTE are putting a brave face on it, but admits that hosting the event is becom-
ing a bit of a challenge (BBC News [TV] 20.05.1996). 
Michael D Higgins, then Minister of Culture, was angered by suggestions that 
the Eurovision Song Contest was anything other than positive for Ireland and 
suggested that the victory represented “a combination of different excellences 
both musically and culturally” (BBC News [TV] 20.05.1996). It is interesting to 
note the aims that RTE had for the show; a departure from Celtic imagery and 
a more contemporary, youth-orientated broadcast content (RTE, 1997). Despite 
initial contact between the BBC and RTE regarding sharing the responsibility for 
staging the event, RTE decided that they would go ahead with the 1997 produc-
tion alone and the contest returned to Dublin. Thus the 1997 contest represented 
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a stronger, more confident Ireland and RTE, and a symbol of national pride 
during the boom years of the Celtic Tiger. Ireland used the ESC in a wider politi-
cal battle for recognition on the international stage, in an attempt to banish its 
peripheral status. This process of discursively performing Europeanness through 
the ESC has continued, as the Turkish example demonstrates. 
Turkey won the Eurovision Song Contest in 2003, three decades after it 
made its debut in the contest. The victory made headlines and was viewed by 
some politicians as having possible political ramifications for Turkey’s aspira-
tions to join the EU. 
This is a milestone in creating an atmosphere for entry in the EU like we 
deserve […] it is a very important day […] Turkey has earned a lot of sympathy 
from the European people (BBC News, 25.05.2003).
Turkish victory in the ESC coincided with the wider peace process going on 
in Cyprus, which was reflected in the contest itself through the Turkish act 
receiving points from Cyprus for the first time in Eurovision history, a gesture 
which was not lost on the spokesperson for Cyprus who made specific refer-
ence to the ongoing peace process during the broadcast. Again, this was despite 
insistence from the EBU that Eurovision is not a political event. Victory in the 
ESC therefore represented a culmination of energies as the country worked 
towards acceptance in Europe, namely the EU. Eurovision recognised Turkey’s 
cultural contribution and therefore afforded the country the opportunity to be 
accepted as a European state, note the tone of the language used in the quote 
from Kursat Tuzmen, “like we deserve”. 
Turkey staged the 49th ESC in Istanbul in May 2004. The theme for the con-
test was “Under the Same Sky” which highlighted the significance of Turkish 
integration into a united Europe. The Minister for Broadcasting underlined 
how seriously the Turkish government viewed the ESC at the time: 
I want to underline how important Eurovision is for the Turkish govern-
ment, which regards the contest as a unique opportunity to promote Turkey 
in Europe. The event is […] more important than any other political summit 
(Soloman, 2007, p. 148). 
Thus, Eurovision was a tool for nation branding, which, as described earlier in 
this chapter represents a form of soft power, unlike government summits. The 
notion that the ESC was more important than political summits can be seen as 
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a rejection of the previous model of European integration that the Turks had 
been following, the subtext being. Turkey’s efforts had failed elsewhere yet they 
had succeeded in the ESC, which is based on a popular vote. 
The 2004 contest featured the now customary postcard images; various 
beauty spots from around Turkey as well as historical sites were broadcast 
whilst the Turkish winner of Miss World, Azra Akin, introduced each national 
f lag. The postcard images therefore served as a way of further promoting 
Turkish success on the world stage. Much of the content in 2004 was of a dis-
tinctly cosmopolitan nature; featuring café culture, nightlife, beach resorts and 
modern dance, suggesting that the show was produced with the European audi-
ence in mind. The broadcast attracted strong criticism from Kurdish groups 
who claimed that the scenes portrayed cultural heritage from the Kurdish, 
Armenian and Syrian regions of the country (Kurdish Media, 2004). Yet, after 
closer examination of the 2004 broadcast, the unambiguous message was that 
this is a distinctly Turkish landscape. National identity as a construction and 
the politics of nationalism are both reinforced through the ESC in 2004.
In 2008, Russian singer Dima Bilan won the Eurovision Song Contest and 
in the words of Russian Prime Minister at the time, Vladimir Putin, the victory 
represented ‘not only Dima Bilan’s personal success, but one more triumph 
for all of Russia’ (New York Times, 25.05.2008). Russian national broadcaster 
Channel One went on to stage the event in Moscow in May 2009. The 2009 
contest was like no other before; it was the most expensive in the contest’s his-
tory, costing over €30 million (compared to the 13 million Euros spent in 2007). 
It was also the largest physically, the stage, according to the organisers, held 
30% of the world’s available LED lighting. The event was also one of the most 
controversial, with various political and nationalist grievances being played 
out in front of an international audience. Given the unprecedented budget in 
the midst of a global financial crisis and the overall spectacle surrounding the 
2009 affair, the ESC was therefore a chance to promote a positive international 
image of Russia on its own terms to the global media, given that much of the 
international media coverage of Russia in recent years has come from outside 
Russia and therefore outside its control. The Official Programme Booklet pub-
lished by the national broadcaster, Channel One, emphasised the significance 
of the event in terms of boosting the international image of the host country. 
The Eurovision Song Contest was therefore an opportunity to present a positive 
side of Russia to the world through the media. 
In the gaze of the Western European media, Russia has not fared well. The 
recent and public fallout from the death of Alexander Litvenenko, the recent 
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killings of prominent journalists that were critical of the Putin administration, 
such as Anna Politkovskaya, as well as the so-called cyber attacks on Estonia 
and the 2008 war with Georgia, have left Russia open to criticism with con-
sistent negative narratives appearing in the UK media (Daily Mail 27.08. 2007; 
Reuters, 15.08.2008). Georgia, which only the year before was engaged in a 
war with Russia, after initially refusing to take part in the show after the war, 
confirmed their choice of entry in early 2009. However the song, “We Don’t 
Wanna Put In”, was largely seen as a swipe at Vladimir Putin and deemed to 
be “too political” by the EBU. The Georgian broadcasting authorities were 
asked to change the lyrics of the song or submit a different entry, which they 
declined to do and so withdrew from the competition. 
In the run-up to the contest, the Moscow authorities made headlines with 
alleged heavy handed tactics being employed in the efforts to clean up the 
city with up to 30,000 stray dogs removed from the city streets in a bid to pre-
sent a positive image of the city to the international delegations (Daily Mail, 
15.05.2009). The article also reported rumors that prostitutes and homeless peo-
ple were to be taken out of the city centre as reportedly happened with the 1980 
Olympic Games, thus reinforcing the notion of such spectator events being seen 
as a viable and serious platform for image building. It was also announced that 
a gay pride march would take place on the same day as the main broadcast. The 
organisers hoped to draw attention to what they see as systematic discrimina-
tion against the gay community in Russia whilst at the same time hoping that 
the heavy media presence for the Eurovision Song Contest would decrease the 
chance of violence, which occurred during Moscow Pride in both 2006 and 
2007. The Mayor of Moscow previously described homosexuality as “satanic” 
and banned the proposed march. The protest did go ahead and over 20 people 
were forcibly removed and arrested by police. Whilst there was no repeat of the 
previously violent scenes, such unrest and the forcible removal of the protestors 
provided a striking counter narrative to the comparatively innocuous scenes 
broadcast during the Eurovision Song Contest itself. In this context, the label 
of the “Beijing Olympics of Eurovision”, by UK commentator Graham Norton, 
takes on deeper significance. The authorities in Beijing were criticised after 
reports emerged of heavy-handed tactics whilst the city was being prepared for 
the Olympic Games, protests relating to the situation in Tibet were silenced and 
it was alleged that a recall of contaminated milk products was delayed so not 
to damage China’s international image during the events (The Daily Telegraph, 
15.09.2008). Confirmation of how seriously the Russian authorities were taking 
the event came when Vladimir Putin appeared at one of the rehearsals to oversee 
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the preparations for himself. Security was tight in Moscow in the run-up to the 
2009 contest with a heavy police presence: up to 20,000 officers were brought in 
to preside over the event (Daily Mail, 15.05. 2009). 
From a technical perspective ESC 2009 was flawless, a piece of highly sophis-
ticated television and therefore a triumph for Russia. To reinforce the notion of 
a successful Russia, small clips of recent cultural victories were showing during 
the telecast. Fricker (2009, p. 2) argues that whilst the show was a spectacle in 
itself, the self-representation of Russia seemed somewhat uncertain. The present-
ers joked several times that Russia “does not have bears walking in the streets” 
in an attempt to jokingly refute an image of Russia as being perceived by the 
rest of Europe as uncivlised, backward, and barbaric. However the continu-
ous verbal and visual repetition of these stereotypes arguably re-inscribes this 
image. During the interval the choice of entertainment was also ambiguous. The 
Russian girl-duo Tatu performed backed by the Red Army Chorus whilst a pink 
inflatable tank and jet appeared on a stage. In an attempt to dispell the idea of 
Russia as militaristic and aggressive, the producers inadvertenetly reinforced 
the image with such imagery and attempts to inject humour into the scenes, in 
the form of the pink tank, months after the war with Georgia and when there 
was controversy ensuing regarding the hostility towards Gay Pride in Moscow. 
Russia is the only host country of the ESC to explicitly make on-air 
references to stereotypes in order to attempt to dispel them, thus the 2009 
Eurovision Song Contest became a public relations vehicle for the Russian 
government, which assisted with the financing of the project. The Eurovision 
Song Contest in Moscow in 2009 was, until Baku 2012, the most expensive ever 
and a testament to how seriously the Russian authorities view such events as 
opportunities to promote positive international images to the global media. 
The underlying assumption is that Russia attempts to present certain narra-
tives regardless of the cost, financial or otherwise. As one journalist present at 
the event in 2009 recalled:
Looking at it now, and at the amazing venue we were in, it was not hard to 
believe that the Russians had spent over €30 million on staging the event. It 
was all very big, very grandiose and very expensive. We were told anecdotally 
that the Russians simply kept throwing money at any problems that arose dur-
ing the organisation of the contest until those problems went away (Journalist 
A, Interview, 10.05.2009).
The 2012 contest held in Baku, Azerbaijan was arguably the most politically-
charged in the history of the ESC. Azerbaijan, like Russia, used the contest as 
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a platform for promoting itself on the world stage. Located on the Caspian Sea, 
Azerbaijan is an oil-rich nation which straddles both East and West. Raykoff 
and Tobin (2007) argue that participation in the ESC often represents both an 
expression of modernity and a country’s claim to Europe and the West. In the 
case of Azerbaijan, this is a somewhat dubious claim given the lack of success 
that the country has had in terms of opening doors to Europe, something 
which has arguably been held back by the alleged authoritarian regime led by 
President Ilham Aliyev. Nonetheless, Azerbaijan has engaged in the nation 
branding process and plays the public diplomacy game, as evidenced by its 
bid to host the 2020 Olympic Games as well as the launch of the Amazing 
Azerbaijan nation branding campaign. If anything, such activities represent an 
exercise in nation building on the part of Azerbaijan’s ruling elite. Azerbaijan’s 
victory in 2011 and its hosting in 2012 serve as ‘normalisation’ to quote Michel 
Foucault, a complex process by which otherness might be eradicated. Such 
mega-events present an opportunity for nation building by providing the 
Aliyev regime with a façade of legitimacy. However, as is often the case with 
mega-events, a spotlight is shone on host nations, opening up the country to 
international scrutiny, be it welcome or not. 
The Azeri production of the ESC in 2012 is arguably the most expensive 
in the history of the contest. The venue for 2012, the Crystal Hall, was pur-
pose built to host the event in less than nine months and a final budget has 
never been disclosed.7 The lack of transparency surrounding the 2012 event 
is therefore a reflection of the domestic political situation in Azerbaijan. As 
with the Russian authorities in 2009, Azerbaijan’s staging of the event was 
taken seriously as a platform to promote the country, namely in Europe. With 
Azerbaijan hosting the contest, serious political questions concerning human 
rights and the freedom of the press, as well as the on-going territorial disputes 
with Armenia, arose. Just weeks after Azerbaijan’s Eurovision victory, President 
Aliyev pardoned journalist Eynulla Fatullayev and 89 other prisoners (Abbasov 
2011). Fatullayev was imprisoned in 2007 for articles he wrote concerning the 
Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as alleged 
possession of illegal drugs. Amnesty International described the charges as 
“fabricated” and state that his imprisonment is related to his critical stance on 
government policies (Amnesty International, 2011). Furthermore, allegations 
of forced evictions during the construction of the venue, as well as denial of 
7 The budget for the 2012 ESC, exluding construction costs of the venue, is estimated at €50 
million.
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freedom of assembly in the run-up to the contest surfaced. Armenia eventu-
ally withdrew from the 2012 contest and in August 2012 it was reported that 
Azeri authorities had thwarted an Iranian-led terrorist attack on the contest 
(The Telegraph, 22.08.2012). These striking counter narratives meant that the 
2012 event was the most contentious in ESC history. 
Closer reading of the organisation of the 2012 contest reveals an interesting 
insight into the workings of the political elite in Azerbaijan. Mehriban Aliyeva, 
the wife of the current president of Azerbaijan, headed the organising com-
mittee of the 2012 contest. The performer during the interval act in 2012 was 
Emin Agalarov, who is married to Leyla Aliyeva, the daughter of the president 
and first lady of Azerbaijan. If there was an attempt to portray Azerbaijan as 
a meritocratic democracy then the organisation of ESC 2012 re-inscribed the 
opposite. The actual content of the Azeri show was equally contentious. In the 
postcard videos broadcast before each national entry, Karabakh horses, native to 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is currently under Armenian control, were 
routinely portrayed. The implication being if Karabakh horses are Azeri, then 
so too is the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, subliminal political messages 
were peppered throughout the 2012 contest despite the continued reinforcements 
from the EBU that the ESC is a television show and not a political event. Further 
controversy came during the voting procedure when the German spokesper-
son, Anke Engelke, appeared to make reference to the political situation in 
Azerbaijan: “Tonight nobody could vote for their own country. But it is good 
to be able to vote. And it is good to have a choice. Good luck on your journey, 
Azerbaijan. Europe is watching you” (BBC TV, 2012). The debates concerning 
Azerbaijan’s staging of the ESC in 2012 highlight the fraught nature of nation 
and state building processes in a post-colonial context. By hosting events such as 
the ESC countries open up to scrutiny. In short, Azerbaijani authorities arguably 
wanted to influence the way the country is viewed on the world stage. However, 
the on-going dialogue concerning human rights in the country and the actions 
of an increasingly authoritarian government may well mean that it is Azerbaijan 
and its ruling elite which are influenced in the long-term.
Concluding remarks 
The Eurovision Song Contest can be seen as a platform for the expression of 
Europeanness and in the case of newly-sovereign states, it acts as a tool for 
nation building and a platform for nation branding. It is not only new countries 
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that use the contest in this way though, Norway in 2010, Germany in 2011 and 
Sweden in 2013 promoted a brand of multiculturalism through their respec-
tive productions. The former two highlighted cultural diversity through their 
postcard images and representations on stage. Norway has in the past been 
represented by immigrant performers, one of which, Belarus-born Alexander 
Rybak, won the contest in 2009. In 2011, Germany opted to introduce each 
national entry with an introductory postcard featuring an immigrant from 
that particular country. The positive images associated with this reinforce the 
message that Germany is open and multicultural. Interestingly, this was to 
follow the announcement by German Chancellor Angela Merkel claiming that 
multiculturalism had failed (BBC News, 17.10. 2010). The slogan for the 2013 
contest in Sweden, “We Are One” promoted the equality and unity of com-
peting countries (EBU, 2013) at a time when Europe as a political, social and 
political entity is fractured. Branding, whether branding a nation through the 
ESC, or branding the ESC itself through slogans, is a contentious undertaking. 
The ESC it inherently political or at least, is highly politicised, despite 
continuous insistence from the EBU to the contrary. It has in the past, and con-
tinues, to reflect the socio-political issues of the day, the case studies detailed in 
this chapter exemplify this. During Soviet times, the USSR used the Olympic 
Games as an opportunity to demonstrate national prowess through sport. 
Russia, Azerbaijan and other host countries, use the Eurovision Song Contest 
in the same way. It is noteworthy that the Turkish government placed emphasis 
on the importance of hosting the contest in the same year that Greece was due 
to stage the Olympic Games. It is an event linked with national prestige, both in 
terms of voting and hosting the event itself. Victory in the contest relies solely 
upon the approval of other nations in the form of votes. The ESC affords the 
host nation the opportunity to change perceptions and manage its external 
image, in essence, presenting and performing certain narratives of the nation to 
a global audience. Both ESCs in Moscow and Baku show that striking counter-
narratives can influence the way this re-imagining takes place. Inversely, the 
very stereotypes countries seek to dispel through hosting the ESC may in fact 
have been compounded by the spin, scale of the production, and political con-
troversies. The fact that the contest is bigger than ever and continues to attract 
fans and critics alike, nearly sixty years since its creation, is a feat which surely 
only existed in creator Marcel Baison’s imagination. 
4. “What do I see? Estonia has again gotten 
one foot in the door to Europe.”
Victory in the Eurovision Song Contest arguably took on great significance for 
Estonia since it was through singing that the country is said to have mobilised 
popular resistance to the Soviet government even though the tradition of song 
festivals goes back much further. Beginning in Tartu in 1869, the national Song 
Festival (Laulupidu) is held every five years since the late 19th century. The 
tradition continued during the interwar republic and was permitted during 
Soviet times, albeit with songs which had to be approved by the authorities 
(O’Connor, 2006, p. 181). Song festivals were one of the few opportunities for 
representations of national identity as opposed to Soviet identity within Soviet 
Estonia. This collective identity was especially important during the struggle 
for independence starting in 1987. The easing of restrictions on political pro-
tests under perestroika meant that mass demonstrations could take place. It 
was during the late 1980s that the song festivals took on a greater significance 
as focal point for national assertion, when national symbols re-emerged dem-
onstrating resistance to the Soviet regime. This became known as the “Singing 
Revolution”, a term which was coined by Estonian activist Heinz Valk (Vogt, 
2005, p. 26). In September 1988 over 300,000 people gathered at the Tallinn 
Song Festival Grounds and, for the first time in public, people began to call for 
outright Estonian independence. In this context, song festivals represented an 
opportunity for Estonians to collectively express their dissatisfaction and even 
hostility towards what they saw as an illegitimate regime, further strengthening 
the national resolve to restore independence, as Vihalemm explains: 
Mass demonstrations united the participants with emotionally high voltage. 
Symbols, myths and rituals had a heyday, and the function of words during 
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the mass rallies was magical. Speeches, songs and slogans represented a col-
lective witchcraft, the symbolic fight of a small nation against the totalitarian 
machinery (Lauristin et al., 1997, p. 202).
Against this backdrop, winning the ESC in 2001 gained an added significance 
for many Estonians which could be observed in the public reaction to the 
Estonian Eurovision Song Contest victory in 2001. The image of Estonians 
“simply walking in[to Europe] singing”, as declared by PM Laar after the vic-
tory, was arguably a highly competent piece of PR. Nevertheless, it does capture 
the wider political discourses which were ongoing and prevalent in Estonia at 
that particular time. Estonian victory in the ESC exemplifies the importance 
that is attached to singing within narratives on national identity in Estonia; it 
can be seen as an extension of the role that singing played during the independ-
ence movement as well as an affirmation of a small nation’s identity. 
The window on the West
Estonia had a history of following the ESC, since during Soviet times it was 
watched in the north of the country via Finnish television. This window on 
the West was an opportunity to monitor global events as well as follow popular 
culture in Western Europe, the ESC being just one example. Juhan Paadam, 
who went on to produce the 2002 ESC in Tallinn highlighted the significance 
of the programme. It is interesting to note the reference to Intervision, the 
communist equivalent of the ESC, as being especially unpopular in Estonia, a 
reflection of the wider malaise towards Soviet rule in the country.
There is a historical and emotional story from our own past. Estonia is unique 
because during the Soviet occupation we had the ability to follow Eurovision 
on Finnish television […] we are talking about the possibility to watch 
Finland. We knew exactly what the Eurovision Song Contest is and a lot of 
people thought in these days that maybe one day we will have the possibility to 
go [to Eurovision]. Of course the Socialist world established their own version 
[Intervision] to compete with Eurovision but it was not so popular and was 
not popular here at all (Juhan Paadam, Interview, 02.11.2007). 
In this sense, television can be seen as a form of soft power for the transmission 
of propaganda. Popular culture became an ideological battleground and in the 
case of Finnish TV, it highlighted the disparities between a capitalist West and 
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a communist East, an example of technology overcoming government power 
(Holden, 2010), a pre-cursor to the modern day equivalent of the use of social 
media in popular resistance. Close links with Estonian émigré communities 
abroad and this access to Finnish television, as well as the loosening of the 
political system during the 1980s, provoked widespread dissatisfaction with 
the ailing Soviet system. This was highlighted in the documentary film “Disko 
ja Tuumasõda” (Disco and Cold War) which chronicled the role of Finnish 
Television in Estonia. Essentially watching Western TV shows such as Dallas 
became a symbol of resistance to Soviet rule, a rejection of communist economic 
policies by a population curious about capitalism. In this sense, following the 
ESC also represented the othering of Soviet rule in Estonia. The event gained 
an underground following with a fan club established by radio technician Karl 
Pihelgas during the 1960s. According to Pihelgas, Eurovision had a symbolic 
value, it was something that the West bought into and the Soviets did not, a 
symbol of a carefree capitalist society. In an interview given to the media in 
2002, Pihelgas recalled that he and twelve other friends watched the event in 
secret; he feared that he would lose his job if his clandestine meeting became 
public knowledge (Rosenberg, 2002). Soon after Estonia entered the contest, the 
membership of the club began to wane, many members had died or were too old 
and since the programme was legitimately broadcast on Estonian TV there was 
no need to watch the event via Finnish television and so it was finally disbanded. 
However, for Pihelgas the event was so much more than just a television show, 
“it was a chance to feel that the Iron Curtain could break down, and I and my 
family could, if just for a night, be part of Europe” (Rosenberg 2002).
As highlighted in chapter three, Estonian participation in the ESC can 
be seen as a manifestation of the wider process of state building, putting the 
country on the world map. Estonia took part in qualifying rounds in 1993 but 
did not make it to the final until 1994 when the late Silvi Vrait represented 
the country in Dublin. After facing relegation from the competition in 1995, 
Estonia returned in 1996. During the transmission that year, a message express-
ing goodwill to the participants, recorded by a political leader or official from 
that country, was broadcast before each entry. The seniority of the figure who 
delivered the message varied wildly from country to country, ranging from 
Presidents and in Estonia’s case, the Prime Minister Tiit Vähi, to junior minis-
ters, or in the Spanish case, an ambassador. Effectively the choice of messenger 
symbolised the significance attached to the ESC by the participating country. 
Estonia reached fifth place in Eurovision in 1996, a feat which was front-page 
news and lauded as a breakthrough by the press at home (Postimees, 20.04.1996). 
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Closer reading of the press coverage from the time shows that it represented 
more than just a success in a song contest; it was in fact a metaphor for Estonia’s 
return to Europe. Alongside the main article on Eurovision, there was a carica-
ture of the singers sitting on a flying carpet featuring the EU flag. Waving them 
off was President Meri with a thought bubble reading “Mida ma näen? Eesti on 
jälle ühe jala Euroopa ukse vahele saanud” (“What do I see? Estonia has again 
gotten one foot in the door to Europe”). Whilst the cartoon is tongue-in-cheek, 
it has deeper significance. EU accession was a priority for the government of 
the day, this Estonian breakthrough in the ESC represented acceptance, on a 
populist level, of Estonia as a European state. 
It is interesting to note that Estonia, the singing nation, continued to per-
form strongly in the contest and avoided relegation, a fate which Finland and 
Russia were unable to match. As with EU accession talks, to which Estonia was 
invited to before neighbouring Latvia and Lithuania, the country was seen as 
ahead of the game in the Baltic region both in terms of economic reforms and 
indeed, the ESC itself. Estonia won the competition after eight attempts, a sig-
nificantly stronger performance than neighbouring Finland which managed to 
score its first victory with its fortieth attempt in 2006. 
In 1999, the European Broadcasting Union changed the rules to allow com-
peting countries the right to perform in any language and Estonia, like most 
other countries opted for English. This was largely uncontroversial in Estonia 
and was largely seen as a chance for Estonia to succeed rather than a failure to 
promote national values. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that viewers 
in Estonia were largely familiar to Eurovision by this stage, as well as having 
the added benefit of viewing the contest years prior to participating via Finnish 
television in the north. Moreover, Estonians watched Finland continually fail 
to win votes when singing in Finnish. Achieving success in the competition 
was arguably the priority for Estonian Television during this time as opposed 
to promoting the Estonian language. As one former Estonian representative, 
Evelin Samuel explains, “as a singer it was an amazing opportunity but it was 
also an honour to represent my country, we were like ambassadors for the new 
Estonia. I don’t think the language was so much of an issue” (Evelin Samuel, 
Interview, 07.04.2008). It is interesting to note that such pragmatic views were 
not shared by Mart Laar who actively called for Estonian to be reinstated as 
the main language of performance in the competition. Given Laar’s political 
views, this is perhaps not surprising. The politics of national identity is rarely 
simple, and the rhetoric concerning national representations in the ESC is 
therefore a reflection of this. 
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Everybody is a winner at Eurovision
The winning song for Estonia, Everybody, was performed by Tanel Padar and 
Dave Benton. After the results were announced people took to the streets to cel-
ebrate in scenes reminiscent of a national holiday. According to Sarah Squire, 
former UK Ambassador to Estonia:
It was an extraordinary moment and for Estonians, who are reserved and on 
the whole, quiet people, that eruption of celebration was something to witness 
(Arena: Estonia Dreams of Eurovision [TV] 2002).
The media coverage in the days following the contest was expansive; for weeks 
the ESC was on the front pages of the newspapers in the country. Victory in 
the ESC represented a significant breakthrough for the country, not only in 
terms of national pride but also in terms of international, namely European, 
recognition. In short, Eurovision was big news. The Estonian public engaged 
with the Eurovision Song Contest victory in 2001, and unlike the Welcome to 
Estonia campaign discussed in chapter two, the embrace was not top-down, it 
was spontaneous. Winning Eurovision was seen as “the most important event 
since independence” (Guha, 2002) and even a cursory glance at the media cov-
erage from the time reflects this. The flag, a potent symbol of national identity, 
was very much at the forefront of the celebrations. Juhan Paadam recalled that 
the celebrations which followed the Eurovision result were a reflection of how 
significant this victory was seen at the time in Estonia:
It was like a national holiday, it was a new explosion of our national identity 
[…] the delegation were met in town hall square the next day. In the first year 
only four people wanted to meet us. The town hall square was absolutely full 
(Juhan Paadam, Interview, 02.11.2007).
Closer reading of the Estonian reaction to this victory provides a unique insight 
into the construction of national identity in a post-Soviet context. Eurovision 
victory represented acceptance; Estonia had competed on a level playing field 
with more powerful, Western European neighbours, and emerged victorious. 
To date, it remains the largest international competition that Estonia has won. 
Hobsbawm (2002, p.143) highlights the role that football matches have played in 
constructing an imagined community within the nation, he cites that the nation 
appears to be more real when seen as just a team of eleven people. Fox (2006) 
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argues that national holidays and sporting events are comparable; both are key 
focal points for collective experience in which the imagined community, which 
is the nation, is articulated. The Estonian ESC win can be viewed in the same 
vein, Padar and Benton embodied the hopes and optimism of a young nation, 
the victory was not only a personal triumph but one in which the entire country 
could celebrate. Ilmar Raag, former chairman of Estonian Television expands:
While we Estonians have always been proud of our statesmen and celebrities, 
we don’t really believe in our own importance. After all, history has testi-
fied numerous times to the fact that the interests of small nations are seldom 
considered in the maelstrom of global politics. It might even be more accurate 
to say that they go unnoticed […] The significance of the winning song […] 
was much bigger than just any Eurovision victory. It instilled optimism and 
confidence in all Estonians […] this is the only major chance […] to prove that 
despite the small size of our nation, we have something to say to the world 
(Ilmar Raag, in Eesti Televisioon, 2002, p. 8).
The Eurovision Song Contest offered Estonians an opportunity to celebrate their 
national identity together. As discussed in chapter one, Michael Billig in his work 
argues that most flags are ignored; flying saliently from civic buildings, part of 
the routine fabric of social life (Billig, 1995, p. 43). However, the Estonian flag, 
itself a symbol of opposition to the Soviet regime during the Singing Revolution, 
was anything but overlooked that night in Tallinn following Eurovision 2001, 
the waving of the Estonian flag was one of the defining images of the evening.
The hoisting of the newly designed flag indicates that another nation has 
joined the club of nations: “we” have become like “you” (no longer “them”; 
“we” are all nations, with “our” flags and “our” anthems, “our” seats in the 
United Nations, and “our” participation, with appropriately designed vests, at 
Olympic Games and World Cups (Billig, 1995, p. 86). 
The jubilant scenes of the Estonian flag being waved in the centre of Tallinn 
following the announcement of the result were therefore symbolic, affirming 
a sense of collective nationhood. This raises interesting questions concerning 
who is part of this imagined community and who is not. The narrative of the 
nation is not linear, nationalism does not speak with a straightforward voice and 
national identity is never easy to deconstruct. The story of Dave Benton, one half 
of the winning duo for Estonia, offers a unique insight into the way Estonian 
national identity is both constructed and contested in a post-Soviet context. 
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Dave Benton: a model Estonian
Estonia has continued to face complicated inter-ethnic issues since the res-
toration of the independent state in 1991. Estonian nation builders found 
themselves at an interesting juxtaposition since, on one hand, restoration of 
independence drew upon the legal continuity principle which gave legitimacy 
for successive governments to ensure (ethnic) Estonian dominance in the politi-
cal and public spheres and, on the other, the return to Europe discourses which 
implied signing up minority rights. This was, at times, at odds with the agenda 
of some Estonian nationalist politicians. Given the demographic situation with 
a sizeable Russian speaking minority, Estonia can be considered to be mul-
ticultural, home to different national groups with different understandings 
of their recent history. Multiculturalism in the Estonian context refers to the 
peaceful coexistence of Estonians and Russian speakers. As EU integration 
was sought, the previously dominant ethno-state was substituted with a more 
pragmatic approach, one of integration and the creation of a multicultural, 
democratic Estonian society (Lauristin, 2002, p. 22). Such a paradigm shift 
meant that Estonian society had to come to terms with its Soviet past if its 
future was to include full European integration. According to Lauristin, the 
Russian minority did not feature at all in the considerations of the Estonian 
government during the early 1990s with no official policy or statement issues 
between 1992 and 1996 (2002, p. 22). By the millennium, this had changed 
with the implementation of the Integration Programme of Estonian Society 
2000–2007 in March 2000. The programme emphasised the need for societal 
integration to be based upon knowledge of the Estonian language as well as 
acquiring Estonian citizenship although the recognition of minority cultural 
rights was also acknowledged. The coalition government which passed the 
integration programme in 1998 was the same government which introduced 
restrictive citizenship laws in the early half of the decade. Therefore, the shift 
towards integration, community cohesion and the rhetoric of multicultural-
ism which prevailed in Estonia towards the end of that decade can be seen as a 
reflection of the Estonian government’s orientation towards Western European 
institutions, namely the European Union. With this background, closer exami-
nation of the story of Dave Benton, one half of the winning duo provides an 
insight into the complexities of minority issues in Estonia.
Dave Benton, a Dutch national originally from Aruba moved to Estonia 
in 1997. He, along with Estonian rock singer Tanel Padar, won the Estonian 
Eurovision Song Contest heats, Eurolaul in February 2001 and then went onto 
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represent Estonia in the Eurovision final. Dave Benton is a point of interest 
not only because of his story as an immigrant to Estonia but also because he 
is to date the only black person to win the Eurovision Song Contest. It is also 
noteworthy that he represented Estonia, which like many countries in Eastern 
Europe, does not have an established black community. It is interesting to note 
that the Estonian Eurovision entry was selected by jury rather than public 
telephone votes (the public did not have a say until 2004). Benton and Padar 
also had backing singers and dancers, 2XL, two of whom were ethnic Russian 
speakers. The song was performed in English and written by ethnic Estonian 
songwriters Ivar Must and Maian-Anna Kärmas, with inclusive lyrics (the song 
itself being “Everybody”), performed by an ethnic Estonian, a black immigrant 
and supported by ethnic Russian speakers on backing vocals. The Estonian 
Eurovision entry in 2001 can therefore be seen as a construction of multicul-
turalism to a European audience. 
However, the discourses surrounding Dave Benton are paradoxical. At the 
same time that he was held up as a symbol of Estonian multiculturalism by 
political elites, groups representing the interests of Russian speakers in Estonia 
complained that they were being discriminated against. The way in which 
Benton was represented in the Estonian media provides a unique insight into 
the nature of national identity debates at specific moments in time. The lan-
guage used in the media coverage suggests that Dave Benton’s ethnic origins 
were not as invisible as some politicians tried to portray. After Benton and 
Padar won the domestic selection, Eurolaul, he was referred to as a “dark-
skinned man” (Leivak, 2001a) and after winning Eurovision itself a woman 
was quoted as saying “I really like that black guy” (Leivak, 2001b). Whilst this 
is not evidence of racism as such, which itself is not the focus of this work, it 
does highlight that the coverage in the media at the time was perhaps chauvin-
istic and Benton’s ethnicity was regularly flagged. Benton, however, who was 
interviewed for this book, refutes any claims of racism and has stated that he 
was fully accepted into Estonian society:
I did not find any problems as a foreigner; I did not even find any problems 
of discrimination as a coloured person (Dave Benton, Interview,15.11.2007)
In the context of EU accession, Dave Benton can be seen as a useable figure 
for Estonia’s political elites at the time. Integration and multiculturalism were 
the buzzwords and it can be argued that Benton embodied all of these things. 
He was a foreign national who moved to Estonia, learned the language, and 
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was consequentially accepted into society. His status as being part of an eth-
nic minority could further be evidence of Estonia’s multicultural credentials, 
useful at a time when the Estonian government were coming under increasing 
pressure to extent citizenship to its stateless persons. This opportunity was not 
lost on Estonian politicians. Signe Kivi who was the Minister of Culture from 
1999 until 2002 stated that she was proud that Benton represented Estonia and 
that there were no issues regarding public attitudes towards him:
I was proud when we won – it is a huge event for anyone to win. I liked the 
fact that we had a white Estonian and a black Estonian resident. It supported 
the opinion of Estonia being liberal and friendly. It was a good image to show 
Estonia’s multiculturalism [...] There was no issue with Dave’s colour (Signe 
Kivi, Interview, 26.11.2007).
Dave Benton, in his interview, emphasised that he tried to learn Estonian as 
soon as he arrived in the country. He therefore reflects the view from the 
Estonian political elite that language is the key to integration in the country 
and that those who do not speak Estonian do so out of choice:
I had to integrate here. I moved here to stay, to live [...] you have to speak 
Estonian [...] I speak it with my children [...] I started to speak in my second 
week of being here […] there are Russians here for ten years who still don’t 
speak it, they still don’t know it (Dave Benton, Interview, 15.11.2007). 
Benton’s comments regarding Russian speakers shows that he buys into the 
notion appropriated by Estonian politicians such as Mart Laar that many 
Russian speakers simply do not make the effort to learn Estonian. For Estonian 
political elites such as Kivi and Laar, Benton represented an opportunity to 
promote multiculturalism to the wider European community. It is interesting 
to note that the two Russian speakers, who performed as part of the backing 
group 2XL, were conspicuously absent from discourses of Estonian multicul-
turalism in both the media coverage and amongst respondents interviewed 
for this work. The issue is further complicated by the fact that some media 
professionals stated that the selection of two Swedish singers as Estonian ESC 
representatives was more controversial than the choice of Benton:
There was nothing about Dave Benton. I don’t remember hearing anything 
about that. After this Eurovision win the government gave him permanent 
residency [...] everybody likes that he was the only black man in Estonia, there 
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wasn’t any problems [...] about Swedish girls later because there were many 
Swedish girls [...] especially in 2006 [...] Sandra didn’t even know the colours 
of our flag (Marko Reikop, Interview, 19.11.2007).
I don’t remember any [negative] analysing in the media. Later on this dis-
pute arose because one year we had a Swedish girl who got nothing, then the 
media asked why this foreign girl, we have lots of talented singers here (Andri 
Maimets, Interview, 26.11.2007).
It is notable that no elite level respondent went on-record to state that there 
were any negative comments concerning Benton, however, some of the public 
level respondents told a different story. Whilst they do not state that Benton 
himself experienced racism per se, they did allude to underlying attitudes in 
Estonia which were not engaged in by the media or by politicians at the time. One 
respondent recalled that the Dutch Ambassador, Hans Glaubitz resigned in 2006 
because he and his Cuban partner “could no longer cope with gay hatred and rac-
ism on the Estonian streets” (Margit, Travel agent, Tallinn, Estonia, 17.11.2007).
It was a chance for us to show solidarity with a black man which is a joke actu-
ally. It was a cover-up. Estonia is a very nationalistic country. It was a huge 
spin. You never see black people here. There are no Indian students in Tallinn 
University, not that there aren’t any applications. I think that speaks volumes 
[...] I don’t think Estonians are aggressive towards him [Benton] [...] after all 
Estonians still respect him for winning this contest (Anonymised respondent, 
Interview, 12.11.2007)
As stated earlier, Benton himself states that he has not experienced racism 
in Estonia, nor is this the focus of this work, however, the disparity between 
the public level respondents and media/elite-level respondents is revealing. 
Benton represents the desires of the political elite keen to portray Estonia as a 
liberal, multicultural country in the run up to EU accession. It is interesting 
to note that on the subject of integration, he buys into the same rhetoric as 
Estonian politicians, the ethnic Estonian narrative of the nation, that knowl-
edge of Estonian is required in order to be accepted in Estonian society and 
that many Russian speakers are simply unwilling to learn Estonian. 
Eurovision gave me a boost in the eyes of the Estonian people [...] you start 
using more and more the norms of the country. You can’t ask them to change 
their norms of culture to suit yours, you have to change yours to suit theirs [...] 
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my opinion is that you have all the rights, it’s your own country (Dave Benton, 
Interview, 15.11.2007). 
Note the reference to ethnic Estonian ownership of the country, despite the fact 
that many Russian speakers were also born and raised in Estonia. Benton has 
arguably integrated into Estonian society; he lives in Estonia, speaks Estonian 
and buys into the notion of knowledge of the Estonian language as key to 
integration. As such, Dave Benton’s ethnicity is not an issue, despite the strong 
views from some respondents stating that he is a one-off due to his celebrity 
status. Perhaps this is the case, however for those who advocate language as 
the key to integration then Dave Benton is living proof of this. Likewise, those 
advocating that Benton is a symbol of multiculturalism can claim that this is 
still the case; he is fully integrated and accepted in Estonian society albeit on 
ethnic Estonian terms. 
Through the media gaze: Eurovision 2001
After Estonia won the ESC, the headline of the tabloid, Õhtuleht, simply 
read “Uskumatu” (“Unbelievable”). The articles which followed were entirely 
in-keeping with the headline; the victory was seen as unbelievable. Closer 
examination of the content reveals interesting narratives relating to Estonian 
identity and highlights the significance of this event for Estonia and Estonians 
at the time. The first edition featured 16 pages which were dedicated to 
Eurovision; extensive coverage of the celebrations both in Copenhagen after 
the event as well as the reactions in Estonia, and analysis of the event itself. 
All the articles relating to Eurovision were emotionally charged and reflected 
a lack of self-confidence in Estonia at the time, moreover, almost immediately, 
concerns were also raised that Estonia would be incapable of successfully host-
ing the competition in 2002.
One article, “Flowers and Tears at the Airport” (Jakobson, 2001) focussed 
on crowds waiting for the winning duo to arrive at the airport in Tallinn. Signe 
Kivi, the Minister of Culture at the time was there to welcome to team back 
home. Upon arrival she was immediately asked about whether Estonia could 
host the event to which she replied “Europe has chosen Estonia’s entry as the 
best, should we really bring shame upon ourselves?” Thus, the link between the 
victory and Estonia’s international image is reinforced. Another article focused 
on the celebrations the previous evening after the Estonian entry was declared 
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the winner. “Estonia Celebrated Until Morning” (Kaupmees, 2001) described 
the scene in Tallinn with masses of people filling the city centre with flags and 
car horns. Again the narrative focused on the disbelief amongst Estonians. One 
respondent is quoted as saying that the event was “unbelievable… I would never 
have thought that Estonia would win.” It is noteworthy that much of the tone of 
the reporting was overtly masculine; the article specifically mentioned that the 
person was a man with tears in his eyes. When the duo arrived in Tallinn they 
were introduced to the crowd by conductor Tarmo Leinatamm, who remarked 
“Thank you boys, yesterday Estonia became world famous, Tallinn next year”. 
When Signe Kivi spoke to the crowds that evening she proclaimed that 
Estonia would be capable of hosting the event and highlighted that Estonians 
had been organising song festivals for 135 years. With such rhetoric the issue 
of Tallinn hosting the event in 2002 was then put firmly on the agenda. Kivi 
and Laar appeared to be determined that the event would go ahead in Tallinn 
in 2002 when there were significant doubts. As early as 14 May 2001, Laar was 
said to have committed 50 million EEK (£2.5 million) to the event (Õhtuleht, 
14 May 2001). Thus, even in those very early days, the Laar government saw 
value in hosting the contest in Estonia, presenting a narrative of the Estonian 
nation to a global audience. 
The nature of the media coverage highlights several issues. First, the 
Eurovision result was a significant event for Estonia in terms of placing them on 
the world map. Secondly the newspaper coverage was overwhelmingly masculine, 
which given the previous analogies that I made with sporting events, is perhaps 
unsurprising. The tone of the articles resembled football coverage or other such 
popular events; it was not seen as camp or kitsch and there were no negative con-
notations attached to winning this contest in the Estonian media’s representation. 
Thirdly, the nature of the coverage reveals how Estonians saw themselves at the 
time. Constant references to the win being “unbelievable” or “shocking” suggests, 
to a degree, a low level of self confidence among Estonians. Winning Eurovision 
was a morale boost for the Estonian public and came at a time when they had 
been preparing for European Union membership and as such had been feeling the 
effects of economic cutbacks to ensure smooth accession to the Union in 2004. 
It was arguably a big shot in the arm for politicians who had invested everything 
in the EU integration project. Eurovision therefore represented an opportunity 
to manage Estonia’s international image on a global scale. 
At the time it was seen as a unique opportunity to show Estonia to almost 300 
million viewers or more. This was a pretty powerful argument […] in Estonia 
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at the time Eurovision was front page news[…]for Estonia in any competition, 
if our sportsmen get into the top ten it is already a newsworthy item (Ilmar 
Raag, Interview, 13.11.2007).
Many years earlier in the 1990s and still now, almost every family watch. It was a 
very big deal for Estonia […] it gave us the opportunity to organise an all-Euro-
pean television show in Tallinn. Estonia was the first former Soviet country to 
do this. Some didn’t think we could do it (Ivo Rull, Interview, 09.11.2007).
“We will do it and we will do it well!”
As highlighted in chapter three, towards the end of the millennium, the ESC 
had grown to accommodate increasing numbers of participants, and ever 
increasing production costs. The challenge for Ireland’s state broadcaster, RTE, 
which staged four out of five competitions, was well-documented. Immediately 
after Estonia won the ESC, doubts were raised in both the Estonian and inter-
national media as to whether or not Estonian Television had the capacity to 
produce a show on such a scale, the comments above from Ivo Rull reflect 
this uncertainty. The budget for the event at that time was estimated to be in 
the region of 100 million EEK (£5 million). Whilst the EBU provides almost 
half of the funding, the remaining balance is met by the host broadcaster. The 
enormity of the project became clear when the annual budget of Estonian 
Television was taken into account; 160 million EEK (£8 million) in 2001 (Pino, 
2001). Estonian Television not only had to come up with the necessary funding 
guarantees to secure the event in Tallinn but the organisation also had to prove 
that the country had the necessary infrastructure. It was a challenge which 
Estonian political and media elites rose to. 
On 23 May 2001, the BBC reported that Estonian Television were facing a 
financial crisis and would not be able to stage the event in Tallinn unless the 
government stepped in. The nature of the debates surrounding the financ-
ing of the Contest reflects the wider debates surrounding cuts to government 
subsidies in an EU accession context as well as an illustration of the politics 
of Europeanisation around that time. “We will do the concert for sure” was 
a paraphrased quote from the Director General of Estonian Television, Aare 
Urm (Viivik, 2001). ETV was given four weeks to confirm to the European 
Broadcasting Union whether or not they would stage the event in 2002. Some 
commentators in Estonia saw the contest as a tool for forcing the government’s 
hand into providing more funding to ETV to help clear its debts, after a series 
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of cutbacks in state subsidies in the run-up to EU entry. The Estonian gov-
ernment had initially offered ETV a loan to stage the contest however at £1.4 
million it fell short of the amount requested. Aare Urm stated 
We are doing our best to stage the contest but the government’s anti-public 
service broadcasting policy makes this impossible […] should the government 
stick to its ruling, it is likely there will not be a public service broadcaster in 
Estonia by next year. (BBC News, 23.05.2001) 
Other commentators viewed the contest differently; they saw it as a way of 
ensuring that the government stepped in to stage the event while also assisting 
the financing of ETV more generally:
ETV and entrepreneurial head director Urm are of course very cunning. They 
use the situation and try to resolve two problems in one take. Get money for 
the singing contest and also fix the bad economic state of the institution in 
the shadow of the competition […] getting one fly with two hits (Maide, 2001).
Whilst this may have been an issue for the government to consider, closer 
reading of the article below suggests that political wrangling within the coali-
tion government itself rather than concerns about ETV may explain the delays 
providing concrete guarantees on assisting with the financing of the project.
The Toompea boys have messed up […] If the Laar–Kallas government should 
ruin the Eurovision contest in the fight or rivalry between them, it will bring 
severe consequences for both of them. (Maide, 2001)
Eurovision effectively represented a public relations vehicle for the Estonian 
government. Failure to stage the contest successfully would be damaging to 
the country’s prestige and international image. Pressure began to grow in the 
Estonian media with calls for the government to fund the contest:
Because the expenditures are direct and the profits are only indirect we might 
feel that the money is just being thrown into a black hole. If we leave aside the 
multiplied profits that the capital’s hotels, pubs and bars and other amusement 
establishments will gain, we win most of all from the worldwide presentation 
of Estonia’s image. For Estonia, who before had to buy advertising space for 
itself in foreign newspapers, this is a chance that has fallen into its lap, to pro-
mote itself through a modern television medium (Pino, 2001).
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Mart Laar recalled that there were initial discrepancies with the allocation 
of funds, he maintains that hosting the event was cost effective in terms of 
the airtime and media coverage dedicated to Estonia as a result, as well as the 
cost of failing to capitalise on the opportunity being far more costly in the 
long run. Indeed, the lack of a larger debate suggests that there appears to be 
an almost-unanimous elite-level consensus around the necessity to stage the 
ESC in 2002 which can be seen as reflective of an elite-level consensus around 
Europeanisation and, arguably, for that matter, EU membership.
There were [people who questioned the value of funding the event] but they knew 
not to argue with me. Maybe when they had opinions they kept them [...] we had 
some meetings with the Irish Prime Minister who was absolutely terrified when 
they won the Eurovision three times in a row, it is some economic burden. We 
were the first country, a new democracy, it is huge work [...] we demonstrated that 
new democracies can host such a large international event in the same quality 
as so-called developed countries. When you get this amount of people looking 
at you it really was a great opportunity to use (Mart Laar, Interview, 12.11.2007). 
Signe Kivi also highlighted the importance of the event for the Estonian image 
and viewed it as a long-term investment for both Estonia’s international image 
and the broadcasting industry more generally: 
We viewed it [Eurovision] not only as a great way to boost Estonia’s image 
but also good training for all involved, TV technicians, and designers. An 
event of that scale was the biggest chance and the biggest challenge for both 
Estonia and Tallinn [...] we [the Estonian government] had regular contact 
with Estonian TV and they reported the progress and problems which needed 
to be resolved. 15 ministers were involved in this team [...] It was an opportu-
nity which had to be caught. We were initially concerned about putting on a 
good show – if we failed, it would have been extremely negative for Estonia. It 
was a huge responsibility. We decided to go for it and it was given a priority by 
all involved (Signe Kivi, Interview, 26.11.2007).
The fact that the Laar government held a meeting with the Irish Prime Minister 
is telling; it reveals how seriously the Estonian government, or indeed Laar him-
self, took this opportunity as well as highlighting that the debates in Estonia 
echoed those in Ireland after they were faced with hosting the event three years 
in succession. Ireland capitalised on the publicity garnered from this and was 
able to promote a positive international image. Failure to do so could have con-
firmed stereotypes about Ireland being less developed than other EU members. 
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In the wider (Western) European press, articles continued to appear high-
lighting Estonia’s apparent inability to stage the contest. In the UK, the Daily 
Telegraph newspaper suggested that the opportunity to host the event in Estonia 
was likely to be turned down since Estonia was “woefully ill-equipped to host 
an event such as Eurovision. It has no stadium big or modern enough for the 
contest and there are not enough tourist hotels”. (The Telegraph, 27.05.2001). Such 
rhetoric appears to confirm that assertion from Kuus and Petersoo that the East/
West divide is alive and well, as discussed in chapter one. Perhaps more telling is 
the fact that the article in question was reprinted in Õhtuleht, Eurovision there-
fore became not only an opportunity to promote Estonia internationally, it was 
also a chance to prove that the country could host large scale events at the same 
standard as other European countries. By June 2001 ETV received the necessary 
financial backing from the Estonian government and confirmed to the European 
Broadcasting Union that they would stage the event in Tallinn in May 2002.
Concluding remarks
Through Estonian participation, victory and hosting, the Eurovision Song 
Contest was one of the symbols of Estonia’s return to Europe. The competition 
represented an opportunity for Estonia to manage its own image on its own 
terms, particularly in light of negative press attention from Western Europe. 
Arguably Estonian political elites used the opportunity to promote the image 
of Estonia that they wished to. In the context of EU accession, Dave Benton’s 
ethnicity became a useful tool for highlighting both Estonian multiculturalism 
and the success of the government integration programme, but also countered 
claims by some Russian speakers that the state was discriminating against 
them. Media analysis surrounding the debates on Eurovision in 2001 reveals 
that Estonians were lacking self-confidence; victory was regularly referred to as 
“unbelievable”, thus suggesting that the Estonian nation were somehow unwor-
thy. The rhetoric concerning the financing of the event reveals that the Laar 
government saw value in hosting the competition particularly in the shadow of 
negative press attention from Western Europe, namely dispelling negative stere-
otypes of “backward” Eastern European Estonia. This is precisely what Estonian 
politicians have been trying to do since independence. With the finances settled, 
the Estonian government, in cooperation with Estonian Television, then set 
about planning the 2002 Eurovision Song Contest to be held in Tallinn. 
5. Eurovision Song Contest 2002: a modern 
fairytale
As highlighted in the previous chapter, Estonian officials had to confirm in 
June 2001 whether they would be staging the event in Tallinn in 2002. There 
was much pressure on Estonian Television to ensure that the event was staged 
successfully. Failure to host the event was seen as undoubtedly damaging to 
Estonia’s international image, confirming Western assertions that Estonia was 
not fit to compete on the same level as other EU members, thus cultivating an 
image of Estonia as a “poor Former Soviet republic” rather than a prospective 
EU member. It is with this background that the preparations for the 2002 
Eurovision Song Contest began. Estonia not only had to prove that it was capa-
ble of producing a slick international television show but also had to do this 
against a backdrop of uncertainty in terms of technical expertise and infra-
structure and in front of the gaze of the international media. Closer analysis of 
the content of ESC 2002 provides a unique insight into both the construction 
of Estonian national identity and the self-image of the country as well as the 
reinforcement of the other, namely Russia and the Soviet past. 
By August 2001, plans for the 2002 Eurovision Song Contest were well under 
way in Estonia. ETV, a small broadcasting corporation, lacked both the technical 
equipment and experience required for such a large-scale international broadcast 
as the ESC. Neighbouring Sweden stepped in and assisted in the production of 
the event. Executive producer of ESC 2002, Juhan Paadam highlighted the neces-
sity of this international cooperation in an interview given in 2007: 
We did not buy in people to do it instead of us, we needed help with knowledge 
and facilities […] the ideas were absolutely Estonian, it was our show […] every 
television professional understands what it means […] Estonia was the first 
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country to have an international co-production team, it was my idea and it was 
the only solution to the problem […] It is an ambitious project […] it is the purest 
propaganda for the country which hosts the broadcast […] It was our purpose 
to tell Europe of our modern fairytale (Juhan Paadam, Interview, 02.11.2007).
Paadam was keen to stress that whilst ETV required technical support, the 
ideas for the content of the production were wholly Estonian. It is noteworthy 
that as Estonian politicians were keen to emphasise that Estonia was the first 
post-Soviet country to enter into EU accession talks, Paadam highlighted that 
Estonia was the first country to pioneer international cooperation in the ESC, 
a system which was then repeated in consecutive years by other broadcast-
ers. The following year both Swedish and Estonian officials assisted Latvian 
Television with preparing for Eurovision in 2003 and Swedish broadcaster 
SVT continued to provide technical assistance until 2010. Whilst Paadam’s 
comments concerning international cooperation are slightly misguided since 
other countries have worked together in the past (Yugoslavia and the UK in 
1990 for example), never before has such substantial technical help had to be 
bought in from outside the host country, without which Estonian Television 
would never have been able to stage the show. According to journalist Andri 
Maimets, the Estonian public were pragmatic about this issue:
We had to face up to the fact that we had not done anything like that. For some 
people in Estonian Television it was also the start of their career, after host-
ing, doing the show, they worked for the EBU, for the career it was a very good 
start and some people, one is now the head of EBU entertainment. I think for 
the television company the organising was much more important to show that 
we can do the show. For the people generally, the fact we won was important. 
Sweden was involved and this was not controversial, they are our neighbours 
(Andri Maimets, Interview, 26.11.2007).
Given the historical links between Sweden and Estonia, Maimet’s comments 
regarding Swedish involvement in an Estonian production go some way to explain 
the lack of any substantial media debate on this issue. This Nordic link was fur-
ther reinforced after the selection of a Swedish singer to represent Estonia in the 
contest in Tallinn. Whilst not uncontroversial, it reflects the Nordic image that 
Estonian politicians were keen to portray through Brand Estonia and indeed the 
ESC itself. The 2002 Eurovision Song Contest can therefore be seen as a mirror of 
the wider debates concerning the wider geopolitical position of Estonia, a reflec-
tion of the political rhetoric presented by Estonian politicians during the 1990s. 
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“Run away to the stars”
As highlighted in chapter four, from the outset, the ESC was linked to Estonia’s 
international image thanks to speeches from Mart Laar and Signe Kivi. 
Arguably the doubts concerning ETV’s inability to host the show which were 
raised in those early days following the victory meant that there was added 
impetus for the project, Estonia now had something to prove to the world. 
Eurovision was regularly in the headlines in the Estonian press throughout 2001 
and this in itself can be seen as a reflection of the significance of the event at the 
time for Estonia. Ehtel Halliste, press spokesperson for the Estonian Foreign 
Ministry, highlighted the importance of foreign media in the promotion of 
Estonia and spoke with particular reference to the Eurovision Song Contest:
We are a small economic tiger. We have tried to make people understand that 
we are credible as a state as well as a people […] after we won [Eurovision] 
people started to show more interest. I can’t remember any big newspaper or 
magazine not visiting Estonia that fall (Gardner & Standaert, 2003). 
Winning Eurovision helped to present a positive image of Estonia at the time. 
When we won, our German colleagues sent us a small article from a newspa-
per where it was written that the event would be held in the forest where the 
Russian bears live […] Even the Germans, with who our culture is tied with 
did not know much about Estonia. Our tiny European country really needed 
promotion (Tiiu Simm, Interview, 02.11.2007).
Not only was the emotional significance attached to the event in terms of 
Estonia’s international image f lagged, but also potential ramifications for 
Estonia’s standing amongst its EU member neighbours if the country failed 
to host successfully. Juhan Paadam highlighted the significance of the event 
within the context of EU enlargement. He stated that the event date was 
changed in order to align it closer to the time when EU accession talks were 
concluding in order to capitalise on publicity garnered in the global media.
Eurovision really was the greatest possibility we had to promote our country. I 
am quite sure there was an influence in the negotiations between Estonia and 
the EU […] I asked the European Broadcasting Union to move the Eurovision 
to two weeks later […] closer to the time of the final negotiations between 
Estonia and the European Union (Juhan Paadam, Interview, 02.11.2007).
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Whilst EU accession was obviously unrelated to the ESC, Paadam’s response 
does show that the Estonian image was very much on the political agenda at 
this time; the event was a springboard used to direct Estonia’s image away 
from a post-Soviet setting and towards an EU accession context. The mere 
fact that the date of the event was moved to coincide with the conclusive EU 
accession talks is hugely significant. The former UK Ambassador to Estonia, 
Sarah Squire went further to state that she believed on some level that winning 
Eurovision in 2001 and staging the event in 2002 had an impact on the outcome 
of the EU accession referendum.
At the time of Eurovision, the EU was absolutely looming over the horizon 
and Eurovision had this remarkable effect […] there was a very strong fear 
that the sceptical Estonians would vote no […] winning I think came abso-
lutely at the right time because it suddenly made Estonians think, not only 
“we are part of Europe but we are potentially a winning part of Europe” 
[…] It’s very difficult to extricate of course but my observation from being 
there was that the national self-confidence and the sense of being European 
and having something to show Europe and be proud of and put themselves 
on the map, not just be sort of steam-rollered by another big cultural bloc 
as they always were steam-rollered in the past […] seeing their country on 
the TV [Eurovision 2002] really did change people’s attitudes (Sarah Squire, 
Interview, 15.01.2008).
 Paadam elaborated on this issue of the EU:
I heard that there was an interest in Brussels concerning Eurovision in Tallinn. 
You must understand that there are not many people interested in Eurovision 
in the power corridors of Brussels but the interest was there. It was interesting 
because we were the first post-communist country to host the event and in 
the process of EU negotiations and the second being that we are a tiny coun-
try with a very small television corporation. How we survived with this huge 
and unique production was of interest to them (Juhan Paadam, Interview, 
02.11.2007).
The ESC was not a substandard competition; it was a platform for the Estonian 
state to present itself to the world, namely the EU, as a transforming nation, able 
to produce high quality events much like other countries in Western Europe. 
This is also the view shared by Mart Laar, who stated that whilst Estonia was 
well on the road to EU membership at the time, Eurovision helped to portray 
Estonia as a so-called normal country. 
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When I talked about Europe at the time it was clear that we would arrive on 
the inside of the European Union but it was absolutely unclear about NATO. 
[…] It [Eurovision] helped to put us back on the map […] Estonia is now more 
known, we are a normal partner in Europe (Mart Laar, Interview, 12.11.2007).
The 2002 ESC was a manifestation of the return to Europe discourses within 
the realm of popular culture. Laar was keen to stress that whilst it was the 
reforms taken by his government in the 1990s that paved the way for EU 
accession, the ESC provided a much-needed boost to his wider campaign of 
promoting Estonia on the world stage. However, with government interest in 
the project, both financial and political, it raises questions about who ulti-
mately took the decisions and how much impact the Estonian government had 
on the creative process.
The government which governs least, governs best
The ESC in 2002 was essentially a government-sponsored event and as such 
it raises questions concerning the potential influence that the authorities had 
over the direction and content of the show. According to ETV’s Juhan Paadam 
and Tiiu Siim there was early confusion over the responsibility for the contest 
during the initial planning phase. 
In the very early stages someone from the culture department phoned and 
asked us if we had listed the political aims of our work. I do not remember 
the name but I explained that we are not a political organisation (Tiiu Siim, 
Interview, 02.11.2007). 
From when we started there was not a clear understanding of what the song 
contest is and lots of powers wanted to take it over […] there was a real misun-
derstanding because we needed the state’s support and the money so at first the 
debates were related to who was paying. ETV was on the edge of bankruptcies 
[…] it was not easy to explain about the costs […] we had long talks [with the 
government] and I spoke with ministers. In the spring Mart Laar’s government 
collapsed […] when he was Prime Minister he was very interested in the suc-
cess of the project and a couple of times he gathered with us in his office and 
was asking how things were going. After they understood more about the show 
they did not try to control the content (Juhan Paadam, Interview, 02.11.2007).
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It is interesting to note the initial, almost Soviet reaction from the Estonian 
government, something in which the administrations of the 1990s would have 
been keen to distance the country from. When asked to reveal who exactly the 
voices in the government wanting to take over the contest were, both Paadam 
and Siim were either unable or unwilling to say. Whilst ETV was eventually left 
to produce the content of the show, the interest from the Estonian government, 
perhaps unsurprisingly given that public money had been pledged, remained. 
Paadam did specifically credit the Minister of Culture, Signe Kivi, for helping 
to secure the event for ETV.
I am very grateful to her because she took some risks. We had a lunch every 
second week together. People questioned her about the costs, why the stage 
costs this and that and she had to answer why. She trusted us at ETV that she 
would be repaid the following May in a positive sense because it was a success-
ful show (Juhan Paadam, Interview, 02.11.2007).
Mart Laar himself rejected the notion of any “government control. We just 
pushed the TV team and promotion campaign together. We were sure they 
would find the exact style and the exact way to promote Estonia (Mart Laar, 
Interview, 12.11.2007). The nevertheless significant interest in content, i.e. in 
using Eurovision as a way of promoting a positive image of Estonia, was also 
confirmed by Signe Kivi:
There was no political pressure over the content. That was not our aim. We 
just wanted Estonian Television to produce a good show as we gave them the 
tools to do this […] If we failed it would have been extremely negative for 
Estonia. It was a huge responsibility and we decided to go for it. It was given 
priority by all involved (Signe Kivi, Interview, 26.11.2007).
Such testimonies reveal that initially there was not only a debate as to who was 
responsible for leading the project, the broadcaster or the state, but also how 
much control the government would have over the content. Both Signe Kivi 
and Mart Laar when questioned about the government exerting control over 
the content completely refuted this. However, they did acknowledge that there 
was an effort to ensure that the team working on Eurovision had contact with 
those at Enterprise Estonia, which was launching the Welcome to Estonia pro-
ject. Thus, technically, the content was not influenced by government pressure 
per se, although by linking Eurovision to the launch of Brand Estonia it ensured 
that the programme was in-sync with the essence of the campaign. Note that 
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whilst the two politicians refute any suggestion that there was government 
involvement in the preparations for the ESC, others from ETV, such as Paadam 
and Siim concede that there was “confusion” in the earlier stages. This also 
represented the view expressed by Ilmar Raag, Chairman of the Board of ETV 
in 2002, who said that there was “soft” government involvement in the project:
We were lucky enough not to have too much involvement [from the govern-
ment] the question was what was to be promoted more – Estonia or Tallinn? 
[...] We managed to sell the idea that the best way to promote Estonia was sim-
ply to produce a good show [...] we agreed that the clips should reflect Brand 
Estonia (Ilmar Raag, Interview, 13.11.2007).
Whilst the respondents did not expand greatly on the issue of government 
involvement in the project, it is clear that there was an active interest in the 
promotion of Estonia, a format for promoting Estonia to a global audience. In 
short, heavy-handed government involvement might be seen as a throw-back 
to the Soviet regime, something which Estonian political elites have strived to 
distance the country from since 1991. 
The theme chosen by Estonian Television for the 2002 ESC was the modern 
fairytale which serves as an interesting point for analysis. The fairytale, a dis-
tinctly European construction (Quentel, 2006, p. 97), served two purposes in 
the Estonian case; to present Estonia as European and also to other the Soviet 
past through the continuous reinforcement of Estonia’s so-called happy end-
ing. Specific mention of the theme was made by creative designer Rene Vilbre 
in the official programme booklet for the 2002 contest: 
If Estonia were a fairytale, it could perhaps be likened to Sleeping Beauty. 
Having awoken from the ice cold slumbers of Soviet Rule, Estonia today is a 
bold, young country, vibrant with creative energy and eager to take its place 
in Europe (Eesti Televisioon, 2002, p. 12).
The continuous flagging of this happy ending was a way of distancing Estonia 
from its Soviet past whilst simultaneously promoting a strong and positive 
international image. The fairytale analogy links in with the nationalist dis-
course which portrays nations as primordial, where historical and national 
actors have awoken from periods of repression to the realisation of their des-
tiny. In the Estonian case, Soviet rule represented the period of oppression, 
which has seemingly been absorbed by the public quite uncritically. The more 
traditional narrative of nationhood was wedded to a more future-oriented 
96
The Modern Fairy Tale
discourse of economic dynamism in Estonia through both Eurovision and 
Brand Estonia. Arguably, the issue of how to deal with Estonia’s Soviet past 
was a contentious one. Given that the period from 1991 can be characterised as 
that of a return to normalcy. To quote Daina Eglitis, any reference to the past 
would inevitably have invited discussions concerning Soviet rule, something 
which Estonian politicians had strived to move away from since independence. 
The modern fairytale theme then is entirely reflective and representative of 
the wider historical and political paradigms in the country.
There was a debate about how we talk about 50 years of Soviet rule [...] at the 
time it was quite clear what we wanted to say to Europe, what we wanted to 
show [...] that we are not Soviet, we never were. The slogan for the brand-
ing campaign was positively transforming. It was a good place to start (Andri 
Maimets, Interview, 26.11.2007).
Note the reference to Estonia not being Soviet, this rejection of the Soviet past 
is entirely consistent with narratives on Estonian nationhood. Respondents 
regularly emphasised that during Soviet times, Estonia was seen as the Western 
part of the Soviet Union; the linguistic, historical and cultural ties with Finland 
and Sweden were continuously flagged by those interviewed. Soviet rule was 
illegitimate in Estonia and therefore dismissed as a mere footnote in the years 
following independence. The concept of the modern fairytale was launched at 
a press conference in May 2002 by Signe Kivi. Each postcard image broadcast 
between each national entry depicted a modern take on a traditional fairytale, 
set in Estonia. 
The broadcast in 2002 opened with scenes set inside a castle and featured 
commentary introducing Estonia through typical fairytale language. “Once 
upon a time, in a land far, far away” (Eurovision Song Contest 2002, [TV], 
ETV). This not only set the scene for the theme of the show but also served to 
portray Estonia as somehow exotic and undiscovered. Within seconds of the 
start of the transmission, the Estonian flag flying at Toompea, the focal point 
of the re-establishment of independence in 1991, was shown. In the context of 
the fairytale theme, this represents a direct and explicit link to the cessation 
of Soviet rule. During introductory scenes the UK commentator, Terry Wogan 
explained the significance of the contest for the country: 
Welcome to the 47th Eurovision Song Contest from Tallinn, the capital of 
Estonia. A small, proud Baltic state, independent of mother Russia since 1991 
when they shrugged off the USSR, pulled down Lenin’s statue and decided to 
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go it alone. Some may scoff and even snigger at the old Eurosong but winning 
it last year was regarded as a major breakthrough by the Estonians, an oppor-
tunity to show themselves off, make their mark in Europe. Seven thousand 
people here tonight in the Saku Suurhall, hundreds of millions around the 
world watching from Reykjavik to Sydney (Wogan, Eurovision Song Contest 
2002, [TV] BBC1). 
The opening scenes served a dual purpose, to promote Estonia as European 
through the fairytale but also as a modern European nation, the choice of 
images reflected this. Mobile telephones, flat-screen computers, e-government 
were all depicted, presenting the country as a land of innovation. The images 
included in the opening sequence therefore reflected this enmeshment of 
ancient and modern. Images of technology; the mobile phone, computers and 
the idea of e-government were alluded to by showing members of parliaments 
behind flat-screen computers. It is worth noting that in 2002 flat-screen moni-
tors were not mainstream, the image of Estonia as a technologically advanced 
country with a modern government is therefore reinforced. 
The broadcast then came live from Tallinn’s Saku Suurhall with presenters 
Annely Peebo and Marko Martvere making specific reference to the fairytale 
concept, “Estonian history is like a fairy tale too, with happy ending”. Arguably 
this was a political point, again as highlighted in chapter three, despite insist-
ence from the EBU that the contest is not political in nature. The national 
entries were then introduced via small video clips or postcards depicting vari-
ous well known fairytales. Each clip told the story of a fairytale but with a 
modern Estonian twist. For example, in the clip entitled Snow White, instead 
of a mirror, an interactive computer was shown. The clips were a way of show-
ing positive aspects of life in Estonia through a variety of stories. At the end 
of each clip a slogan was shown on-screen which related to the theme of the 
postcard. The essence of these clips reflected the narratives of Brand Estonia, 
promoting the country as modern, positively transforming and Nordic with 
a twist. Like the opening sequence, these images served to promote Estonia 
as a modern European country. The notion of Estonia and technology was 
regularly flagged with references to Estonian internet connections and “eve-
rything at the touch of a button”. The Estonian countryside was also regularly 
highlighted along with science and education in the postcard depicting the 
University of Tartu. 
Many of the clips included in the Eurovision 2002 broadcast also promoted 
Estonia as a Nordic country, reflecting the narratives of both Brand Estonia 
and the rhetoric from Estonian politicians throughout the 1990s. The Estonian 
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sauna was featured directly before the Finnish entry. The slogan “extrem heat 
from Estonia” that came with it appears to be a deliberate reference to the 
sauna being Estonian rather than Finnish. Naturally, debates rage around 
issues of origin, however, the clip served to promote Estonia as the home of 
the sauna whilst at the same time aligning the country closely to Finland and 
the Nordic sphere. 
The clip screened directly before the Estonian entry told the story of 
Sleeping Beauty. Given the previous references to Estonian history being like 
a fairytale in both the programme booklet and at the start of the broadcast 
itself, this video clip can be seen as a metaphor for how Estonians view their 
country and their recent history. According to the ethnic Estonian narrative of 
the nation, the country was stifled under Soviet occupation but now thriving 
in independence. Perhaps controversially the clip screened before the Russian 
entry was called Freedom. This particular clip told the story of a goldfish in 
captivity, a modern take on Alexander Pushkin’s fairytale. The man in the clip 
feels compelled to release the fish as the slogan “Freedom” appears immediately 
before that of the Russian flag. When questioned about this, Juhan Paadam 
stated that it was a deliberate decision to screen that particular image at that 
particular time. It therefore serves as a political point. 
There was a postcard called Freedom and we put it before the Russian entry. 
The American ambassador mentioned to me about the coincidence that it was 
put there. I said that we exactly put it there [...] we were not insulting anyone, 
it was a light story with no politics in a hard way (Juhan Paadam, Interview, 
02.11.2007).
It is noteworthy that whilst Estonian politicians were playing on discourses of 
multiculturalism in the run-up to EU accession, Dave Benton represented a 
useful and useable figure in this context; there was absolutely no reflection of 
this in the ESC broadcast itself. Mention of multiculturalism would undoubt-
edly have needed to address the Russian speaking minority. Furthermore, the 
clips which were chosen featured diverse regions of Estonia and yet Narva, 
the third largest city in Estonia, with a majority Russian speaking population, 
was conspicuously absent from the broadcast. This reinforces the notion that 
the 2002 Eurovision Song Contest was told on purely ethnic Estonian terms.
As is now commonplace at the Eurovision Song Contest, the interval 
act organised by the host country when the voting is taking place usually 
portrays some aspect of national identity. The interval act in Estonia was a 
modern dance piece which served to encapsulate what the essence of Estonia 
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is. Like the postcard images, there was a fusion of old and new, reflecting 
the Estonian story. In one section of the performance, the sauna is shown 
through the medium of dance whilst later dance sections portray the external 
influences which have shaped Estonian culture over the centuries. The offi-
cial programme booklet described the many influences that have shaped the 
Estonian character over the years:
A maritime country, Estonia is inclined to be open to foreign influences, to 
take some and spit some out [...] We preserve our own – our minds are open 
to the new, but caution and sobriety always pulse on the edge of our brains [...] 
All of this has helped us to be preserved as a nation and delivered us to the 
present day (Eesti Televisioon, 2002, p. 78).
Again there was no direct reference to the influence of the Russian empire 
or indeed to Estonia’s sizeable Russian speaking minority. Although the 
notion that Estonia had not always been open to foreign influences, hence the 
quote “spit some out”, might be a veiled reference to the rejection of Soviet 
rule. Whilst Soviet rule was arguably never going to be articulated through 
Eurovision, the diversity of Estonian society may be been. However, this was 
something which was not evident or explicit during the broadcast of Eurovision 
in 2002 and offers a striking counter-narrative to the rhetoric of diversity 
which Dave Benton elicited from the political elite in Estonia. 
Quantifying the unquantifiable 
Gauging the success of large-scale events such as the ESC or the Olympic Games 
is no easy task since much of the revenue generated through tourism and the 
publicity associated with such occasions are difficult to quantify in monetary 
terms. The London 2012 Olympic Games were considered by the UK’s National 
Audit Office to be value for money (Gibson, 2013). However, no such govern-
ment analysis was undertaken in Estonia following ESC 2002 although ETV did 
provide its own report. According to ETV, the final cost of the 2002 Eurovision 
Song Contest was €7.9 million. The scale of the competition can be seen when 
the entire annual budget for Estonian Television is considered, €10.9 million 
(ETV, 2002, p. 27). The EBU provided €3 million with government funding 
(€2.2 million) and sponsorship and ticket sales providing the remaining €2.7 
million (ETV 2002, p.27). Estonian political and media figures interviewed for 
this work discussed the legacy of hosting the event and as such these testimonies 
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provide a unique insight into the importance placed on Estonia’s international 
image at the time. The event was seen as overwhelmingly positive and cost-
effective given the viewing figures and potential reach of the television format. 
Quite often people questioned where the money was going […] there were 
doubts whether the money would be used properly. This show represented 
huge amounts of money for Estonia […] For television promotion, the 
Eurovision Song Contest was the only way for Estonia […] It was seen as a 
unique opportunity to show Estonia to almost 300 million people. This was a 
pretty powerful argument (Ilmar Raag, Interview, 13.11.2007).
We had a good opportunity […] it was not wasted money. It was an investment 
in the Estonian image. The value of this publicity was in fact priceless […] 
in that time we were heading towards EU membership. We were a positively 
transforming country (Ivo Rull, Interview, 09.11.2007).
The tone of the media coverage is particularly worthy of note, it was over-
whelmingly positive with few, if any, dissenting voices concerning the costs 
involved. Moreover no single respondent could name an individual who 
categorically stated that hosting the Eurovision Song Contest was a waste of 
resources. One article in particular, in Õhtuleht, cited the importance of the 
contest for Estonia’s standing in the world, reflecting wider political discourses 
from Laar and Kivi. Regardless of the credibility of the event as a musical 
showcase, it is clear that the ESC was viewed as a serious event in Estonia at 
this time. 
The image we created before Eurovision was already very high. The responsi-
bility of raising it or at least keeping it on the same level rests on our shoulders. 
If at least twenty three countries are watching Estonia at the same time, if the 
Eurovision is successful it is the best marketing technique for the country, you 
cannot buy it for any amount of money. This opportunity should be used to 
the maximum. I think that after the Eurovision the impression will be uni-
form, one of surprise. Many have prejudices about the place the event will be 
held in. I can imagine the surprise will be the more positive for it. I think that 
maybe it is the best Eurovision ever made […] our pride and self-esteem has 
been rising especially when you see the in-between clips (Kasemaa, 2002).
There were, however, some small low-level media debates concerning the pres-
ence of the government in the auditorium at the event itself, many of whom had 
received free tickets. An article published in Õhtuleht on 7 May 2002 reported 
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that over one hundred VIP passes had been given to politicians whilst mem-
bers of the public had to pay to attend. The Minister of Agriculture, Jaanus 
Marrandi, was quoted as saying “I would not have thought that the members 
of the government would get any sort of free tickets […] they can afford to 
buy their own” (Michelson, 2002a). Regional Minister Toivo Asmer stated that 
he believed that he personally did not think it was right that the government 
would be able to attend for free. However, he still accepted the invitation, 
flagging the significance of the event. “The Eurovision Song Contest is a big 
historical event, Estonia may never get to organise it again” (Michelson, 2002a). 
Such discourses were the only controversies, for lack of a better word, concern-
ing the financing of ESC 2002, a stark contrast to the rhetoric which dogged 
the Brand Estonia campaign, suggesting that the ESC was something which 
media, politicians and the public alike bought into. The mere fact that there 
was such a strong political presence in the auditorium itself speaks volumes 
about the emphasis placed on the ESC that year. Political figures such as Signe 
Kivi, Mart Laar, Marju Lauristin as well as the UK ambassador to Estonia, 
Sarah Squire, were all in attendance.
There was a very excited atmosphere, the build up to it. All the ambassadors 
were invited to the event, so I attended the Eurovision Song Contest, sitting in 
a rather sedate part of the auditorium […] I do not remember any grouching 
in the columns in newspapers or editorials […] we were just astonished by the 
effervescence of the crowd. We had never seen an Estonian crowd behave this 
way. It was out of the norm (Sarah Squire, Interview, 15.01.2008). 
Perceptions of self
As underlined in the introduction to this book, much of the data gathered 
for this work involved interviewing political and media figures in Estonia as 
well as the wider public. These interviews, whilst not wholly representative, 
provide unique insights into the way national identity is both constructed and 
internalised. This chapter has already outlined some of the responses from the 
elite level, the public level almost entirely reflect these testimonies, a sharp 
contrast to the reaction to Brand Estonia as discussed in chapter two. ESC 
2002 was seen as not only a success in that the production itself was impres-
sive, but also that it promoted an image of the country which Estonians could 
readily identify with. 
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I think the introductory clips they showed between the songs were great; 
they were really clever and funny. I remember thinking that a lot of people 
in Europe were watching this and maybe even the class of people who might 
not be interested and would actually learn something from this kind of stuff. 
For sure it had to be a positive thing […] I think hosting the show was a good 
thing, it was an amazing chance (Riina, Interview, 10.04.2008).
It was really good. I think it was very witty and clever. If you compare it to 
Ukraine for example [host of Eurovision in 2005] I didn’t understand what 
they were trying to show. Do you remember what Terry Wogan said about 
it? He said “average people look ugly everywhere” because they were showing 
pictures of faces from the streets and from the young people, it was terrible 
[…] at that time it was very important to show the world that we are as good 
as other countries, that we are not using the wooden spoons and not driving 
carriages with horses and that we can do a production which is as good as 
the BBC and that’s the part that we took really seriously (Margit, Interview, 
17.11.2007).
As can clearly be seen from the selection of interview transcripts, Eurovision 
in 2002 was an event which the Estonian people bought into. Again the 
importance of the Estonian image is reinforced, respondents highlighted 
that organising Eurovision afforded Estonia the opportunity to prove that 
the country can produce large-scale international events to an equal stand-
ard as other Western European countries, namely the UK, given the specific 
reference to the BBC. Criticism of the Ukrainian production reveals more 
about the orientation of Estonian national identity, that of Estonia as Nordic, 
not like Ukraine, an Eastern other, “with wooden spoons and carriages”. It 
is interesting to note that the term “Eastern Europe” is seen as pejorative to 
many of the Estonians interviewed. Riina, a respondent quoted earlier, is a 
Canadian-Estonian who moved to Estonia in 1991 and explained further the 
disconnection that Estonians appear to have to the term: 
I think most Estonians who have come from abroad, they feel that they do love 
Estonia but there are certain things, certain oddities like principles or morals. 
I started thinking about the whole idea of Nordic versus Eastern European 
thing and it is interesting to think whether your average Estonian is offended 
by that, I don’t think it is an offensive thing if we lump people together as one 
of the other. I understand that there is nothing to be ashamed of; if all those 
countries have had the same sort of Soviet lifestyle then there are certain things 
which are bound to be the same. I guess it’s more to do with being somehow 
connected to Russia or the Soviet past (Riina, Interview, 10.04.2008).
5. Eurovision Song Contest 2002: a modern fairytale
103
Estonia is a small country. This was a time when not too many people knew 
about Estonia anywhere so for one moment I think they were looking on the 
map and when it was held here […] I think there is a stereotype about us being 
in Eastern Europe […] Eurovision gave us the chance to have a voice for once, 
to say something for ourselves about ourselves, for me that was really power-
ful (Margit, Interview, 17.11.2007).
Returning to the issue of the content of the postcard clips specifically, some 
respondents did highlight that with hindsight there were some images that they 
felt were somewhat dated or unrepresentative, namely the clip entitled Snow 
White. This particular video, whilst arguably aiming to be amusing, provoked a 
reaction from two respondents in particular who viewed it as having undertones 
of misogyny. The clip featured the wicked stepmother asking a digital computer 
screen the well-known question of who is the fairest of them all. Again the image 
of Estonia as one of technological innovation is re-inscribed. Several images of 
Estonian women were then shown and the tagline “So many beautiful women”. 
The queen is then seen to be organising crates of apples to be sent to Estonia.
Whilst I thought the clips were great, they absolutely reflected the Estonia that 
I identify with, I did have an issue with them saying that there are so many 
beautiful women here. It was a bit sexist really and I don’t think they would get 
away with doing that now, Estonia has moved on since then (Kati Varblane, 
Interview, 09.04.2008). 
This was the only noticeable point of criticism from ethnic Estonian respond-
ents. All other interviewees expressed positive views that the clips promoted 
a positive image of Estonia as well as one in which they could easily identify 
with. This then raises the issue of how Russian speakers in Estonia viewed the 
content of the broadcast. Could Russian speakers readily identify with a pro-
gramme which consistently emphasised Estonia’s so-called happy ending or 
more specifically, the triumph of good over bad through the fairytale theme? 
Whilst this work does not focus on Russian speakers per se, some responses 
from interviews conducted in Narva illuminate some of the more salient nar-
ratives of identity politics in Estonia. None of the Russian speakers interviewed 
had strong feelings on the modern fairytale theme while ethnic Estonians 
readily identified with it, which in itself is telling. 
I thought the show was impressive, Estonia looked good but I am very curious 
why they did not show anything of Narva in those clips. We are the third city. 
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They showed Tallinn, ok I understand and Tartu too but why not us? It’s a bor-
der town, an interesting place for people to see I think. They showed nature 
and forests but not my hometown (Dmitry, Interview, 23.11.2007).
I remember thinking that it was great to have such a big event here in Estonia. 
I speak Estonian fluently, I consider this to be my home but I also under-
stand why Russians look to Russia too. Eurovision is one example, we vote for 
Russia. In 2002 I remember thinking that it was strange, there was a Swedish 
singer for Estonia. Imagine if there had been a Russian singer, that would be a 
big challenge for Estonians (Andri, Interview, 12.11.2007).
Such testimonies reveal that whilst Eurovision again was seen as a useful tool 
for promoting Estonia, the view amongst Russian speakers was that the con-
tent did not reflect aspects of Estonia which were part of their lives. Given 
that Narva, the third largest city in Estonia was completely absent from the 
entire broadcast despite other arguably more obscure images being screened 
appears to confirm this. In particular the goldfish “freedom” clip broadcast 
before the Russian entry, as discussed earlier, appears to be a political point 
by ETV. The narrative from Andri in particular highlights that divisions exist 
within Estonian society; he suggests that the selection of a Russian speaker as 
Estonian representative at the ESC would be problematic, thus providing a 
counter narrative to the rhetoric on multiculturalism from Estonian politicians 
in the run-up to EU accession negotiations. 
For me it is better to say that I think I am Estonian-Russian. It means that I am 
a Russian speaker who lives in Estonia […] I can say that if we win something 
it’s my victory too. A good example was the year 2006 when we won some 
gold medals in the Winter Olympic Games. I heard our Prime Minister on the 
radio say that he is proud about Estonians and all Estonians can celebrate. He 
did not use the phrase “Estonian people” so when I heard this I understood 
that I am not welcome to understand it actually in his point of view […] I 
remember how it [Eurovision] was presented, our country they really did not 
mention national minorities but I am not sure if it was a good place to do that 
[…] I was very proud about my country […] People always know that I am 
Russian because I look like a Russian person, I have dark hair and my skin is a 
little bit different from Estonians. When I use Estonian language I speak with 
an accent which always gives some information about my origin. I cannot say 
that I was discriminated because of this (Dima, Interview, 27.11.2007).
The respondent, Dima, spoke fluent Estonian and is an Estonian citizen, on 
paper he is officially integrated into Estonian society. However, his testimony 
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reveals that deeper divisions remain despite his affiliation to Estonia, not the 
use of “my country”. It is also telling that his Russian origins are flagged by 
others and he is sensitive to semantics; “Estonians” versus “Estonian people”. 
The testimonies here show that multiculturalism and the integration of the 
Russian speaking minority in Estonia are both complex and multifaceted. This 
issue is not clear-cut; language is not the only point of difference. Examination 
of the debates surrounding Eurovision therefore serves as a mirror of the wider 
identity debates ensuing in Estonia. Those that do not speak fluent Estonian 
were the source of great anxiety for many ethnic Estonians interviewed whilst 
those who do speak fluent Estonian are yet still somehow singled out, as high-
lighted in the response from Dima. This in turn suggests that Estonia has yet to 
construct an inclusive sense of national self, signifying that integration issues 
are more complicated than the conventional literature on Estonia suggests.
Media analysis
A cursory glance at the Estonian media coverage of ESC 2002 reveals that the 
issue of Estonia’s international image was never far from the agenda. Articles 
speculated about the success of the show and how Estonia would be seen in the 
gaze of the international community, the reporting portrayed a latent anxiety 
concerning this issue. Mart Laar, who was by that time, out of political office, 
emphasised in an article he wrote for the newspaper Postimees, that the inter-
national image of Estonia was of paramount importance. 
Although there may be differing opinions, it is important to us that more than 
100 million people will watch Eurovision through us. It means that 120–160 
million people will acknowledge the bearings, the place where Eurovision 
takes place. It is a very important event for Estonia. I believe that we will suc-
ceed in showing Estonia in a good light to the world (Postimees, 2002c). 
In an editorial piece entitled “Unknown Comparison” Andri Maimets (inter-
viewed for this book) flagged the opportunity that the event brought for the 
country but also highlighted that Estonia should be seen as a “normal country” 
and in order for this to happen people should not expect a heavy emphasis on 
Estonia’s past. 
To Estonia winning the Eurovision and being able to organise this year’s event 
means a lot. It is a chance to show a three hour long live show from Tallinn, and 
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wedge in little fragments about Estonia (which are, by the way, made very pro-
fessionally), to present different Estonian landscapes, introduce our musicians 
and choreographers; to paint a good image of us, to create a certain reputation 
[…] We are a normal nation in a normal state, not some sort of cage monkeys 
begging for bananas who have to hang down the wall by their toes and show 
everything they can do […] We should try not to go out of our way to hope for 
an echo of our independent country’s ten year history (Maimets, 2002b).
Much of the coverage in the Estonian media was preoccupied with what the 
foreign press were reporting about the country at this time as evidenced in 
the article “What the foreign press thinks about Estonia” (Postimees, 2002a). 
The article detailed the various reports published in the international press as 
Estonia prepared to host Eurovision, all of which signified the importance of 
the ESC for boosting Estonia’s international image: 
A miniscule Baltic republic is about to register in the popular imagination of 
Europe for the first time [...] This month Tallinn is set to become the latest 
member of yet one more exclusive European club (The Independent, 2002). 
The Observer (28 April 2002) emphasised the importance of the event given 
the recent political and historical context and presented an alternative view 
of Eurovision, in contrast to the deep cynicism in which many British people 
view the ESC. The Observer almost suggested that the Estonian government 
had pinned its foreign policy agenda on hosting Eurovision, which was not 
only untrue but also borderline chauvinistic. The comment from Maimets, 
“we are not monkeys in a zoo”, therefore takes on significance and can be seen 
as a response to the reporting of Estonia internationally. 
For most viewers in Britain it will be a three hour sneerathon, a showcase for 
everything risible in Euroland. Not so in Estonia [...] Estonians argue that 
Eurovision will put them on the map [...] The project is daunting – the three 
hour show will cost as much as the entire annual budget of the national televi-
sion corporation [...] The recent past has not been buried. The talk in Tallinn 
these days may be of joining the European Union and NATO but it is accom-
panied by a nervous glance over the shoulder at the Russian bear. In this 
context Eurovision has taken on an almost surreal significance (Guha, 2002). 
However, not all the international media coverage was positive. The Times 
newspaper focussed on the social cost of the transition from communism to 
capitalism, even going as far to suggest that the country was a quasi-Soviet state 
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with “mafia-type organisations prevalent”, an image that the political elite in 
Estonia would have been keen to dispel, particular in the context of the clean 
break from the past, the return to Europe. 
The experience of freedom has not been completely pain-free for Estonia. 
Crimes committed by mafia-type organisations are prevalent, and the fact 
that a third of the population is Russian – of the occupying nation – means 
that the social fabric of the country is far from perfect. The divide between the 
rich and the poor is very clear on the streets. Old ladies in worn out farming 
attire are hauling bags past the Mercedes-Benz cars parked in two lanes on the 
streets [...] All this can’t cloud the charm of Tallinn. It is one of the most beau-
tiful medieval towns in Europe [...] a little bit unnerving, like an eerie magical 
forest in a fairytale (The Times, 2002).
Perhaps more controversially, closer reading of this article suggests that if 
there is blame to be apportioned for societal ills in Estonia, then they lie with 
the Russian speaking population. The article makes a link between Russian 
speakers and the recent past, labelling them as “the occupying nation” and 
referencing “mafia-type organisations”. Interestingly, whilst this image would 
undoubtedly have been unwelcome, the references to occupation have been 
seemingly internalised in both the media and amongst respondents, such an 
article therefore serves as another avenue in which to other the Soviet past and 
indeed the Russian speaking population. A further article provided a review 
of the BBC documentary based on Estonia’s preparations for the ESC. The 
programme, Estonia Dreams of Eurovision, contextualised Eurovision in terms 
of Estonia’s tradition of song festivals and its recent strides towards EU mem-
bership. However, the coverage in the Estonian press was arbitrary:
In itself it was a very well made programme about a country from the former 
Soviet Union down to every last cliché – the one-time fear of the KGB, then 
songs that stopped the tanks and a sly remark about the number of suicides 
[...] Our lives do not seem quite as amateur as the BBC makes them out to be 
(Erilaid, 2002).
The BBC documentary of Estonians and their recent history will proba-
bly make a large proportion of viewers think that Estonians drink, live in a 
dark and cold place, are poor, miss the regime of the Soviet Union and try to 
swindle and defraud other people’s money [...] Such a film is enough a reason 
why Estonians should think about marketing at home as well as abroad. This 
documentary [...] will have a very depressing effect on future investors and 
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tourists [...] In the light of the BBC’s depressing vision of Estonia, the country 
should take decisive actions to market itself and help improve its image abroad, 
although the millions needed for it may seem too big (Õhtuleht, 29 May 2002).
The reviews of the documentary in the Estonian press therefore serve as a 
reminder that the issue of the image of Estonia was a pressing one; the BBC 
documentary presented a narrative of the nation which was alien to many 
Estonians. Such articles provide an insight into the way through which the 
Estonian nation is imagined; note the particular flagging of the term “Former 
Soviet Union”, a label which Estonia had been trying to shed during the previ-
ous decade. Not all voices in the press were critical however, Gerli Padar, an 
Estonian singer and contributor to the documentary film, was quoted as saying 
“I like the film. I like the fact that it is honest, that we are showing what we 
are actually like”. Immediately after this quote, it was referenced, rather wryly, 
that Gerli Padar lives in Finland, the subtext being that she therefore is not 
best placed to say what is a true reflection of Estonia and what is fabrication. 
Following the ESC, the press in Estonia deconstructed the event, again, 
with focus on what the world was reporting, again, reinforcing the notion 
that Estonians were conscious about their international image. Of the articles 
which centred on Estonia itself, some could be interpreted as contentious. 
Õhtuleht published an article claiming that Eurovision had almost become a 
battleground between Estonians and Russian speakers in the centre of Tallinn; 
“Russians and Estonians were shouting over each other” (Michelson, 2002). 
On Saturday night on Raekoja Square at the “People’s Eurovision” event, thou-
sands of people were screaming over each other. “Eesti! Eesti!” and “Ross-i-ja! 
Ross-i-ja!”. In the end a Russian youngster broke the flagpole of the blue-
black-white flag [...] During the Russian song it feels like we are not in Estonia 
at all. “Ross-i-ja! Ross-i-ja!” people are punching the air. The noise is so loud 
that people in the back can’t hear the song at all. But Estonia’s song brings 
back the belief that we are in Estonia after all and that not everyone is Russian 
(Michelson, 2002).
The article serves as a reminder that Estonia is, to some extent, a divided 
society and seems to suggest that the loyalties of Estonia’s Russian speaking 
minority do not necessarily lie with Estonia itself. Eurovision therefore offered 
another platform for the rhetoric that, on some level, Russian speakers are seen 
as disloyal to the Estonian state and therefore presented an opportunity for 
the othering of those populations; “it feels like we are not in Estonia at all”. 
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Concluding remarks
In terms of providing a platform for the country to manage its own image on 
its own terms, the Eurovision Song Contest was hugely important for Estonia 
in 2002. The debates which were central to the planning of the event were 
dominated by discussions concerning the image of Estonia in the context of 
the return to Europe. The sheer volume of coverage dedicated to Eurovision 
in the Estonian media is further evidence of how significant the event was 
in terms of raising Estonia’s international profile. The personalised tone of 
many of the articles appears to have had an impact on many Estonians since 
the event was seen as a personal affair, something that the country needed 
to support in order for it to be a success. It seems that Estonians were fully 
behind the event and felt a connection to it. The preoccupation with what the 
world thought about Estonia at the time is a reflection of an almost inferiority 
complex that the country had at the time. Eurovision was an opportunity to 
prove that it was as good as the others, i.e. its Western, EU neighbours. The 
self-representation of Estonia through the ESC itself was that of a fairytale, a 
country which had escaped its evil captor, the Soviet Union, and found a happy 
ending. The content of the broadcast was informed by the ethnic Estonian nar-
rative of the nation and apart from the “Freedom” postcard directly before the 
Russian entry, any references to the Soviet past, or indeed the Russian speaking 
minority, were absent. Ethnic Estonians identified with this content, whereas 
Russian speakers were less certain, even apathetic towards it. As such these 
groups lack a common Estonian national identity. Russian speakers therefore 
represent a form of hybridity; not quite Estonian and not quite Russian. Latvia 
won ESC 2002, which attracted speculation in the Estonian media that the 
country would not be able to host the contest the following year. The successful 
staging of Eurovision provided Estonians with a confidence boost since they 
were casting doubts over their neighbours when, only twelve months before, 
other countries were ironically doing exactly the same to Estonia. 
6. From Wild Dances in Ukraine to Hard Rock 
in Finland: A comparative perspective
This chapter explores the connections between nation branding and nation 
building through the Eurovision Song Contest in two other cases: in post-
Soviet Ukraine and in Finland. This contextualization is meant less as not as 
a full-scale comparison of cases, but rather as providing a broader comparative 
perspective on the Estonian case. What all of these cases have, indeed, in com-
mon historically is that they have straddled, with varying degrees of success, a 
geopolitical tightrope between East and West. In all cases winning and staging 
the Eurovision Song Contest were lauded as a major opportunity to promote 
the country to the rest of Europe, a chance to manage the international image 
and, as I argue in this chapter, the debates also reflect a desire by the political 
elite to use the event to promote nation building in the post-Cold War context. 
When Ukraine, another post-Soviet state struggling with nation building, 
won the 2004 Eurovision Song Contest the event was afforded significance in 
terms of image building since it provided Ukraine with the opportunity to 
host a major cultural event for the first time since independence. The winning 
performer, Ruslana, declared at a press conference immediately after the event 
that “all of us are making a positive image of Ukraine. I want my country to 
open up before you with friendship and hospitality […] I would like you to 
forget about Chernobyl” (Moscow Times, 17.05.2004). Thus, from the outset, 
the victory was linked to the international image of Ukraine and as such it was 
seen as an opportunity to present a different view of Ukraine to the rest of the 
world. The hosting of the 2005 ESC in Kyiv took on even greater significance 
following the political protests which took place across the country at the end of 
2004 which became known internationally as the Orange Revolution. A study 
of the 2005 Eurovision Song Contest offers a rich set of insights into the nature 
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of the Orange Revolution and its accompanying debates on Ukrainian nation 
and state building. Moreover, the debates in Ukraine, often wholly different to 
the narratives on national identity in Estonia, illuminate the complex nature 
of post-Soviet nation building. 
Finland, like Estonia, emerged as an independent state in the aftermath of 
World War I. While the two countries have many differences, there is also an 
element of commonality. Language is arguably the most obvious similarity, 
both being the only Baltic Finnic people to have managed to build their own 
nation state (Lehti, 2003, p.16) However, both can also, to differing extents, be 
considered to be post-colonial. Moreover, both states have shared a peripheral 
status in relation to Europe, namely Western Europe, and both have renegoti-
ated their prospective international relations with neighbouring Russia and 
the wider world. Finland, unlike Estonia, managed to resist Soviet demands 
through military force during World War II, retaining its status as an inde-
pendent state in the face of overwhelming odds. Given Finland’s geopolitical 
position it is perhaps not unsurprising that respective Finnish governments 
pursued a policy of neutrality during the Cold War. Indeed, it was by no means 
predestined that Finland would not suffer the same fate as Estonia and the 
other Baltic nations since Finland was assigned to the Soviet sphere of influ-
ence under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (Jakobson, 1998, p. 4). 
Finland’s peripheral status means an analysis of the Eurovision Song Contest 
and the ensuing debates that the event engendered provides a unique insight 
into the way national identity is constructed in the country in a post-Cold 
War context. Both Ukraine and Finland attached great importance to victory 
in, and hosting of the ESC and as such demonstrate the significance that the 
event has as a platform for nation branding. An analysis of the event in both 
countries not only reveals the more salient narratives of national identity, they 
serve as an interesting comparison to the main case study on Estonia. 
The 2005 ESC in Kyiv in the context  
of the Orange Revolution
Unlike in Estonia, Ukrainian nation and state building was slow and piecemeal 
in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ukrainian poli-
ticians took a middle of the road approach. The successive presidents Kravchuk 
and Kuchma remained on good terms with Moscow despite attempts to inte-
grate with Europe In practice, both leaders did little to move Ukraine towards 
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this goal. Arguably, the return to Europe discourse was not prevalent in direct-
ing Ukrainian policy. This has been labelled as “declarative Europeanisation” 
by Kataryna Wolczuk, in that only lip service was paid to the idea of Ukrainian 
integration into European structures such as the European Union with lit-
tle else tangible forthcoming in reality (D’Anieri, 2007, p. 217). Presidents 
Kravchuk and Kuchma promoted a sense of nationhood which was not based 
on ethnic criteria and accepted the use of Russian in state business, despite 
the implementation of one official state language, Ukrainian. Thus, nation 
building in Ukraine was constrained by the difficulties in encapsulating and 
building a common national identity. Succinctly capturing the essence of 
Ukrainian national identity is no easy task. Ukraine has been described as an 
“amalgam of regions” with different ethno-linguistic, economic, cultural and 
political profiles (Wolczuk, 2002, p. 65). The lack of a uniform consensus on a 
constitution, which was finally ratified in June 1996, making Ukraine the last 
former Soviet republic to do so, exemplifies the protracted and complex nature 
of Ukrainian nation building.
The 1986 Chernobyl disaster has continued to loom large over Ukraine’s 
international image, the legacy of which has arguably impacted upon the way 
in which the country is viewed in the West. Regional divisions and political 
factors aside, the incident cast a shadow over the country in the eyes of the 
world. Ukraine, unlike the so-called “clean slate” Estonia, had far more work 
to do in terms of shaking off this negative image. Given the immediate link 
between Chernobyl and the Ukrainian victory in the ESC in 2004, when the 
winner Ruslana stated that she wanted the world to “forget about Chernobyl”, 
the incident has left a lasting impression on Ukrainians and on the way in 
which their country has come to be viewed by the West. Both the 2004 ESC 
victory and indeed the Orange Revolution represented positive news stories 
for Ukraine, the former providing Ukrainian officials with an opportunity 
to manage its own image on its own terms for the first time since independ-
ence. The ESC in Ukraine therefore took on an unprecedented significance in 
the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, as Vasyl Myroshnychenko, from the 
Ukrainian public relations firm CFC Consulting explains:
If you analyse the history of Ukraine most of the information about Ukraine 
in the media was negative […] Chernobyl or corruption […] of course a splash 
of positive information was the Orange Revolution but I would still put on 
winning Eurovision in 2004 and then hosting in 2005 up there as the most 
important events to help our image in recent times (Vasyl Myroshnychenko, 
Interview, 05.12.2007).
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The Orange Revolution in context
By 2004, Ukraine was said to have slipped into an increasingly authoritarian 
state with widespread corruption going largely unchallenged by the Kuchma 
government (D’Anieri, 2010, p. 1). The 2004 presidential election, of which the 
first vote was held in October 2004, saw neither candidate, pro-Western Viktor 
Yushchenko or pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, surpass the 50% majority 
requirement. A second round was held in November which saw Yanukovych 
emerge victorious. In the immediate aftermath, reports emerged of electoral 
fraud and voter intimidation, widespread protests took place. When it emerged 
that the opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko had been poisoned with 
dioxin it served as a rallying call to people, effectively the presidential election 
came to be seen as being “stolen” (D’Anieri, 2010, p. 81 and 99). People took 
to the streets of Kyiv with orange flags, banners, symbols representing their 
opposition to the government. Later counter-protests from pro-Yanukovych 
supporters, with blue as their emblem, emerged. In crude terms the Orange 
Revolution can be seen as a clash between East and West. However, as with 
the linguistic divide, not all Western regions were pro-Yushchenko nor were 
they all pro-Yanukovych in the east (Velychenko, 2007, p. 85). The Orange 
Revolution therefore serves as a mirror of wider Ukrainian society; complex, 
confusing and often contradictory. 
The events which took place in Kyiv in winter 2004 attracted the attention 
of the world. The elections and protests potentially represented a change in 
geopolitics given that victory of the opposition could potentially take Ukraine 
closer to EU and NATO membership, and further from Russia. It is therefore 
not surprising that both East and West closely followed the dramatic events in 
Ukraine. After the votes of the previous run-offs were nullified by Ukraine’s 
Supreme Court another election was announced for 26 December. This time 
the ballot was closely scrutinised by international observers and deemed to be 
fair and free. The result showed a clear victory for the orange opposition led 
by Yushchenko who won 51.9% of the vote compared to 44.2% who voted for 
Yanukovych (D’Anieri, 2010, p. 23). Consequentially, Yushchenko was sworn in 
as President of Ukraine on 23 January 2005. The significance of the events of the 
Orange Revolution was not lost on the new president who made reference to the 
impact that the protests had on Ukraine’s geopolitical position in Europe. “We 
are no longer on the edge of Europe […] we are situated at the centre” (D’Anieri, 
2010, p. 25). The Orange Revolution became a discursive tool for Ukrainian 
politicians to define and create a new image of the country. Effectively, the 
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Orange Revolution put the country on the map, in a positive light, in the gaze of 
the international media and demonstrates the influence that protests can have 
on nation identity formation as well as the international image of a country. 
Previous media coverage on Ukraine focused, rather unsurprisingly, on the 
continued challenges that Chernobyl posed, allegations of political corruption, 
and the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze in 2000 (Krushelnycky, 2006, 
p. 359). The Orange Revolution provided Ukraine with something that had 
previously been lacking; recognition and positive affirmation within the inter-
national community. As Krushelnycky concludes, the events were “spectacularly 
successful at winning Ukraine international goodwill” (2006, p. 359).
The Orange Revolution also became a platform for other expressions of 
protest namely through music. Ukrainian bands performed for the hundreds 
of thousands of people who were gathered in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
(Independence Square). One such band, Greenjolly, was a group from the 
Ivano-Frankivsk region in Western Ukraine. Their song “Razom nas bahato, 
nas ne podolaty” (Together we are many, we cannot be defeated) became an 
unofficial anthem of the Orange Revolution. In 2005, it was controversially 
chosen to represent Ukraine at the Eurovision Song Contest, an issue which 
will be discussed later in this chapter. The reigning Eurovision champion 
Ruslana also became heavily involved in the Orange Revolution. The singer 
went on hunger strike in protest against what she saw as a stolen election and 
later went on to become a politician herself as a member of parliament for 
Yushchenko’s ruling Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine) party (Krushelnycky, 
2006, p. 294). The links between the Eurovision Song Contest and politics go 
further than just from the outset of the Orange Revolution since Ukrainian 
participation in the event itself can be considered to be an inherently political 
act, aimed specifically at improving the international image of the country. 
Eurovision: “It was a good opportunity  
to showcase Ukraine”
Ukraine entered the ESC in 2003, a year before scoring its first victory and 
a decade later compared to other post-Soviet successor states, a reflection of 
the country’s protracted trajectory towards reforms and European integration 
more generally. Ukrainian participation in the ESC was the idea of Gennadiy 
Kurochka from the public relations firm CFC Consulting. CFC Consulting, a 
private marketing and public relations organisation based in Kyiv, approached 
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the government of Ukraine in 2002 and offered assistance to the National 
Television Company of Ukraine (NTU) with regards to managing the coun-
try’s entry to Eurovision. The corporation is funded by corporate and private 
sponsors. In 2005, they signed a contract with the Ukrainian government as 
official public relations partner for the 2005 ESC and in 2007 the organisation 
signed an agreement with the government of Georgia, overseeing its Eurovision 
debut that year. According to CFC Consulting, Ukraine participated in the ESC 
specifically to improve its international image: 
When we started with the idea of having Ukraine in the Eurovision […] 
what we had in mind was how to use it to work on improving the image of 
Ukraine internationally […] I remember when we had to present the entire 
project of Eurovision to the vice Prime Minister of Ukraine […] we had to 
draft all the positive benefits Ukraine would get should we actually win the 
contest. So it was on the back of our minds from the very beginning, how to 
use this television musical project for the benefit of Ukraine’s image (Vasyl 
Myroshnychenko, Interview, 05.12.2007).
In 2004 CFC Consulting oversaw the selection of Ukrainian ESC representa-
tive and together, with the national broadcaster, NTU, approached Ruslana 
Lyzhychko. The song Wild Dances is said to be derived from Hutsul songs 
and rituals from the Carpathian region of western Ukraine. Ruslana’s perfor-
mance drew upon various “ethnic Ukrainian” motifs and victory in Eurovision 
arguably boosted self-esteem and the image of the country. The song which 
features traditional drums and the Hutsul alpine horn, the trembita, immedi-
ately connects with Ukrainian tradition; the various incantations in the song 
carries associations with Hutsul culture and the Carpathian region of Ukraine 
(Pavlyshyn, 2006, p. 475). However, what is perceived by audiences as Hutsul 
may, in fact, be references to a more generic European folk sound (Yekelchyk, 
2010). Transferred to the Eurovision stage, this essentialised depiction of a 
local, western Ukrainian, culture comes to be seen not as a local representa-
tion but as a national one; speaking on behalf of Ukraine as a whole. The 
song was performed in both English and Ukrainian and, interestingly, not 
Russian. The absence of this effectively shows that the performance of Ruslana 
was an ethnic Ukrainian narrative of national identity. Ruslana’s sexualised 
and almost militant style led her to be dubbed Xena: Warrior Princess, by UK 
commentator Terry Wogan. Ruslana was not only “wild” for the purposes of 
the performance of her song; she also projected this image in the promotional 
material for her song, even sharing a cage with wolves. Wild Dances therefore 
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served to sexualise and exoticise a particular narrative of national identity 
whilst simultaneously presenting Ukraine, or more specifically, the Carpathian 
mountains, which inspired the performance, as being at the heart of Europe 
(Baker, 2006). Ruslana was selected internally as Ukraine’s representative for 
the ESC in 2004 and promoted internationally by CFC Consulting. Thus, the 
narrative of Ukrainian identity sold to a wider European audience was con-
trolled by a select group of elites in the country. In representing Ukraine as a 
nation state, Ruslana’s performance raises questions about how nationhood is 
defined, constructed and affirmed through Eurovision.
We didn’t have any national selections here so it was pretty much the deci-
sion of CFC and the National TV Company of Ukraine and we came up with 
Ruslana […] her act and her performance was very ethnic but it was very par-
ticular to special rituals in western parts of Ukraine, from the mountains […] 
it was very Ukrainian […] it was an act itself which did a great deal for pro-
moting Ukraine the country (Vasyl Myroshnychenko, Interview, 05.12.2007).
Note that Myroshnychenko appears to suggest that this western Ukrainian 
style is perhaps more organic than something reflecting the eastern influences 
in the country, “it was very Ukrainian”. Wild Dances can be seen as a product 
of a small elite circle that decided and disseminated understandings of what 
constitutes national culture in Ukraine, and promoted that message to the 
rest of Europe. Wild Dances ultimately had little to do with folk traditions of 
east-central Ukraine, by far the most populous area of the country (Yekelchyk, 
2010). Thus, the constructed nature of national identity in Ukraine and the 
underlying power relations behind it are revealed. In the media, Ruslana was 
held up as a symbol of Ukraine and articles appeared promoting the singer as 
an embodiment of a new, post-Orange Revolution, national identity: 
The new nation has acquired new symbols that embody its success on the 
international arena: the footballer Andriy Shevchenko, Ruslana Lyzhychko 
and boxing champions the Klitchko brothers. No matter what language they 
speak, no matter where they were born and where you work at this time, it is 
important that they feel themselves to be Ukrainian (Den, 21.09.2004).
The discourse concerning Ruslana reflects the complexities and difficulties in 
defining Ukrainianness, which is complicated further by the apparent absence 
of a strong linguistic divide that exists in other post-Soviet states. Mykola 
Kniazhyts’kyi argues that regardless of language or narratives of identity, 
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figures such as Ruslana present an opportunity for Ukrainians to build a com-
mon identity and can act as an antidote to what he calls the “national inferiority 
complex” in Ukraine (Pavlyshyn, 2006, p.482). It is interesting to note that some 
western Ukrainian purists objected to the alleged corruption and commerciali-
sation of traditional Carpathian musical styles (Fawkes, 2004). It is interesting 
to note that Ruslana’s selection as Ukrainian representative at Eurovision took 
place when Leonid Kuchma’s allegedly pro-Russian regime was still in power. 
Ruslana presented a narrative of Ukraine which was exotic and sexualised; a 
wild country in need of exploration. Ruslana’s performance arguably repre-
sented a highly competent piece of PR and one which was directly orientated 
towards a wider European market. Ruslana therefore represents the contested 
nature of encapsulating Ukrainian national identity; the narratives of identity 
which can be discerned from her Eurovision performance are questioned in the 
west of Ukraine, amongst the people who, arguably, can understand it the most. 
Ukraine twelve points
During the immediate aftermath following Ruslana’s and Ukraine’s victory 
in the 2004 Eurovision Song Contest, explicit references were made in the 
Ukrainian media regarding the impact that the event would have for Ukraine’s 
image and standing in the world. TV station One-Plus-One saw the victory as 
having possible political connotations for the country especially since European 
Union Commission President Romano Prodi had recently expressed scepticism 
about Ukraine’s chances of joining the EU. One-Plus-One’s analytical TV pro-
gramme, Epicentre, countered Prodi’s comments: 
[t]he gloom of Romano Prodi that Europe has no room for Ukraine was 
smashed last night […] Ruslana and her “Wild Dances” have proven to us and 
to the whole world that we can get what we deserve in Europe – if only in sing-
ing, for now (BBC News, 17.05.2004)
To state that winning Eurovision had smashed the notion that there is “no room 
for Ukraine” in the EU is dubious and can be put down to the initial euphoria 
during the immediate aftermath of winning the ESC, if not political oppor-
tunism. However, the opportunity to host the ESC provided a much-needed 
platform for Ukraine to be heard on its own terms, an opportunity it had not 
had since independence. Here there are strong echoes of the Estonian case study 
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where the ESC came to be used as a potent tool for image management. It was 
in this context that state broadcaster NTU set about planning the 2005 event.
“It is up to Ukraine to prove that it is a true  
European country”
Almost immediately following the announcement that Ukraine had won the 
2004 contest, doubts were raised in the Western media concerning the coun-
try’s ability to stage the event with references to a lack of infrastructure and 
substandard venues prevailing. The rhetoric which previously faced Estonia 
and Latvia previously was repeated, otherness continued to be re-inscribed. 
As such, the ESC almost served as a platform for the othering of new entrant 
states by Western media outlets, a new chauvinism towards lesser developed 
nations. Such discourses did not go unnoticed in Ukraine; tabloid newspaper, 
Segodnya highlighted the significance of hosting the event successfully. There 
are echoes from the Estonian case; the subtext being that failure to host the 
event would appear to confirm a stereotype of the country as a poor former 
Soviet republic. “It is up to Ukraine to prove that it is a true European country” 
(Segodnya, 17.05.2004). Like in the Estonian case, the event was seen as a unique 
opportunity in the context of European integration and consequently took on 
significance. “Ukraine’s leaders have a new headache – how not to miss this 
chance to gain a foothold in Europe” (BBC, 17.05.2004). In September 2004, 
it was confirmed that the venue for the 2005 contest would be the Kyiv Sports 
Palace. However, the arena was to undergo extensive renovations in order to 
bring it up to the standards required by the EBU. 
The political turmoil caused by the Orange Revolution meant that the 
preparations for the 2005 contest were seriously hindered. When the EBU’s 
then Executive Supervisor of the Eurovision Song Contest, Svante Stockselius, 
visited Kyiv for a routine meeting in February 2005 he found that the prepara-
tions were seriously behind schedule, so much so that an agreement had not 
been signed between NTU and the management of the Kyiv Sports Palace. 
Stockselius warned the Executive Producer of the show, Pavlo Grystak, that he 
would move the event to another country unless significant progress was made. 
Stockselius was taken to a meeting with Yushchenko himself, a move which 
demonstrates the seriousness in which Ukraine and Yushchenko’s government 
approached the Eurovision Song Contest. 
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Whilst I did not speak Ukrainian or Russian, I understood what he was doing; 
he assigned each member of his cabinet a specific responsibility for Eurovision. 
It was quite extraordinary (Svante Stockselius, Interview, 03.04.2008).
Stockselius gave Grystak and NTU two weeks to fulfil a list of demands and 
when he returned to Kyiv he found that all the conditions had been met. How 
close the EBU came to moving the event from Ukraine has never been pub-
licly disclosed however the response to Stockselius’ ultimatum highlights the 
urgency and significance of the event for the Orange Revolution government 
in Ukraine at the time. Whilst initial demands were met, NTU and Ukraine 
still faced a significant challenge in preparing the city for such a large-scale 
international event to take place in a matter of weeks, against the backdrop 
of simmering media discourses of chaos. In an interview with the BBC, the 
presenter of the 2005 contest, Pavlo Shylko admitted that the organisation of 
the event was proving to be a challenge:
We understand what we have to do, otherwise the prestige of the country 
which is starting to be built in Europe might go down…That’s why we’re 
working every day, 24 hours a day […] before the Olympic Games in Athens 
people said that nothing was ready […] when I went there [to Athens], every-
thing was ready and everything went well (Fawkes, 2005). 
Note the parallels between the staging of the Olympic Games in Athens in 
2004 and the ESC in Kyiv, both of which had faced negative press attention 
while being on the receiving end of othering from the West. Given that the 
Eurovision Song Contest was taking place in a country which, only months 
before, had become the focal point of the world’s attention as a result of political 
protests, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Contest that year was tinged with 
political rhetoric. The slogan for the competition in 2005 was “Awakening” 
and this, along with the selection of the band Greenjolly, who had been 
active in the political protests, as the Ukrainian Eurovision entry that year 
meant that the contest was highly politicised and as such highly contested. 
The insights of Svante Stockselius, the EBU Executive Supervisor and Juhan 
Paadam, the Executive Producer of Eurovision 2002 in Tallinn and member 
of the EBU Reference Group in 2005 are crucial to understanding the way by 
which Eurovision was used as a political platform for Yushchenko’s govern-
ment. According to Paadam, Yushchenko initially intended to make a lengthy 
political speech at the contest itself:
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President Yushchenko wanted to come to the show and have a speech for forty 
minutes. I think the EBU had a strong word and explained that it was a TV 
show. The president agreed to come and give the award [trophy to the winner] 
which is ok as it was a revolution situation, democracy won and so on. But 
they could have used any celebrity for the final, the Klitschkos were there. 
They had their president (Juhan Paadam, Interview, 02.11.2007).
Stockselius supports Paadam’s recollection of events and states that the 
Yushchenko government “tried to influence it [Eurovision] more than they 
were supposed to” (Svante Stockselius, email correspondence, 03.10.2008). 
Whilst Yushchenko’s appearance at Eurovision was a brief affair, the fact 
that he went on to the Eurovision stage at all is momentous. In the history of 
the Eurovision Song Contest such a move was unprecedented and took place 
despite the continuous reinforcement from the European Broadcasting Union 
that the contest is a non-political event. 
Orange Eurovision
In autumn 2004, Ukrainian broadcaster NTU announced that they were to 
host a national selection for the first time. The Ukrainian national final com-
prised of 15 rounds where each week five songs were presented to the audience 
and the winner put through to the grand final which was to be held in February 
2005. Ani Lorak, one of Ukraine’s most popular singers, and a vocal supporter 
of Viktor Yanukovych, was one such act to compete in the qualifying rounds. 
Controversy arose when, at the request of Deputy Prime Minister Mykola 
Tomenko, four wildcards were entered into the national selection programme. 
One of these wildcards was a pro-Yushchenko political anthem by the band 
Greenjolly. The group therefore bypassed the heats. The group’s entry went on 
to win the competition and were to represent Ukraine in the Kyiv final. Largely 
seen as a political coup, the actions were highly controversial with both public 
and competing artists alike: 
It was a political decision. It was a really hard period in Ukraine because of 
the revolution. This team, they sang a song about the party, the President, it’s 
a little bit political even, the situation. It was so political and yet the contest 
should not be about politics (Ani Lorak, Interview, 16.05.2008).
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Given the attempts by the Ukrainian government to influence the organisa-
tion of the Eurovision Song Contest it is therefore not inappropriate to assert 
that last minute changes to the Ukrainian selection for ESC 2005 were shaped 
by political manoeuvres. Whilst it should also be pointed out that the song by 
Greenjolly was popular in Ukraine at the time and did win the public telephone 
vote, there was media speculation that the result was untrustworthy. 
I thought the decision was political. They [Greenjolly] did nothing before and 
nothing after. It was purely political […] I really don’t think the people voted 
for it, I seriously doubt it […] I was at the first national channel listening and 
reporting […] I don’t know. They tried to link Ukraine and the revolution 
with Eurovision but I don’t think it was the right decision (Olena, Interview, 
13.12.2007) 
Whilst conspiracy theories abound concerning the affair, it is somewhat ironic 
that a song which encapsulated the very essence of the Orange Revolution 
and called for an end to manipulation and falsification, went on to represent 
Ukraine as a direct result of rules being adapted at the request of politicians, 
arguably a throwback to the pre-revolutionary corruption which was supposed 
to have been suppressed as a result of Yushchenko’s rise to power. Further con-
troversy ensued when the EBU rejected the song as it contravened the ban on 
political references. The mention of Yushchenko as president in the chorus of 
the song was dropped and more generic phrases were introduced in English, 
the entry then was allowed to proceed to the Eurovision finals. The actual ESC 
performance of Razom nas bahato, nas ne podolaty included direct and explicit 
references to the Orange Revolution. At the start of the performance the two 
backing dancers wore handcuffs, symbolising the stifling of democracy which 
was such a driving force for protestors in Ukraine. As the performance culmi-
nated, the handcuffs were broken. Again, the latter can be seen as a metaphor 
for Ukraine. As a result of the protests described in the song; the country is 
now free. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the performance received the largest reaction 
in the hall on the night. As with Ruslana, it appears that Ukraine was again 
represented in the international arena by specific, elite-driven narratives of 
identity. Greenjolly’s participation in the ESC therefore embodies a specific 
political narrative, that of the ruling elite, the Orange Revolution government. 
Despite the delays to the organisation of the contest, the 2005 ESC was a 
success for the National Television Company of Ukraine (NTU). At that time, 
in May 2005, the Eurovision Song Contest was the largest international event 
ever staged in Ukraine. A direct and public link to Ukraine’s position regarding 
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the EU was made by Deputy Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko at the welcome 
reception for participants and delegates, who said the contest is a serious step 
for Ukraine towards the EU membership. Hosting Eurovision also meant that 
there were significant changes to legislation in Ukraine for visitors to Ukraine 
from the EU. The visa restrictions were lifted for EU nationals from 1 May 2005 
and this is still in place today. When questioned about the “Awakening” theme 
of the show, Executive Producer Pavlo Grystak was quick to point out that this 
was not an explicit reference to the Orange Revolution per se but more of a 
statement on behalf of Ukraine in general. There were other options such as 
“Beautiful Ukraine” and “Beautiful World of Ukraine”. However, according to 
Grystak, these were deemed “more romantic, more lyrical”. He added that the 
Awakening theme “was not about politics or politicians […] it was just about 
society […] Ukraine has been awakening and it has been doing it for decades” 
(Pavlo Grystak, Interview, 12.12.2007). When questioned about government 
involvement in the contest, Grystak maintains that the government played a 
supportive role and that there was “no big interference into all this creative 
part”. Note that Grystak discusses the “creative part” of the ESC, suggest-
ing that the government may have been involved elsewhere. CFC Consulting 
representative Vasyl Myroshnychenko also said that the government was not 
heavy handed in terms of dictating content. This is in sharp contrast to the 
testimonies of both Juhan Paadam and Svante Stockselius who, as previously 
highlighted, asserted that Yushchenko was planning a political speech during 
the broadcast in 2005. The testimonies from Grystak and Myroshnychenko 
are also questionable given that Vice Prime Minister, Mykola Tomenko, was 
the head of the organising committee for ESC 2005. 
Closer reading of the broadcast content sheds further light on the way in 
which Ukrainian elites chose to present the country to an international audi-
ence. Within seconds of the broadcast going live, the logo for the event that 
year appeared immediately on-screen with the slogan “Awakening” immedi-
ately connecting the wider political context to the ESC in Ukraine. Ruslana, a 
political figure in the revolution, then appeared on stage performing another 
Hutsul-inspired song, “Heart of Fire”. The hosts Pavlo Shylko and Maria 
Efrosinina then made their appearance on stage and welcomed the audience in 
the now customary English and French. It is noteworthy that the presenters also 
spoke in Ukrainian rather than Russian, this coupled with the particular spell-
ing of the host city, Kyiv, the Ukrainian version rather than the Russophone 
Kiev, shows that ESC 2005 reflected and reinforced an ethnic Ukrainian nar-
rative of national identity.
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A cursory glance of the scenes depicted in the postcard images shown 
between each national performance suggests that this was an event in which 
the eastern urban regions of Ukraine were not the point of focus, a reflection 
of the new geopolitical orientation of the Yushchenko government in moving 
away from the Soviet past. Many of the images depicted non-descript rural 
regions whilst others focussed on Kyiv and in particular western Carpathian 
traditions. The significance of Eurovision itself was routinely f lagged; the 
preparations of the host city were shown regularly along with scenes of the 
semi-final which had been held two days prior to the event. Many of the scenes 
were disjointed and seemingly incoherent; shots of ballet were intermingled 
with fishing, weddings and shipping. The ambiguity of the scenes depicted are 
a metaphor for Ukrainian national identity itself; difficult to encapsulate in a 
limited narrative. The clips shown directly before the Ukrainian entry were 
scenes from the Orange Revolution, featuring protesters, tents and banners 
bearing Yushchenko’s name as well as shots of the president’s inauguration. 
It was undoubtedly a political message depicted through Eurovision, again, 
despite the insistence from the EBU that the contest is not political. 
The politicised messages of the contest continued into the voting pro-
cedure when a short video clip was shown, a clear reference to the agenda 
of the Ukrainian government. The video opened with shots of Kyiv and the 
Ukrainian flag before covering various scenes from the official welcome recep-
tion held the previous week. Towards the end, a billboard was shown with 
various goodwill messages written. The heading read “Leave your wishes for 
the Ukrainian people here”. A highly symbolic shot of the Ukrainian flag next 
to the flag of the EU was then shown. Immediately after this, a shot from inside 
the arena was shown; Yushchenko and Tymoshenko sitting in the audience. At 
the end of the voting procedure Yushchenko appeared on stage alongside the 
emergent winner, Greece’s Elena Paparizou. The president was given a standing 
ovation by the audience whilst he gave “a special prize symbolising friend-
ship and unity between European countries”, according to the presenter Pavlo 
Shylko. The closing shots of the 2005 Eurovision Song Contest were therefore 
of the Klitchko brothers, Ruslana and Yushchenko himself, reminiscent of the 
scenes from the Orange Revolution only months before.
Concluding remarks
Ukrainian national identity is presented as a unified entity through its repre-
sentation in, and hosting of, the ESC, despite the fact that Ukraine is a country 
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divided by history, language, economics, and as the latest wave of protests show, 
politics. The ESC was of tremendous significance to Ukrainian politicians in 
the wake of the specific geopolitical context of the Orange Revolution, as exem-
plified by Yushchenko’s personal involvement in the organisation of the event. 
The Eurovision Song Contest represented a unique opportunity for Ukraine 
to control the image of the country for the first time since independence. The 
narratives concerning Ukraine’s self-representation through hosting the ESC 
reveals that the organisers actively aimed to dispel stereotypes about the coun-
try; “there were a lot of stereotypes about Ukraine in Western Europe […] stray 
dogs running downtown in Kyiv […] contamination from Chernobyl […] there 
is more to Ukraine than sports stars and Chernobyl” (Vasyl Myroshnychenko, 
Interview, 05.12.2007). The reference here to stereotypes reveals that not only 
was the image of the country paramount, and intrinsically linked to the ESC 
in 2005, but also that Chernobyl lingers on in the popular psyche. The choice 
of phrase “there is more to Ukraine than sports stars and Chernobyl” is par-
ticularly interesting in that it represents a desire by Ukrainian image makers 
to move towards a more contemporary international image. However, it is 
also perplexing given the positive news stories associated with many sports. 
As Barry Smart writes:
Sports are universal signifiers, they “travel across borders”, rise above differ-
ences of politics, culture and religion, and promote a positive feeling of shared 
experience and a sense of common meaning […] iconic globally popular 
sporting figures increasingly accord a cosmopolitan character to production 
and consumption in every country […] as modern sport has become global 
in scope it has largely lost its playful character and its professional practice 
has become both a global and media spectacle and a serious and financially 
significant business (Giulianotti, 2008, p. 24).
According to a recent analysis of Western media coverage of Ukraine, “the 
country is mostly associated Orange Revolution, political instability, the 
Chernobyl nuclear disaster and contentious relations with Russia. Positive 
coverage of Ukraine was mostly confined to news reports about Ukrainian 
sportsmen, in particular the Klitschko Brothers (Katchanovski, 2009, p. 8). 
Given the importance attached to the ESC by the ruling elite in Ukraine at the 
time, I argue that it remains significant given that it was also a positive news 
story and represented a change in the way the country was represented in the 
international media. The 2005 ESC was arguably the most politicised up to 
that time (a label which has now been usurped by the controversy concerning 
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the 2012 contest staged in Baku, Azerbaijan) and the attempt by Yushchenko 
to make a speech at the event demonstrates this. Perhaps more crucially, the 
fact that the visa entry requirements were changed in Ukraine specifically to 
ease the hosting of Eurovision is highly significant and at the time of writing, 
these visa regulations are still in place today; a lasting legacy of the Eurovision 
Song Contest in 2005. 
National identity and nation building in Finland  
through the ESC
Eric Hobsbawm once stated that Finland is one of the few countries to have 
“adequately democratic political institutions that have functioned without a 
break” (cited in Jakobson 1998, p. 3), yet Finland after the Cold War, emerged 
relatively unknown on the world stage. According to former British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan, Finland is a country “much admired, often pit-
ied but never envied” in that the country was respected for initially fighting 
the Red Army, later ostracised for continuing the fight and then castigated by 
Western powers for refusing to trust Stalin (Jakobson, 1998, p. 3). During and 
since the end of the Cold War, Finland has proactively attempted to manage 
its image on the world stage, yet like Estonia, it has continued to challenge its 
peripheral status and labels of otherness imposed from outside the country. 
Finland’s emergence as an independent state and indeed its continued exist-
ence as an independent state were arguably down to skilful nation building 
practices. The Finnish independence movement shows, not for the first time in 
history, that the result of a conflict between a larger, more powerful, neighbour 
with wider geopolitical interests and a small nation state relatively unknown 
on the world stage is not a foregone conclusion.
During the Cold War the Finnish government kept to a strict policy of 
neutrality and one of self-censorship, or “Finlandisation”, whereby Finnish 
authorities curtailed criticism of the Soviet Union in order to remain inde-
pendent as a nation state (Browning, 2003, p. 116). In short, Finland kept its 
mouth shut to avoid the mighty wrath of the Soviets. Paradoxically, whilst on 
the surface, Finland was borderline isolationist, at an official level efforts were 
many to manage Finland’s international image with the development of “inter-
national communication” by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These efforts to 
promote Finland through print and other media as well as through informal 
networks abroad can be seen as an early attempt at public diplomacy or even 
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nation branding. According to Louis Clerc, these activities were also one of 
the stages on which internal debates about Finland’s national identity were 
played (Clerc, 2013). These national networks attempted to manage Finland’s 
image for political, cultural and “national” reasons in order to spread “true” 
notions about Finland as a nation, an economy, a culture and as a worthy 
international actor. Following World War II, Finland engaged in a difficult 
but ultimately successful balancing act of remaining on good terms with the 
Soviet Union whilst making Finnish neutrality, and Finland more generally, 
credible to Western Europe.
Estonia and Finland have faced some similar challenges since independ-
ence in that both were seen as peripheral others, and that both have successfully 
moved towards mainstream geopolitics of Europe. According to Jakobson, 
Finnish entry into the European Union in 1995 ended half a century of ambi-
guity and represented confirmation that Finland was a Western European 
country. Whilst in the Estonian context, there was arguably more urgency with 
the process of returning to Europe, thus showing parallels with the Finnish 
case. The EU was presented as protecting and enhancing national identity 
and security. Rather than a return to Europe, the accession process in Finland 
was presented as “coming home”, belonging to a Western club, and dispel-
ling “Easternness”. D. Smith (2003, p. 59) argues that Finland was by far the 
most enthusiastic Nordic state when it came to joining the EU, a reflection 
of the repudiation of otherness which the country had previously experi-
enced. Finnish history before the end of the Cold War had been dominated by 
antagonists, EU accession therefore offered the country further stability in an 
ever-changing Europe (Browning, 2003, p. 103). 
“The nation needed a state in order to be heard”
Historian Christopher Browning argues that Finnish history before the end of 
the Cold War was dominated by the prioritisation of the state over the nation. 
In short, the people served the country to ensure both government sovereignty 
and territorial sovereignty amidst the continued threat of infringement from 
outside, namely by the Soviet Union. Jakobson (1998) asserts that Finns have 
been seen as nationalist people in the past, prioritising the state above all 
else. However, he also highlights a paradox in the way identity debates are 
articulated. Nationalism today is often seen as a dirty word evoking images 
of extremism and even genocide. Yet the nationalism which was lauded as 
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setting the Baltic states free from Soviet rule, for example, is often forgotten. 
The Baltic Chain of 1989 in which over two million people joined hands across 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in a peaceful protest again Soviet rule was argu-
ably underpinned by nationalist discourse. In a Finnish context, the label of 
nationalism can be seen as another manifestation of otherness. 
The international image of Finland has continued to be a point of debate 
and even consternation for the Finnish government. Whilst the telecommu-
nications company Nokia has arguably helped to put Finland on the map, 
the country remains relatively unknown on the world stage (Anholt, 2007). 
According to Anholt, if Nokia were to articulate its Finnish roots more to 
the wider world, then Finland’s international image would be given a boost. 
Anholt argues that the company does not do this since Nokia is a stronger 
brand than Finland and closer associations may lead to a dilution of the brand 
as a whole. Whilst much of this is hypothetical it does highlight the difficulties 
in promoting lesser known states on the world stage. In 2008, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs set up a committee to produce a nation branding strategy for 
Finland. As discussed in chapter two, branding strategies are often developed 
as a response to otherness, this was true in the Estonian context and the same 
is true in the Finnish case. An analysis of nation branding enables us to see 
how foreign policy is not only about interacting with predetermined actors but 
about communicating values and identity to the wider world and to the nation 
itself. Browning (2011) argues that the formation of a Finnish branding com-
mittee is also linked with ontological security; the security of being and also 
an attempt at collectivising national identity and self-certainty in a changing 
world. In a similar vain Steele (2008, p. 58) states:
While physical security is (obviously) important to states, ontological security 
is more important because its fulfilment affirms a state’s self-identity (i.e. it 
affirms not only its physical existence but primarily how a state sees itself and 
secondarily how it wants to be seen by others). Nation states seek ontological 
security because they want to maintain consistent self-concepts, and the ‘Self ’ 
of states is constituted and maintained through a narrative which gives life to 
routinised foreign policy actions. 
In chapter two, I argued that nation branding can be seen as a form of national-
ism in that it promotes the nation state as a primordial framework for identity. 
Nationalism is driven by the desire of the political and national community 
to justify itself and legitimise and enhance its standing. Lehti and Smith 
(2003) argue that larger powers legitimise their actions whereas smaller states 
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legitimise their very existence in the first place. Nation branding is therefore a 
reflection of this. In the Finnish context, for a country which historically can 
be seen as being subordinated, excluded and marginalised; nation branding 
offers the opportunity to manage its image and be heard on the world stage. 
In November 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its brand-
ing report in which it provided an overview of previous work carried out on 
Finland’s image from a historical perspective as well as a conclusion that “a 
coherent image of Finland, let alone a brand, does not exist” (Moilanen & 
Rainisto, 2008). The report stated that the impression of Finland is that of 
a cold and sparsely populated country in the north inhabited by a quiet and 
peaceful nation and that whilst there is a weak image of Finland, among the 
international community, the impression is generally positive (Mission for 
Finland, 2010, p. 263). Parallels can be seen here with the report commissioned 
by Enterprise Estonia which highlighted the current state of the Estonian image 
on the world stage. As both reports highlight, measuring image is a fraught 
process and one which is ultimately unreliable. However, the fact that both 
countries have not only attempted to do this but have actively targeted resources 
towards nation branding initiatives is a reflection of elite-level repudiation of 
otherness as well as a manifestation of a wider consternation about how the 
country is perceived on the world stage. The report included some humorous 
or even bizarre recommendations, one of which made reference to “emphasis-
ing Finnish honesty through physical nudity” (Mission for Finland, 2010, p. 
359). A low national self-esteem is also detailed, which will be discussed later 
in relation to the Eurovision Song Contest. Thus, nation branding provides an 
insight into wider identity constructions within the nation state. 
The Finnish branding strategy report concluded that Finland should carve 
a niche for itself as a problem solver. The notion of being the “best” as described 
in the report, according to Browning, resonates with Cold War narratives of 
Nordic exceptionalism, the notion that the Nordics were historical exemplars of 
modernity with much to teach the world (Browning 2007, p 28). Interestingly, 
the report makes explicit reference to the Finnish public and recommends 
that any strategy should be developed in consultation with the nation. This is 
markedly different from the Estonian approach which appeared to have been 
imposed from above by an external organisation, as described in chapter two. 
The call to Finns to help build the nation brand and take collective action on 
developing the country’s image in the desired direction is also conducive to 
nation building. Browning argues that the patriotic call to become involved in 
the branding process has parallels with Finlandisation in that those who failed 
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to comply with official policy were subject to legal action. Whilst this is obvi-
ously not the case with nation branding, which does not have any legal force 
underpinning it, the call to the public does imply that failure to engage would 
be deemed unpatriotic and seen to be undermining the national project. Here 
the subtext is that Finns who fail to engage in the nation branding process are 
ultimately failing to fully meet the demands of their citizenship. Such rhetoric 
opens the door to further discussions concerning the constitution of “patriotic 
behaviour”. Again, I argue that this suggests that nation branding practices are 
not as innocuous as they might seem.
Identity of shame: Finland at the Eurovision Song Contest
As highlighted earlier, discourses of low national self-esteem are prevalent 
when the image of Finland is discussed in the literature. Mari Pajala argues 
that these narratives have also been reflected in discussions concerning the 
Eurovision Song Contest. As discussed in chapter three, the ESC is an event 
ultimately linked with national prestige. Pajala argues that whilst the ESC is not 
concerned with history per se, an analysis of the debates that the event engen-
ders provides a wealth of historical discourse (Pajala, 2011, p. 406). Finnish 
national broadcaster YLE first entered the ESC in 1961. Until its victory in 
2006, Finland was one of the least successful competing nations in the ESC 
finishing in last place eight times (nine as of 2009) and never reaching the top 
five. According to Pajala’s media analysis, this lack of success led to a so-called 
“national trauma” in which failure were linked to identity and feelings of shame 
amongst the wider public. Pajala argues that early media discussions concern-
ing Finnish ESC entries were concerned with the representation of nationhood 
with nationality being the dominant theme. Arguably such rhetoric has par-
allels with the historical context of Finland as a small country, dominated by 
its neighbours. The ESC therefore acts as a platform for wider discussions 
concerning nationhood more generally. Pajala argues that nationality has been 
the central frame for making sense of the ESC in Finland, the narrative of dis-
appointment being a reflection of Finland’s peripheral geopolitical position. 
Moreover, Finland’s participation in both the ESC and the Eastern European 
equivalent, the Intervision Song Contest, is a reflection of Finland’s peripheral 
status and its dual-vector policy towards the Soviet Union and Western Europe. 
Pajala argues that by the 1990s readings of the ESC changed from consternation 
engendered by failure to a form of quasi pride in that the country was the “most 
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successful loser”. It is also interesting to note that this paradigm shift took place 
as the contest was expanding to incorporate newly sovereign nations from the 
former Eastern bloc and former Yugoslavia. Parallels with UK discussions con-
cerning alleged neighbourly voting by new entrant countries, discourses of a 
“savage East” can be seen in the Finnish case. Thus, Finland’s lack of success in 
the contest was confirmation of the country’s Western credentials. As discussed 
in the Estonian case study (chapters four and five), having experienced other-
ness, debates in competing countries serve to other newer entrant states, this 
is true in the Finnish context too. Interestingly absent from the Finnish media 
debates is the fact that Finland was actually more successful in the Eastern-
backed Intervision Song Contest than it was with the ESC. 
Finlande Douze Points 
Finland won the 2006 Eurovision Song Contest held in Athens by a landslide. 
The group Lordi with the song “Hard Rock Hallelujah”, received 292 points, 44 
points more than second-placed Russia. After first appearing in Eurovision in 
1961, Finland had scored its first ever victory. The media reaction in Finland 
was one of euphoria with the ESC remaining front-page news weeks after the 
contest and national broadcaster YLE promptly arranged a televised homecom-
ing party for the victors. Jokes circulated on the internet that “hell has frozen 
over since Finland has won the Eurovision Song Contest”. The implication 
being that the impossible had just happened, Finland had won the ESC. Like 
with the Estonian ESC victory in 2001, the 2006 result engendered a sense of 
national pride and provided an opportunity for the commemoration of Finnish 
nationhood. To quote one Finnish respondent, “I had never seen anything like 
it before or since, it was bigger than when we won the ice hockey, and that was 
big!” (Mayu, Interview, 02.04.2012). Lordi’s victory represented a turning point 
in ESC history not only because it marked Finland’s first breakthrough in the 
contest but also because it was a totally new genre, hard rock, to succeed at the 
ESC. The reaction to the victory in Finland exemplifies the capacity that the 
ESC has to engender national pride and evoke a sense of imagined community 
to use Benedict Anderson’s term. YLE then set about planning the 2007 ESC, 
the first ever to be staged in Finland. 
By 2007, the Eurovision Song Contest had grown considerably and as high-
lighted in chapter three, the technical challenges were ever-increasing since 
national broadcasters not only had to produce a live final but also a televised 
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semi-final (two as of 2008). Logistics aside, the ESC was becoming ever more 
expensive. Again as with the Estonian case study, there are parallels in that 
in the immediate planning phase questions were raised in the Finnish media 
concerning the image that the country would present to Europe through host-
ing the ESC (Fricker & Gluhovic 2013, p. 96). Thus, the issue of Finland’s image 
remains pertinent in a post-Cold War context. Like Estonia, debates concern-
ing image have manifested through the ESC itself. Again, as with the Estonian 
case study, the financing of the event was linked with national prestige, as Kjell 
Ekholm, Head of Delegation in 2006 explains:
“When Finland won [in 2006] I was the head of our delegation. During the 
encore I was standing there thinking ‘Oh no’. I knew what was in front of me 
because I had been involved in the reference group for four years. I knew all the 
problems all the broadcasters had […] I started working on it immediately; for 
one year, from June 2006 until July 2007 I was working more or less day and 
night on that project. As a public broadcaster with no sponsorship department, 
doing this show was like somebody throwing us into the lion’s cage […] On 
the Monday after winning our managing director said publically ‘YLE can’t 
arrange this on our own. We have some knowledge and equipment and so on, 
but the government has to come in with €15 million or it will go to Tallinn or 
Stockholm’. It look one hour and the prime minister said ‘No, no, no! Not to 
Sweden! We will give the money to YLE” (Fricker & Gluhovic, 2013, p. 103). 
As with the Estonian case study there are parallels in that the government there 
stepped in to guarantee funding for the event as happened in Finland. Failure 
to stage the ESC would inevitably have been damaging to the international 
image of Finland, especially given that less affluent post-Soviet nations had 
staged the event successfully in the preceding years. The reference to Sweden 
cited in the quote above is telling, whilst it is obviously jovial, it reveals more 
about how Finnish nationhood is constructed and again is a reflection of the 
historical context of otherness and post-colonialism. In short, it would have 
been an embarrassment to ask the big brother, Sweden, to host the ESC in the 
event that Finland was incapable of doing so. As is so often the case, hosting 
the ESC is intrinsically linked with national pride and indeed nationalism 
itself. The nature of the debates in Finland also demonstrates how important 
the ESC is as a platform for promoting a constructed image of the nation to a 
wider audience. 
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Finland’s True Fantasy: ESC 2007
In chapter five I argued that Estonian Television used the Eurovision Song 
Contest in 2002 to essentialise the country’s Nordic credentials, YLE’s 2007 
production can be viewed in the same vein. The slogan for the 2007 con-
test was “Pure Fantasy” and sought to promote the uniqueness of Finland 
or “Finnishness” as described by the organisers (YLE 2007, p. 4). The stage 
design was also a representation of Finnish identity since it was in the shape 
of the kantele, a traditional Finnish string instrument. The postcard images 
screened between the songs encapsulated the essence of this slogan as well as 
promoting the Nordic identity of Finland. Skiing, snowy landscapes, ice and 
water featured regularly. Moreover other postcards depicted aspects of every-
day life in Finland but with a twist, promoting the uniqueness of Finland. For 
example, bog football was presented, of which world championships are held 
in Finland, prompting UK commentator Terry Wogan to state on-air “they’re 
a different people, I can tell you” (BBC TV, 2007). Technology also featured 
prominently, Nokia mobile telephones being heavily promoted in several of the 
scenes. The sauna was rather unsurprisingly included in the postcard selection 
however, those filmed were clothed. This is an interesting point to note since 
saunas in Finland are places where nudity is the norm. Whilst television regula-
tion means that producers had to be careful about the images included in the 
broadcast, the self-censorship can be seen as a manifestation of Finlandisation 
as well as a clear sign that these images were produced with the wider European 
audience in mind, where nudity is not necessarily the norm in public saunas. 
The postcard images offered Finland an opportunity to promote its own 
image on its own terms. The choice of having Santa Claus on-stage to open 
the voting was deliberate, with the hosts making reference to the fact that the 
character is Finnish. The crisp on-screen graphics reflected Nordic design and 
provided an insight into how Finns view themselves. In terms of a wider debate 
the ESC in 2007 led to a positive media debate concerning the images which 
were chosen to promote Finland throughout the broadcast: 
“During that year, many commercial channels in Finland, who are together 
with the newspapers, started saying things like: ‘YLE can’t arrange this. It’s 
going to be a disaster and all of Europe will laugh at us’. That was another 
kind of pressure on us. All the time there were questions about what kind of 
image we will give to Europe, with the postcards and so on. It was a really hard 
thing but we believed in what we were doing, and we stuck to all the decisions 
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we made. After the semi-final – it was just one semi-final in 2007 – every-
thing started changing. Everyone in Finland said: ‘Wow! This is great. This is 
the right picture we want Europeans to have about Finland” (Kjell Ekholm, 
Interview, cited in Fricker & Gluhovic 2013, p. 96).
The testimony above demonstrates that, like Estonia, Finnish television execu-
tives carefully considered what image of Finland they would project through 
Eurovision as a medium. Moreover, the apparent consternation about whether 
the image would damage Finland’s standing reflects wider identity insecurities 
and is arguably related to the peripheral geopolitics of Finland more generally. 
One of the postcards broadcast during the show depicted a large ship breaking 
ice in the Arctic Circle; in essence, this can be seen as a metaphor for Finland 
and the ESC. The ESC offered Finland an opportunity to break the ice with 
Europe and tell its story, on its own terms. 
Concluding comments
The Finnish discourses on nation branding and the ESC reflect the peripheral 
geopolitics of Finland. The Finnish case study also demonstrates that the return 
to Europe rhetoric was not just confined to post-socialist states. Finland’s entry 
into the Council of Europe and the European Union had a symbolic and pow-
erful meaning, confirming the country as Western and no longer peripheral 
(Jakobson, 1998, p. 156). Moreover, if language is what makes a nation, then 
having Finnish formally listed as an official language of the EU arguably pro-
vided a boost to the self-esteem of Finns. The debates that the ESC provoked 
in Finland also reveal that image and image building were important to both 
the authorities, media and public alike and the ESC provided an opportunity 
for the country to speak to the continent. However, as highlighted in chapter 
one, otherness does not disappear overnight, national identity is not about to be 
replaced by a common European identity (D. Smith 2003, p. 56). The success-
ful re-orientation of Finland from a Baltic state to a Nordic one demonstrates 
that image is just as powerful a tool as geopolitics and even physical geography. 
Meanings, identities and otherness are constantly changing and evolving, the 
Finnish example is certainly proof of that. 
Conclusion
This book aimed to offer a new perspective on the relationship between the 
nation and state and the political management of international image in a post-
Soviet, post-Cold War context through an examination of the Eurovision Song 
Contest and nation branding. The case studies cited in this work exemplify the 
importance attached to image by the political community with the nation state. 
By investigating issues of national identity and nationalist politics through the 
medium of popular culture, with particular reference to the ESC and the role 
that the event has played in terms of image building and nation branding, the 
more salient aspects of identity debates have been presented. For Estonia as well 
as for Ukraine and Finland, the Eurovision Song Contest offered an opportu-
nity to present a certain narrative of identity to a wider audience. However, as 
I have argued in this work, this process is an inherently fraught one. In order 
to articulate what a nation is, states have also communicated what they are not, 
engendering fierce identity debates.
There are unintended consequences of both nation branding and nation 
building. The development of Brand Estonia reflected, and was part of, the 
wider return to Europe discourse propagated by the political elite in Estonia 
in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. I argue that nation 
branding in Estonia was a form of soft nationalism in that it was a deliberate 
attempt to convey a certain narrative of the nation to a wider audience, hold-
ing the titular nationality as the primordial framework for identity. The call to 
Finns to participate in the nation branding process, as discussed in chapter six, 
can be seen as conducive to nation building; creating that shared (imagined) 
community. However, this further sets the agenda for otherness and serves as 
a potential opportunity to label those who do not follow the agenda as disloyal 
to the state, which can have serious and tragic consequences. Nation brand-
ing can essentially be seen as forward-looking in the sense that projects are 
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developed with a view to attracting inward economic investment and present-
ing positive images of the country. The process involves a long-term leap of 
faith in believing that the investment in image will be repaid further down 
the line. Nation building on the other hand can be seen as something which 
is retrospective in that it relies on elements from the past in order to build a 
form of social solidarity or community cohesion. However, because nation 
branding is future-orientated, it does not mean that nationalism, a concept 
which nation builders draw upon, is dead. Aronczyk (2013) argues that nation 
branding is little more than an updated form of nationalism for the 21st century. 
Nation branding is therefore evidence that we do not live in a post-nationalist 
world as some scholars such as Heller (2011) suggest. Recent debates within the 
UK on an EU referendum and, indeed, the Scottish independence referendum 
exemplify this. In the Estonian case, nation branding and nation building were 
linked to the other; by saying who we are not, we are confirming who we are; 
“We are not Russian, we are Estonian”. By engaging in nation branding, state 
actors firmly erect boundaries against the other. In promoting a country’s so-
called European credentials, a barrier is effectively constructed against those 
who fail to meet these ideals. 
The Eurovision Song Contest has been used by different countries as a 
platform for the expression of Europeanness and, in the case of newly-sover-
eign states, a tool for both nation building and nation branding. The ESC has 
routinely reflected the wider political context of Europe. It has also been used 
as a tool for both countering and reinforcing otherness. The case of Turkey is 
a strong example, an EU outsider and one which used the ESC as a platform 
for demonstrating its European sameness as discussed in chapter three. The 
apparent irony towards the ESC by participating countries can also be seen as 
othering; a shared view of Eurovision as a joke is thus confirmation of a nation’s 
(Western) European credentials. The case studies cited in this book represent 
a historical account of key identity debates at a specific moment in time. For 
the main case analysed here, Estonia, this is particularly true as the ESC was a 
manifestation of the wider return to Europe discourse. The ESC offers a form 
of approval but also a chance for each host country to say something to the 
world, on its own terms. The case studies cited in this book all demonstrate 
that host nations of the ESC have, to varying degrees, an ontological anxiety 
and share concerns about what the world thinks about them. 
In this sense, Bolin’s comparison of the Eurovision Song Contest as a 
modern day equivalent of the 19th century World’s Fairs can be confirmed. 
Eurovision can be seen as an event which is routinely embedded in the life 
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of the nation, an annual European ritual which is collectively consumed. By 
examining the debates that the ESC engenders, the more salient narratives of 
the nation can be considered at a specific moment in time. 
Image remains an important political issue for nation states. The case 
studies in this book demonstrate the complexity involved with encapsulating 
national identity and branding this for an external audience. Significance has 
been attached to the ESC in Estonia, Ukraine and Finland (as well as other 
states) in that it has allowed them to confirm their European credentials. 
Paradoxically the accession of new entrant countries has provoked fierce debates 
about European identity more generally and mirrors wider debates concerning 
EU expansion. In the cases of Estonia and Finland in particular, later failures to 
succeed in the contest were presented in the mainstream media as confirmation 
of belonging to Western Europe. Over the past two decades, since the contest 
has expanded, negative portrayals about tribal voting and alleged Eastern domi-
nation of the contest have persisted amongst competing countries. The politics 
of the other is very much alive in Europe today. Despite this, the ESC remains 
a powerful symbolic tool. Analysis of the images host countries choose to use 
provides an insight into a sense of self. 
Whilst the ESC has been criticised for its lack of musical and cultural rel-
evance, it is still an event which attracts upwards of 100 million viewers and as 
the 2012 winner from Sweden, Loreen, proved, it still generates international 
hits. It is also an event in which participating countries continue to invest. In 
2010, Estonia’s participation in Eurovision was paid for by Enterprise Estonia 
after ETV announced that they were withdrawing in the light of the global eco-
nomic crisis. Enterprise Estonia cited that the ESC was an important platform 
for continuing to promote Estonia. Despite otherness and cynicism, the ESC 
remains an event which authorities continue to buy into. In Ukraine, a visa-free 
regime was introduced for EU citizens in the run-up to the contest in 2005. 
To date, this policy remains in place, a lasting legacy of the Eurovision Song 
Contest. One quote from Riina Kionka, the former Estonian Ambassador to 
Germany, offers a fitting closing remark for this book. As highlighted earlier, 
whilst otherness is evident in the debates surrounding the ESC, winning and 
staging Eurovision are serious opportunities for putting a country on the map: 
Estonia was the first new country to win and host it [Eurovision], it was a sharp 
contrast. We measured at one point, our year end analysis of the press and ques-
tions that year […] at least a third of the press attention during that entire year 
was press for Eurovision […] They [international media] started writing about 
us right from the win all the way up to hosting. It was huge. Up to that point 
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coverage had always been on the minority or difficulties in the relationship 
with Russia […] it was not necessarily good news stories and Eurovision really 
turned that around […] Everybody understood that it was important and the 
foreign ministry understood it to be important [hosting ESC] It is easy to for-
get now, years later, but these were real decisions at the time (Riina Kionka, 
Interview, 11.08.2008). 
Meanings are never fixed; social reality is constructed and ever changing. The 
continued success of the Eurovision Song Contest, celebrating its 60th edition 
in 2015 is quite remarkable given that a wider European identity remains a 
vague construction still in the process of formation. The questions of what 
constitutes Europe and what holds it together remain as pertinent today as they 
were following World War II. The global economic crisis has further aroused 
discussions concerning development and notions of Europeanness. Fricker 
and Gluhovic (2013) argue that the Eurovision Song Contest has become a 
stage on which the changing realities of Europe are being played out. I go 
further to state that the ESC today, as a competition, sanctions a playful form 
of quasi-xenophobia in that whilst the contest seeks to present Europe as a 
united entity, it actually represents an idealised form of the EU, a notional space 
without borders. Despite media narratives depicting the ESC as an Eastern 
European stitch-up, in reality Western Europe controls the contest and recent 
changes in the voting procedure following pressure from Western European 
broadcasters and the creation of the so-called Big Five exemplify this. The 
slogan for the 2013 contest held in Sweden was “We are one”. The financial 
crisis has demonstrated that Europe is not one, economically, politically or 
even socially. Yet the Eurovision Song Contest as a television format contin-
ues to endure. Eurovision exhibits these wider socio-political tensions year 
in, year out and will continue to do so. As such it represents a unique form of 
public diplomacy, in theory, allowing countries to pass judgement without the 
threat of repercussion. Although, as discussed in chapter three, the disputes 
concerning Azerbaijan and Armenia, to name just one example, demonstrate 
that Eurovision is in fact a form of living nationalism. This analysis of the 
ESC, as well as nation branding and its relationship to and influence on, nation 
building more generally, has highlighted some of the more salient narratives 
of identity politics in Europe today. In an ever-changing Europe, meanings 
and identities are shifting rapidly. This book is offered as a preliminary step to 
understanding and encapsulating some of these key debates in specific contexts 
and at specific moments in time. 
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This book provides a unique and intriguing insight into current 
debates concerning the relationship between nation and state 
as well as the political management of international image in 
today’s Europe through an examination of debates on nation 
branding and the Eurovision Song Contest. Europe is a con-
tested construct and its boundaries are subject to redefinition. 
This work aims to advance critical thinking about contempo-
rary nation branding and its relationship to, and influence on, 
nation building. In particular it focusses on key identity debates 
that the Eurovision Song Contest engendered in Estonia in 
the run-up to EU accession. The Eurovision Song Contest is 
an event which is often dismissed as musically and culturally 
inferior. However, this work demonstrates that it has the capac-
ity to shed light on key identity debates and illuminate wider 
socio-political issues. Using a series of in-depth interviews with 
political elites, media professionals and opinion leaders, this 
book is a valuable contribution to the growing field of research 
on nation branding and the Eurovision Song Contest.
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